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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of political and business interests upon the 
news content of the contemporary Russian media. The main period of focus is 
on the era of the Second Republic ( 1991 - ), with an in-depth analysis from 
1996 - 2000. I make a brief description of the Soviet era media with the 
intention of trying to draw any influences which may have carried through into, 
and influence the present day Russian media. 
Russia's situation is unique, this has come about through a set of 
circumstances over a long period of tradition and history. Russian society 
displays a blending of old and new ideas. To try and explain the contemporary 
situation the thesis grapples with issues such as corruption, politics and 
business. By shedding light on these issues, actions and choices made by the 
participants become more comphrensable. 
The later chapters of the thesis attempt to identify specific pressures on the 
media. Media assets have become valued property in contemporary Russia. I 
endeavour to illuminate any patterns established by those who seek to control 
the media. Suggestions for the motivations which drive politicians and 
businessmen to aspire to control the media are advanced, to explain why the 
media industry is vigorously contested, as the industry itself is very 
unprofitable. 
The content of chapter VII seeks to find explanations for the vulnerability of 
independent media to financial takeover or influence ( from political and 
business organisations). Among the topics to be covered are events such as 
the economic crises and an inability of some mass media organisations to 
make the transition from communism to democracy. 
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0.0 Chapter Objectives 
The objectives of this first chapter are to lay the theoretical and historical framework for 
this thesis. By dealing with these two aspects, I intend to make the current trends 
occurring in Russian society to be a part of an overall process and not an isolated 
incident or series of incidents. 
Firstly, I shall give a brief explanation of the theories which will be utilised. There are 
several theories which are to be used, the reason for this is the inability to apply one 
theory to the Russian situation. Russia has a unique circumstance, which has been 
strongly. influenced by the past. An indication of the importance attached to the 
relevance of the past to the present has been seen in the study of history ( at 
educational institutions). History's perceived importance in shaping Russia's future is a 
topic in itself, at this point I will only mention the concept. 
The initial theories which I study give the focus for the thesis. I have chosen the 
theories of Critical Enlightenment and Semiotics ( Self and Other ) to analyse the 
material that has been collected. The theories on how media organisations function, 
mainly reflecting how media operate in a 'Western' setting form the basis of other 
models in the thesis. 
By profiling the business magnates who own a large portion of the privately owned 
mass media, a picture on similarities of personalities and agendas may emerge. The 
three personalities I have chosen are the most influential in Russian politics and 
business. By making clear issues such as ownership of the media entities, the 
dimensions of the emerging political conflict becomes more transparent to the reader. 
For a large part of the 20th Century ( 1917 - 1991 ) the Russian media has been forced 
to follow Soviet doctrine. Media of the present day Russian Federation have been 
shaped to some extent, by this past. It is my intention to briefly investigate the Soviet 
media in order to discover what influences have carried through into the present day 
situation. 
0.1 Introduction 
The modern media is an influencer and shaper of public opinion. Media organisations 
are also subjected to influence from business and governmental organisations, who 
realise the potential power of harnessing this influence. Events which are now shaping 
the Russian media are indicative of the wider trends of society, and are rooted in 
Russia's past. A centralised conformity is being sought and imposed by the Kremlin. The 
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result being media organisations getting ensnared in the drive to centralise political 
power. 
Over the past decade there has been a struggle to gain power over the media in 
Russia. The conflict over ownership has intensified since Vladimir Putin's election as the 
President of the Russian Federation in March 2000. A harder stance has been taken by 
the government against media who wish to retain editorial freedom and print what they 
wish. New laws are being enacted, these will enhance the government's position as the 
Gatekeeper 1 in the flow of information and news. 
For the above reasons, a focus on what is currently occurring in the Russian media is 
essential for understanding the current economic and political climate. Although the main 
conflict revolves around the TV channels ( because it is considered to be the most 
influential news medium), other forms of media should not be neglected. 
Scholars have produced some recent works regarding various parts of the Russian 
media's world. Ellen Mickiewicz has written an extensive book on Russian television 
(Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia), Laura Belin's 
work on the recent Russian elections ( found on the Radio Free Europe I Radio Liberty 
website, www.rferl.com ), Ivan Zassoursky's work on power play in the Russian media 
( Mass Media of the Second Republic, Media and Politics in Russia in the Nineties, 
Russian Media in the Nineties: Driving Factors of Change, Actors, Strategies and the 
Results, found at WVNV.geocities.comlzassoursky) and Frank Ellis's book on the 
emergence of the internet in Russia ( From Glasnost to the Internet: Russia's New 
lnfosphere ). 
This thesis intends to make a study into the influences, political, business and historical 
on the present development of the Russian media. My main focus is on television and 
newspaper based med1a, however, I will also look briefly at radio and the internet. By 
making such a broad study of the media I intend to show that the current events in the 
Russian media are part of a 'bigger picture' and not isolated inqividual events. 
Conflict between the media and the Kremlin has intensified since the election of 
Vladimir Putin as the Russian Federation's second President. I believe that a possible 
reason for this tension is Putin's desire to resurrect a strong, centralised state. And in 
such a state, the compliance of the media is necessary to carry to the public messages 
designed to bring about this change. A type of 'synthesized reality,' to bring about these 
1 The Gatekeeper is a person or organisation which controls what information is released and which 
information is not passed on. 
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attributes into society, in much the same way that 'Socialist Realism' was designed to 
inspire the Soviet people to achieve bigger and greater feats. 
My study is limited by several factors. One of these considerations is that the study has 
the potential to cover many different aspects ( such as media ownership, suppression of 
information, official and 'unofficial' censorship and the re-emergence of a strong central 
state ideology), this thesis covers some but not all of these aspects. I am bound by 
brevity ( namely a word limit ) to keep the points which I do raise short and concise. The 
sheer distance between Russia and New Zealand offers some difficulty in accessing 
some information. Books which deal with my thesis content are difficult to find due to the 
'cutting edge' nature of the material. 
The internet has been the main source of my primary information. What I am studying is 
occurring at present which has made the internet an invaluable tool. Information has 
been drawn from a wide variety of internet sources; from websites dedicated to 
journalistic freedom of speech ( in Russia and in the West ), newsgroups ( from the 
Netherlands, USA and Russia) and media websites (Radio Liberty and Strana.ru ). 
After having conferred with several scholars who work in the field of the contemporary 
Russian media. Ellen Mickiewicz, Laura Belin, Leslie Holmes and Ivan Zassoursky, they 
have lent me their support through allowing me access to recently completed works. 
Leslie Holmes's work Anti-Corruption Campaigns gives an insight into how political 
mileage is extracted from 'uncovering' corruption. Laura Belin's articles, written for Radio 
Liberty about topics such as media ownership and the elections have been a rich source 
of information. Changing Channels, written by Ellen Mickiewicz offers a good description 
on the politics of Russian television. The articles written by Ivan Zassoursky provide a 
good understanding of the potential path of the Russian media in the future. 
I have sourced a wide variety of literature ( in book form ) covering such aspects as 
corruption, history and the Russian I Soviet media. This mainly 'historical' information is 
designed to place the contemporary material into context, to offer an understanding for 
why an event has transpired. 
The vast amount of information obtained via the internet caused me to decide against 
searching for information from Russian newspapers and magazines. 2 The availability of 
some Russian newspapers and magazines has meant that sourcing them can be 
difficult, although some of these articles are available on the internet based newsgroups. 
2 Articles from Russian newspapers and magazines are already available from the Russian based 
internet newsgroups. There is also the consideration of obtaining timely information, papers and 
magazines can be difficult to find. 
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Some information may have been left out due to the cut off point ( approximately August 
2000 ), which has been imposed due to the rapidly moving nature and massive amount 
of information available. The information already collected needs to be analysed without 
being bogged down by constantly collecting new material. 
In the first chapter I intend to lay out the theoretical framework, to give an 
understanding of the perspective(s) which will be used. These theories come from a 
variety of origins, Soviet social theories, media theories and the new critical 
enlightenment theory. 
After the theories have been made clear to the reader, an understanding of the current 
private media ownership is discussed. The three most influential owners, politically and 
economically are profiled. The intention of this section is to inform the reader of possible 
bias which may occur in newspaper and television articles further on in the thesis. 
A historical overview of the Russian media during the Soviet era. The intention is to 
identify the underlying principles and strategy of the media during the Soviet period. 
Later in the thesis, I will make a study to see if any of these influences have carried 
through into the present. 
Chapter two gives an insight into the tangled intrigue of Russian politics and the 
inseparable Russian business environment ( from the oligarch's perspective ). Alliances 
formed by politicians and businessmen influences the nature, type and perspective of 
news disseminated by media groups. The volatile nature of politics in Russia is looked at 
to determine possible explanations for the actions of some leading Russian politicians 
and the oligarchs. 
Corruption has been closely linked to Russian politics and the media for some time. 
Chapter three aims to establish these links, in the past politicians have used the 
corruption platform ( through media 'exposes' of corruption ) to launch their political 
ambitions and to rid themselves of political opposition. Gbrbachev, Yeltsin and Putin 
have used this tactic with the aid of a 'friendly' media. The role of the media in this 
process is also scrutinised. 
The Second Chechen War ( chapter four) has had a profound impact on editorial 
freedom in the Russian Federation. Freedom of speech issues which are taken for 
granted in the Western world, are slowly being eroded. The government has developed 
the 'defence of the state' catch phrase as a pretext for abolition of media's freedom of 
speech. The Kremlin's attempts to control the flow of information to the public (national 
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and international) has ushered in a specific vocabulary. This 'newspeak' is designed to 
create the division between right and wrong, good and bad. 
Chapter five's subject matter, elections in the Russian Federation, has a pivotal 
influence on the media's present day form. Traditionally, media in Russia are subjected 
to greater than 'normal' restrictions during the electoral process. I intend to identify these 
pressures, and how these pressures affect the way the media is able to operate. One of 
the main factors which inhibit coverage of the elections is the law which prohibits 
non-political parties from discussing the political candidates. The collusion between the 
state and the media, especially in the 1996 and 2000 elections prevented an unbiased 
picture of events. 
Some important events are touched upon in chapter six. These events are significant 
because they have affected or altered relations between the media and the government 
(or the business interests). Consequently, this has an impact upon what is reported 
and how it is reported. Some of the mechanisms used to influence the nature of what is 
reported by the media are investigated. Some of the pressures faced by the 
contemporary Russian journalist include the threat of physical violence, the prospect of 
arbitrary search and arrest and even a return to the Soviet method of incarceration in a 
psychiatric institute. 
The commercial effects on media formation and operation are the focus of chapter 
seven. Questions such as how the media have been affected by the August 1998 crisis 
and the search for economic survival are raised and studied. Recent attempts by the 
Kremlin to obtain financial control of ORT and NTV have raised some questions and 
suspicions of the Kremlin's true agenda. Is it as the Kremlin says, for the good of the 
people? Did the owners of ORT and NTV contribute to the demise of their media 
empires? 
0.2 Principal Theories for the Thesis 
Critical Enlightenment: 
The area of critical social theory has a specific focus on "issues of power and justice 
and the ways that the economy, matters of race, class, and gender, ideologies, 
discourses, education, religion and other social institutions, and cultural dynamics 
interact to construct a social system." ( Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, P. 281 ). 
Critical theory was developed in the 1930's by three German academics. Herbert 
Marcuse, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno moved to the United States after the 
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Nazi accession to power in 1933. The theory of critical enlightenment derives from 
critical theory. 
Critical theory's role is to analyse the competing power interests between groups and 
individuals within a given society. A focus is made on identifying who gains and who 
loses in certain circumstances. An argument of criticalists stipulates that privileged 
groups sometimes have an advantage in supporting the status quo, to protect their 
advantages. 
It is therefore the goal of critical enlightenment to reveal the winners and losers of 
specific social systems by which such power plays are present. 3 I shall attempt to apply 
this theory to the complex interaction which operates between the Oligarchs, media 
organisations and the Kremlin. 
My argument is that the oligarchs ( especially Gusinsky and Berezovsky ) are the result 
of the previous power regime, as represented by the former President Yeltsin. Putin's 
election as President has brought about a partially new power regime, which has no 
place for some of the oligarchs. The incumbent power system ( the oligarchs ) are 
therefore fighting for their power and privilege, in some cases their very existence. They 
want to see the old power base maintained. 
Dualist Theory ( Self and Other): 
In the book The Semiotics of Russian Culture, Lotman and Uspenski ( 1984 ) claim that 
the dual semiotic model of binary opposition was formed in 18th Century Russia. Their 
argument revolves around the premise that there were only two outcomes in Russian 
culture, right and wrong, good or bad. There is no room for neutrality or 'grey' areas, 
everything is black or white. 
Dualism was first applied to the reforms of Peter I, which created Russia as a partly 
Easternised and partly Westernised state. This was a departure from the past, when 
Russia was considered to be an Eastern nation. 
At any one period of time, two sets of mutually opposed mechanisms within a given 
culture are said to operate at given time. One of these mechanisms has a tendency 
toward diversity and the "polyglotism" of culture. 4 
3Editors Denzin,D. K & Lincoln, Y. S., Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks, 
Sage Publications, 2000, p. 281 
4Uspenski, B. A, Ivanov, V. V., Lotman, J. M., Toporov, V. N. & Pjatigorski, A M., Theses on the Semiotic 
Study of Cultures, Tartu, Tartu University Press, 1998, p. 27. 
The other mechanism which operates concurrently, has the inclination toward 
uniformity. An attempt will be made to organising a conformist culture. 5 
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Lotman and Uspenski claim that this tendency is uniquely Russian. The bipolar 
Russian values did not hold in the 'Catholic Christian West,' which had an allowance for 
a neutral state of being. 
According to Uspenski cultures may be "oriented toward writing ( text ) or toward oral 
speech, toward the word or toward the picture[ ... ] ." 6 Russia's rich literary past 
indicates that text is of significant value to the Russian culture. Text has a history of 
carrying more meaning and being more than just a form of entertainment. A dry narrative 
of events, such as in the Western style press, is instead made in the form of political or 
moral analysis. The meaning which is transmitted is more emotionally charged. 
Russian bipolarism did not end at the end with the death of Tsar Peter I. The Soviet 
regime exploited the concept throughout their tenure in power. The use of this strategy 
did not solely apply to labeling the foreigner as the enemy. Stalin used bipolarism to rid 
himself of any possible vestiges of opposition by tarnishing people as 'enemies of the 
people.' 
The popularity of exploiting bipolarism seemingly waned during the early Yeltsin years. 
From 1996 however, the political leadership has shown themselves to be willing and 
able to exploit this tool. Recently in the Second Chechen War, a concerted effort has 
been initiated by the Kremlin to vilify the Chechen people. It is my intention to apply the 
dualistic theory to the Chechen situation. Media coverage has portrayed a struggle of 
good (the Federal Russian forces) against evil (the Chechen leadership), an evil 
which according to the Kremlin will stop at nothing to destroy the Russian state and its 
people. 
5tbid. 
6tbid., p. 28 
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CHAPTER 1: FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN RUSSIAN MEDIA 
1.0 Media Theory 
In this part I shall deal with the concepts of how the media operate, the significance of 
the media, social functions of the media, requirements for freedom of the press and 
lastly, some theories of the press will be outlined. Most of the material from this section 
has been drawn from Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (McQuail). 
1.0.1 The significance of the mass media 
According to McQuail, there are five ways in which the mass media are able to 
manipulate or form public opinion: 
(1) Power Resource: it is an possible medium of determining control and innovation in 
society. The mass media is the principle way in which information that is vital to the 
viability of most social institutions is disseminated and received. 
(2) Location (or Arena): this is where many aspects of public life, at a national and an 
international level are played out. 
(3) Media as a Source: the media provide a major source of definitions and images of 
social reality. As a source, this is the place where the construction of societies and 
groups culture and values occur. And where these concepts are stored and expressed. 
(4) Fame: the means of attaining publicity and effective performance in the public arena 
by, in this instance, politicians. 
(5) Normal: this is the measure by which society deems what is normal and that which 
is abnormal. It is a benchmark that the public uses to make judgments based on that 
society's current value system of normality. 
1.0.2 Social functions of the media 
Functionalist theory: social practices and institutions are explained in terms 
of individual and societal needs. When applied to the media these needs 
include such things as: order, integration, guidance, motivation, adoption, 
socialisation and continuity. Society is perceived as a working system of 
linked subsystems, of which the media is one of the subsystems. The 
media is portrayed as self-directing and self-correcting. (McQuail, 1994) 
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According to Functionalist theory, the media specify certain social functions. In this 
role the media may reinforce existing values and beliefs or may act to change 
incumbent values and beliefs. There are five aspects of social function; information, 
correlation, continuity, entertainment and mobilisation. 
(1) Information: in the constantly changing world in which we live, the media are the 
providers of information about what is happening at a local level and news concerning 
the larger international community. Through the information provided by the media, 
indications regarding relations of power are put forward. 
(2) Correlation: this is where opinions are formed. By commenting on events through 
explanation and interpretation the process of consensus building begins to take place. 
Through the way in which the news is presented orders of priority are set and the 
relative status of the news is given. 
(3) Continuity: through the nature of the events covered the media may either express 
itself in the dominant culture, thereby maintaining a commonality of values. Or 
recognize other subcultures and new cultural developments which will help create a 
new set of values. 
(4) Entertainment: the primary function of the entertainment aspect is to provide a 
source of amusement and relaxation, resulting in a reduction in the level of social 
tension. 
(5) Mobilisation: various societal objectives may be campaigned for, issues of politics, 
the economy, environmental concern and freedom of speech. 
1.0.3 Requirements for the freedom of the press 
There are certa1n conditions and expectations to be met before the label of a 'free 
press' can be given The expectations may differ slightly from culture to culture, there 
are however some common attributes associated with a truly free press. 
The issue of censorship is pivotal to the issue of press freedom. Governmental 
controls such as licensing and censorship restrict what can and will be said. A news 
organisation should be able to publish the news and opinions that it wishes to express, 
without fear of punishment or reprisal. In addition to the publishing of the news, access 
with regard to the collection, should also be equally unimpeded. 
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Bound in the ideal of the right to communicate, the public should have free reception 
of and access to all points of view and news. 
With the advent of vast commercial empires, in which media organisations have been 
swallowed up, comes the concern over the influence on the type and nature of the 
communication of information by the owners. Socialist theorist and author, Altschul! 
stated in his second law of journalism that 'the contents of the media always reflect the 
interests of those who finance them.' 7 
1.1 Theories for the press 
Today, the Russian media fulfills the above mentioned roles. However, a tendency 
exists for the primary function to alternate over time. During the Soviet era the primary 
function of the press was to inform and inspire the people. But, during the immediate 
period after the collapse of communism the function shifted to informing and mobilising 
the reader on issues such as abuses of power and position. An economic downturn and 
the realities of the market economy saw yet another shift, this time to entertaining the 
reader ( based on a tabloid style format ) in order to boost the circulation of their 
product. At present there is a tendency to return to a Soviet style function of the media, 
but set in a 'democratic' form of government. 
There are four theories for the press. They are; Social Responsibility theory, Soviet 
theory, Authoritarian theory and Libertarian theory (McNair, 1994 ). I shall apply relevant 
material concerning the media, to the following theories; Soviet theory, Authoritarian 
theory and Libertarian theory. The reason that I have chosen the above mentioned 
theories and have excluded the Social Responsibility theory, is because I feel that these 
theories are more appropriate and applicable to the situation in Russia. There has been 
some element of these outlined theories at some point of time in Russian history. The 
elements which I refer to are with regard the functions of media in society. I am unable 
to apply the Social Responsibility theory to the Russian media during any period in 
Russia. For this reason I have excluded the Social Responsibility theory from analysis 
in this thesis. 
Soviet theory: was the predominant theory throughout Eastern Europe in the post-war 
period and in Russia from the end of 1917. Soviet theory originates from the social 
theories that were postulated by Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, and at a later date 
were refined by Vladimir Lenin. The media was assigned the position as a collective 
7McQuail, D., Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, London, Sage Publications, 1994, p. 162 
agitator, propagandist and educator in the construction and maintenance of the 
communist state. 
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Marx and Engels formulated the theory of historical materialism. This theory formed as 
the guiding basis for Soviet institutions, including the media. Their conclusion was that 
the state serves particular 'estates' or interests and not for the benefit of the wider 
community. 8 Lenin revised the ideas of Marx and Engels. 
Lenin had envisaged two roles for the media in the newly established 
communist state. An ideological role and an organisational role. The 
ideological role involved the media as an agitator and collective 
propagandist. 9 Author Ellen Mickiewicz made a clear distinction between 
agitation and propaganda. Agitation was to be directed to a mass 
audience, but limited in content. These messages had a wide applicability 
and an emotional impact upon the target audience. Propaganda is directed 
at a smaller and more politically literate individuals. The messages are 
more complicated and theoretical in nature. 10 Lenin made it clear that he 
thought of propaganda as a goal, the socialisation of the members of 
society to communist convictions[ ... ] to disseminate a particular image of 
social reality which corresponds to the values of a socialist society, and 
[ ... ]to create a particular kind of attitude towards reality amongst the 
people to whom the image is addressed. 11 
The second major function of the press was an organisational part. Duties were to be 
dictated by the necessity to collect process and disseminate information on a massive 
scale. In order to achieve this goal a large and coordinated organisation had to be 
created, for the purpose of initiating a socialist revolution in Russia. Lenin considered 
that the effectiveness of the party and the effectiveness of the media were 
inseparable. 12 
Media were organised into four administrative levels, in a pyramid style 
hierarchy; 
(i) Central All-Union publications - produced in Moscow and distributed throughout 
the country. 
(ii) Republican Media - each of the 15 republics had its own media organisation 
which was affiliated to them. 
(iii) Oblast - provincially based media. 
(iv) Rayonny- regional and city level of publication. 
8McNair, B., Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 10 
9Jbid., p.16 
10Jbid., p.17 
111bid., p.17 
12Jbid., p.18 
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Another common form of publication was the so-called 'wall newspaper' which were 
published in individual towns, villages, factories and collective farms. These were 
usually no more than a sheet of paper, and dealt with local issues. 13 
There were four founding principles given by Lenin to guide those that worked in the 
media. These principles are: 
(i) Partiinost (belonging to and expressing ideology of the CPSU) 
(ii) Obyektivnost (objectivity) 
(iii) Narodnost (linkage with the masses) 
(iv) Glasnost (openness) 
No Soviet leader from Stalin to Gorbachev ever rejected these ideals publicly. 14 
Partiinost is founded upon the premise of importing a subjective factor into social 
development. Social consciousness and the way in which this is expressed has a class 
basis. And that class interest decides the direction of the CPSU's spirit. 15 
In the social hierarchy, the media were subordinated to the communist party. Although 
the party did not favour freedom of expression, the media were expected to participate 
fully in the social and economic development of the state with an emphasis on culture 
and information. Lenin voiced his opinions on the question of freedom of the press early 
on, "newspapers must become the organs of the various party organisations, and their 
writers must by all means become members of these organisations." Further to this he 
added, that the notion of an absolutely free press was a bourgeois myth. 16 The state 
demanded that the diversity of the social structure and culture were to be reported in a 
manner that was both serious and responsible. 
Emphasis on the diversity of the press was an important issue. The media were 
expected to cater to all of the different national and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. 
An importance was placed on national self-determination within the framework of the 
socialist state. In 1918 Soviet newspapers were published in twenty languages. By 
1990, the number of languages in which the papers were published had risen to 55. 17 
It must be noted, that although an ethnic diversity was encouraged and existed, at no 
point was ideological diversity encouraged. Soviet Socialist Realism dogma demanded a 
13tbid., p. 45 
141bid., p. 18-19 
151bid., p. 19 
16tbid., p. 20 
17tbid., p 46 
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uniform ideological approach to all matters. Any deviancy from the state ideology would 
incur some kind of punishment. 
Obyektivnost is embodied in the belief that Soviet ideology had elements of the 
scientific worldview and the revolutionary dogma of a class, that was blended together 
giving a truly objective world account. "The Soviet press brings to the people a 
scientifically based knowledge of nature and society, guided by the theory of 
Marxism-Leninist (before the death of Lenin it was historical materialism) and 
developed from a methodical analysis of the appearance of reality." 18 This view is 
further reinforced by a deputy editor of the journal Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, whose 
observation was that "from the point of view of a certain system of values, which do not 
distort events but give a perceptual framework for understanding them." 19 
Soviet journalists did not attempt to deny that they gave a certain bias to the articles, 
but they did justify this action. There was the belief that there were two aspects of 
socialist propaganda. A scientific component which supports what is written. The other 
aspect is of value judgmental character, which has the potential to arrive at different 
conclusions. 20 Lenin was once quoted as saying that the factual accuracy is less 
important than "the truth of exposition, the degree to which coverage is illuminated by 
party policy, and the coverage of facts in their totality." 21 This point could be viewed as 
having some relevance to the media situation in present day Russia. 
Narodnost translates approximately to accessibility or linkage to the masses. A strong 
belief in Soviet dogma was that the masses play a decisive role in history. And that, in 
order for the press to be able to communicate to the masses, the press will be in 
alignment with the masses way of thinking. Alfyorov (a Soviet historian), on the 
subjects of partiinost and narodnost, "the principles of communist partiinost and 
narodnost are inseparable. If the principle of communist partiinost signifies the precise 
ideological and organisational orientation of press activity, then the principle of 
narodnost indicates for whom and with whose help the system of mass media 
functions." 22 
A two-way system of communication existed in the Soviet media. It was felt that the 
media should be receptive to the thoughts and ideas of the masses. In order to achieve 
this, the media were to serve as an intermediary, a link between the masses and the 
18Jbid., p. 23 
19Jbid.' p. 23 
2°Jbid., p. 22 
21Jbid., p. 24 
221bid., p. 24 
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party. This would enable a flow of ideas from below. An important method of obtaining 
these ideas were the letters to the editor. This was a very popular means of 
communication, every year the Soviet media received some 60- 70 million letters. 23 
Yet, not all letters were free from censorship. Allowing readers to write letters to the 
editor was a rhetorical gesture by the party leadership to give the impression that the 
state media exists to benefit the masses. 
The state used the media to transmit what they expected from society, by reinforcing 
or discouraging certain kinds of behaviour. In 1919 , Lenin considered the future role of 
the press. "We must set to work systematically to create a press that will not entertain 
and fool the people with political sensation and trivialities, but will submit the questions 
of everyday economic life to the people's judgment and assist in the serious study of 
these questions." 24 The press was used to publicise 'good news', which was meant 
to have a positive effect on the morale of the masses. By giving people a goal to 
emulate or better. The end goal being the creation and maintenance of a strong Soviet 
state. 
In order to make state sponsored information more readily available to the population 
a vast network of media organisations was set up. There were many specialist 
publications catering to specific sections of the Soviet community. For instance the 
paper Trud was aimed at a factory worker readership. The print media were very 
popular, by 1990 some 8000 newspapers and 1500 journals existed in the Soviet 
Union. Newspaper circulation amounted to 180 million copies, with an average of 400 
copies per 1 000 people. 25 
A possible explanation for this phenomenon was that it was virtually impossible not to 
subscribe to papers or journals. The reason for this is that schools and work places 
often imposed on people, through the trade unions and other organisations, 
subscriptions. By subscribing people were in fact purchasing a 'badge of loyalty' to the 
Soviet system. Newspapers and journals were also cheap during the Soviet period. 
McNair tackles the issue of highly inflated circulation rates in a recent work. "Where 
Soviet newspapers regularly claimed to have circulations of 20 million copies, even the 
most successful titles of the late 1990's were selling no more than 5 million copies." 26 
231bid.' p. 25 
24rbid., p. 26 
251bid., p. 47 
26Curran, J. & Park, M - J., De-Westernising Media Studies, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 83. 
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Another important means of communicating to the people was by the use of radio. At 
the time of the communist takeover, most of the Russian population was illiterate. This 
proved to be a problem, which necessitated designing propaganda which targeted 
specific groups in a manner which could be understood by the audience. Often this 
meant that a very simplistic style of propaganda was directed at the working class. 
Radio was to prove important for two main reasons. Firstly, radio could reach the 
masses easily. So long as the people had a radio they could receive information, no 
matter where they lived in the Soviet Union. The second reason was that the listening 
audience did not need to be literate to receive the message. Much work was done to 
develop radio networks throughout the country. 27 
Glasnost has to do with openness in the conduct of party affairs. There were two 
connotations, a positive and a negative (critical) aspect 
In the capacity of the positive role the media were to publicise large and significant 
events that were occurring in the Soviet economy. This was done with the intention of 
providing positive role models for the workers. 28 A historian, Alexander Sovokin 
described glasnost as "the popularisation of everything positive and good which has 
sprung up in the course of creating a new society, and of all authentic culture left behind 
by the previous generations and civilizations." 29 
In addition to publicising and encouraging positive events, negative social and 
economic cases were discouraged. This was done by using adverse publicity, and 
directing it at the transgressing party. As outlined previously, this carried out with the 
intention of maintaining the public effort in the continued development of the state. 30 
It is clear from the above analysis that the Soviet media could be partly described in 
terms of the authoritarian theory. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, the 
Post-Soviet media is authoritarian in many respects. 
Authoritarian theory: the political rulers will meter censorship and punishment to those 
who dare to breech their rules and guidelines. The most likely conditions present for this 
theory to occur is under conditions of military rule, dictatorial regimes or in democratic 
societies in a state of extreme emergency. The theory's principles might state the 
prevalent desire under conditions such as a nation at war or in response to terrorism. 
27McNair, B., op. cit., p. 48 
281bid., p. 29 
291bid., p. 29 
30Jbid.' p. 29 
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When applied, the main aim of this theory is to protect the existing social order and its 
members. To these ends, clear and narrow limits on media freedom are set. 
During perestroika, there was a relaxation on the restrictions imposed on the media by 
the state. This 'thaw' period continued (for the privately owned media) during the earlier 
years of Yeltsin's rule. When Putin was elected as the second Russian President, he 
began to slowly implement restrictions on the media. Putin's pressure on the media has 
steadily increased, perhaps signaling a return to the situation where the media is 
subordinate to the state. 
Journalists working in the contemporary Russian media face the threat of two 'forces' 
trying to restrict their freedom. The new Russian business class has taken over media 
outlets. As pointed out by Altshull, the media's editorial independence "becomes 
subordinated to the business interests of their new proprietors." 31 
Another group aiming at 'moderating' press content is the parliament. McNair gives an 
account of how the parliament has retreated into a more conservative mindset. "The 
conservative - controlled parliament advanced a succession of pro-censorship bills 
aimed at restricting the ability of the press to act as a genuine 'fourth estate'[ ... ]." 32 
Some of the 'causes' used by this group to bring media under tighter government control 
are moral degeneration and press irresponsibility. 
The authoritarian theory fits closely the situation faced by the Russian media today. 
The Second Chechen War has given the state the pretext to enact or threaten to enact 
parts of emergency powers. Russian media have been issued an ultimatum regarding 
the nature of what they print and broadcast. The government have backed their threats 
with the use of such measures as: not giving the media access to information which 
they are seeking. ustng the tax police to intimidate those that do not follow the 
governments w1shes and threatening to enact repressive laws. Conflict in the Chechen 
War was the pretext for the Kremlin's 'defence of the state from the threat of Chechen 
terrorism.' This subJect Will be discussed further in Chapter IV. 
Libertarian ideal : The ideal rests upon the underlying assumption that the press should 
be 'a free market place of ideas,' a place in which the best ideas will receive recognition 
and the poorest would fail. As such, the fundamentals of individual rights to freedom of 
speech, opinion, assembly and religion are paramount. To extend on this concept 
further, a free press is seen as an essential and integral part of a free society. 
3lcurran & Park, op. cit., p. 84. 
321bid., p. 84-85. 
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With regard to content of an autonomous press, it is the view that the truth will emerge 
from the presentation of alternative opinions. This enlightened approach believes that 
the free flow of ideas will help to create a better, more progressive society and is strictly 
against any interference with a free press. 
With the collapse of communism, and before the firm establishment of the new order, 
there was a period of uncertainty throughout society. During this period there were few 
laws which constrained the media. The media found themselves to be free, in the sense 
that there were not any rigidly enforced guidelines that dictated everything that they did. 
In a traditional Libertarian ideal setting, the press operates in a liberal democracy. 
Although Russia was not a liberal democracy at this time, the state was too weak and 
not established enough to take on the free press in a struggle over censorship issues. 
This gave the media an opportunity to print just about anything. 
By the late 1980's some of the more progressive publications included Argumenty i 
Fakty, Ogoniok and Moskovskie Novosti. These papers and journals grappled with some 
of the issues of the day, something unheard of during the long years of Soviet 
censorship. 
The attempted coup of August 1991 divided the media into two camps. Pro-reformists 
supported Gorbachev and the pluralisation of society. The anti-reformists supported the 
coup plotters and a return to a more hard-line form of communism. After the failure of 
the coup and the collapse of communism, repercussions of media support were felt. 
Media which supported the coup plotters were discredited and went into decline, such as 
the paper Pravda. Reformist media were held up as 'cultural heroes' and were able to 
continue (for example Izvestia). 33 
Some organisations looked to the West for inspiration. Nezavisimaya Gazeta modeled 
itself closely on the British newspaper of the same name, The Independent. 34 There 
were a great many points of view expressed by truly free and independent news 
organisations. Events in the Russian media during the early 1990's closely followed the 
libertarian model of the press. 
During the period immediately following the failure of the August 1991 coup, the press 
experienced a kind of euphoria. They believed the press had the potential in becoming 
an effective 'Fourth Estate,' and could at least exert some influence on the future 
direction of Russia's reform process. 
331bid., p. 83. 
341bid., p. 83. 
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Newspapers such as Segodnya, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Moskovsky Komsomolets 
rank among the new 'liberal' press ( differentiating them from the press in the late Soviet 
era). An increase in independent newspapers, coupled with pressure from the new 
owners for a more profitable enterprise has seen some decline in serious issues in 
favour of a more tabloid style layout. 
1.2 Political Communication 
Brian McNair, in his book An Introduction to Political Communication uses the 
definitions of Denton and Woodward ( 1990 ) extensively in describing political 
communication. The issues surrounding what defines a political communication are 
complex and broad, as are the issues of politics in Russia. The press is often used by 
its owner to express their interests. Politics and business are closely tied, at times 
seemingly inseparable from each other. Media barons vie for positions of influence and 
favour by attacking each other and their political foes through the newspapers and 
television channels. I shall discuss some specific examples in chapters 2.5 
( Berezovsky's Challenge ), 3.6 ( The Russian Privatisation Process) and 6.12 
(Purpose Built Media). 
Denton and Woodward define political communication as the; 
public discussion about the allocation of public resources (revenues), 
official authority ( who is given the power to make legal, legislative and 
executive decisions), and official sanctions (what the state rewards and 
punishes). [ ... ]the crucial factor that makes a communication 'political' is 
not the source of a message, but its intent and purpose. 35 
By this definition, political communication does not necessarily originate from the 
government or politicians. What makes a message 'political communication,' is that the 
message is designed to have an impact upon the political thought process. As such, a 
further definition needs to be made, to define groups that make purposeful 
communications about politics. 
According to McNair, there are three groups that constitute those that perform 
purposeful political communication. 
(A) Politicians and political actors: every type of communication by these groups, 
that is done with the aim of realising a particular goal. 
35McNair, B., An Introduction to Political Communication, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 3 - 4. 
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(B) Non-politicians: communications that are directed at the first group by interest 
groups such as voters or newspaper columnists. 
(C) The media: media analysis of politics ( and of the politicians, as defined in the 
first group ) that takes the form of news reports and editorials. 36 
McNair explains three parts to political 'reality.' The reality is determined by who the 
observer is, of the three groups that have been defined above. 
(A) Objective political reality: this category is made up of political events as and 
when they occur. 
(B) Subjective political reality: how politicians and citizens interpret political 
events. 
(C) Constructed political reality: this is how political events are covered and 
reported by the media. 37 
Russian business interests lobby the politicians for both power and wealth. The most 
powerful lobby groups are made up by the Russian business elite, the so-called 
oligarchs. These oligarchs are a wide and varied group of business and political 
interests. Some will make use of the existing politicians to achieve th~ir aims, others will 
become the politicians making the decisions ( such as Berezovsky ). Part of the financial 
interests held by the more powerful oligarchs ( as outlined in the section relating to 
media ownership ) are media groups, which are used to disseminate the owners point 
of view to the public and to the politicians. 
By controlling the media, the oligarchs are to an extent able to influence the 
constructed reality. The control over constructed political reality in turn, has an influence 
on subjective political reality. This is because of the oligarchs through their media 
holdings, limit the content and focus of news. The public will form opinions on what they 
are able to view, read or listen to. Recent events ( the Kremlin's crackdown on the 
media ) signal the government's realisation of the importance of controlling the flow of 
information ( and consequently the interpretation of the information which is supplied ). 
36Jbid. p. 4 
37Jbid. p. 12 
20 
1.3 Media Baron Profiles 
In this section I shall look at the most influential personalities in the present day 
Russian media and their immediate past. Most of these businessmen come under an 
organisation referred to as the Oligarchy. The background of this organisation reveals 
why the modern media is taking the current course of development. 
The so called Oligarchy was founded in the ashes of the privatisation of state 
industries during the process of dissolving the apparatus of the defunct communist 
state. By using connections, left over from the old Soviet system, these men were able 
to acquire vast wealth in a very short period. 
The following profiles are of the oligarchs, who own large interests in the mass media. 
It is not the complete list of those who are referred to as the oligarchs. 
1.3.1 Vladimir Gusinsky 
Was born in 1952. He was educated at the Gubkin Institute of Petrochemicals and 
Natural Gas. Gusinsky began as a theatrical producer in the provinces. In the 
mid-1980's he started co-operatives that sold office supplies. In 1988 after Gorbachev 
had authorized co-operatives, lnfeks, a legal and business consulting co-operative was 
founded. Through various contracts obtained by lnfeks, Gusinsky was able to found 
Most Bank in 1989. Most Bank was used to finance Gusinky's operations, growing very 
wealthy due to various lucrative government contracts, such as the handling of Moscow 
city's finances. During this period Gusinsky developed a close relationship with Yuri 
Luzhkov (the current mayor of Moscow), who was at this time vice mayor in charge of 
construction. Through this special relationship Gusinsky was able to 
extend his influence. By 1994 Most Bank had become one of Russia's largest banks. 
Gusinsky has considerable media holdings under the umbrella of the Most Group, 
which has made Gusinsky one of Russia's most influential media barons. At one point 
Liberals had held up the media groupings controlled by Most Group as being the most 
objective and independent in Moscow. However, this reputation has been ruined by an 
association with Most Banks political activities. 38 
The media organisations in which Most Group maintains an interest include: NTV 
television company, radio Ekho Moskvy, Seven Days publishing house, Segodnya daily, 
3811.4 Media and the Government, Media in the CIS, European Institute for the Media, 1999. 
www.internews.ru/books/media1999/56.html, 3 January, 2000. 
ltogiweekly, Smena daily, Novaya Gazeta, Obshchaya Gazeta, Seven Days 
entertainment magazine and Karavan entertainment magazine. 39 
1.3.2 Boris Berezovsky 
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Was born in 1946. He started as a mathematician and an expert on decision theory in 
an institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He began his business career in 1989 
as the general Director of Logovaz, the first capitalist car dealership in Russia. He made 
his initial fortune buying Lad a cars manufactured by A vtovaz at a discount price and then 
reselling the cars at a much higher price. By 1994, his financial empire encompassed 
banking, oil and media assets. Berezovky's appointment as the Deputy Security Council 
Secretary in 1996 raised some controversy. He had made promises to withdraw from 
business activities on assuming this governmental role. However, this was not believed 
and culminated in his dismissal from office in November 1997. 
Forbes Magazine referred to Berezovsky as the head of the Russian Mafia in 1996 
and went on to claim that this is how he is able to expand his 'legitimate' business 
empire. Forbes stated that during the auction of Sibneft Oil, Berezovsky and Smolensky 
had intrigued behind the scenes to exclude their rival Oneksimbank. Berezovsky has 
repeatedly denied these claims and is in the process of suing over the allegations. He is 
an active member and initiator of gatherings in the Oligarchy. 
Media organisations in which Berezovsky I Logovaz hold an interest include: ORT TV, 
TV-6, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Novye lzvestya daily, Ogonyok weekly and Matador 
entertainment magazine. 40 Two of Berezovsky's business allies include Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky of Menatep Group and Aleksandr Smolensky of SBS-Agro. Through this 
arrangement further influence is exerted on the following: Stolitsa magazine, 
Kommersant (weekly and daily), Dengi business journal, Domovoi entertainment 
magazine, Avtopilot entertainment magazine, Literatumaya Gazeta and a stake in 
Independent Media. 41 Khodorkovsky reputedly told the Central European Economic 
Review in 1996, that "to develop a major corporation you need the support of the 
government." 42 
39http://home 1 .swipnet. se/-w-1 0652/robber/gusinsky. html 
40(1)Boris Berezovsky, Cars and Aeroflot, Media and Political Baron, swipnet, 2000. 
http://home.swipnet.se/-w-1 0652/robber/berez.html, 18 March, 2000. 
(2)Special Report, Russian Financial Empires: LogoVAZ, RFE/RL, January 1998. 
www.rierl.org/nca/special/rufinance/logovaz.html, 4 March, 2000. 
41 www. rierl. org/nca/special/rufinance/sbs-agro. html, 
www.rierl.org/nca/special/rufinance/menatep.html 
42(1)Special Report, Russian Financial Empires: Menatep, RFE!RL, January 1998. 
www.rierl.org/nca/speciallrufinance/menatep.html, 4 March, 2000. 
(2)Special Report, Russian Financial Empires: SBS-Agro, RFEIRL, January 1998. 
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1.3.3 Vladimir Potanin 
Was born in 1961. Potanin attended the Moscow Institute for International Relations 
and after graduation went to work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through the 
connections that were developed in Foreign Affairs, Potanin managed to gain a 
US$10,000 loan from Vneshekonombank (the foreign trade bank) to start up MFK and 
Oneximbank in 1993. Potanin served as First Deputy Prime Minister from August 1996 
until March 1997, resigning after receiving criticism that he was not able to keep his 
governmental and business affairs separate. Oneximbank has obtained and maintained 
many government accounts. These accounts include; 1993 paying agent for Finance 
Ministry bonds and servicing bank for Moscow's external economic activities, 1994 
depository and paying agent for Treasury obligations, 1995 authorized bank of the 
federal agency which handles bankrupt enterprises. The bank also had seven Foreign 
Ministry accounts worth approximately US$150 million in foreign currency. From 1995 
until 1997 the bank managed Customs Service accounts. Political patronage has 
enabled Oneximbank to rise to a very powerful position in a short period. 
Forbes has named Potanin as the most wealthy Russian and one of the worlds top ten 
smart businessmen in 1998. The magazine estimated his net worth to be US$1.6 billion. 
Now head of the country's largest industrial group, lnterros Group, some twenty former 
state owned companies are included. lnterros is made up of many branches that are 
involved in import/export, heavy industry, banking and media. 
Potanin through his company lnterros, also controls several media organisations which 
include; Russky Telegraf daily, lzvestya daily, Komsomo/skaya Pravda daily, Ekspert 
weekly, Prime news agency and radio Evropa Plus. 43 
1.4 Mass Media During Soviet Times 
There was, and still is some debate as to the exact role played by the media during 
the Soviet era in Russia. In spite of disagreement about aspects of the media, there 
was some agreement as to the role and direction as guided by the communist hierarchy. 
The literary media was very popular in the Soviet Union's highly educated society. In a 
1967 survey of newspaper and magazine sales in the Moscow and Leningrad regions it 
was found that 1500 copies were sold for every 1000 people. In the rural areas this 
www.rferl.org/nca/special/rufinance/sbs-agro.html, 4 March, 2000. 
43(1)Special Report, Russian Financial Empires: Oneximbank, RFEIRL, January 1998. 
www.rferl.org/nca/special/rufinance/oneximbank.html, 4 March, 2000. 
(2) Vladimir Potanin, Import/Export, Heavy Industry, Media and Banking, Swipnet, 2000. 
http://home1.swipnet.se/-w-10652/robber/potanin.html, 4 March, 2000. 
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declined to 820 copies for every 1000 people. 44 Freedom of speech from a Western 
point-of-view was restricted. Initially, there was no strongly felt attitude toward restricting 
the freedom of the press, but the events of July 1917 changed the attitudes of the 
Bolshevik leadership. Conditions were attached as a condition for the right to publish. 
Gradually, the Bolsheviks consolidated and expanded their control of the media. This 
was done by enacting a series of repressive laws. 
Karl Marx, when talking on the subject of the role of the press in society, "the first 
condition of freedom of the press is that it is not a business activity." 45 From the time of 
Lenin's earliest writing, a role was being defined for a new breed of media with a clear 
set of objectives. Ellen Mickiewicz, the Director of the De Witt Wallace Center for 
Communications and Journalism at Duke University ( Durham, USA ) narrowed the role 
of the press as follows, "the most important function of the Soviet Press is the 
socialization or education of its citizens. [ ... ] to point out roles and models for imitation 
or avoidance." 46 
In the role as disseminator of information from the state and that of an institution of 
socialization there were strict guidelines to be followed. This process was explained in 
Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, "how knowledge was disseminated 
and portrayed was vital for the survival of communism, stifling alternative concepts or 
critiques of the existing order."47 In order for the authorities to maintain a facade, on 
which their 'ideal' society was built a list of taboo subjects was created. Discussion or 
reporting of these topics was strictly forbidden. An American journalist claimed to have 
seen at least part of this list which included crime, drugs, accidents, natural disasters, 
occupational inJuries. official organs of censorship, security intelligence, schedules of 
travel for the polft1cal leadership, income and purchasing power structure at home and 
abroad, arms sales abroad, crime and morale problems in the armed forces, hostile 
actions agamst Sov1et atizens abroad, special payment and education of athletes. 48 
The Soviet authont1es were relatively open about censorship issues, Nozhin states 
that "there is no such thing as neutral information today. All information has an 
ideological character. and can be the object of class struggle." 49 The media were seen 
as a means to Win the Ideological struggle that was taking place between communism 
and capitalism. For this reason, the media held a pivotal role. A Soviet source in 
44Mickiewicz, E., Media and the Russian Public, New York, Praeger Publishing, 1981, p. 54 
45Editor Gardner, C., Media, Politics and Culture: A Socialist View, London, Macmillan Press, 1979, 
p. 119 
46Mickiewicz ( 1981 }, op. cit., p. 53 
4Jt:.ditor O'Neil, P. H., Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, London, Frank Cass & Co 
. Ltd., 1997, p. 1 
48Mickiewicz ( 1981 }, op. cit., p. 54 
49McNair ( 1991 ), op. cit., p. 20 
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Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media (McNair) backs this claim by saying that the 
"mass media under socialism not only express public opinion, they are the most 
important means of its formation." 50 
The spark that ignited the imposition of censorship started with the Kerensky 
government reintroducing censorship, which was aimed at silencing Pravda, on July 12, 
1917. Soon after the Bolshevik takeover after the October Revolution, a decree was 
issued and published in Pravda on the 1Oth of November, 1917. This decree strictly 
forbade any press organisation which openly opposed or was insubordinate toward the 
new Soviet authority. This was initially done as a temporary measure. 51 Shortly after 
this a Revolutionary Tribunal for the Press was established on December 18,1917. The 
Tribunal was to be the watchdog, with the task "to suppress the provocative activities of 
the bourgeois newspapers." The result was that some 3200 publications ceased to exist 
within one year of this decree being enacted. 52 
Lenin justified his act of censorship in the First Congress of the Third International in 
1921. 
This freedom (of the press) is a deception while the best printing presses 
and the biggest stocks of paper are appropriated by the capitalist, and 
while the capitalist rule over the press remains[ ... ] In capitalist usage, 
freedom of the press means freedom of the rich to bribe the press, 
freedom to use their wealth to shape and fabricate so-called public 
opinion. 53 
Another law which was designed to eliminate the non-party press was enacted on 
November 21, 1917. The law gave the state a monopoly on advertising. This had the 
effect of cutting the privately owned media from their main source of income. 54 
With this amount of importance attached to the potential power of the media, the state 
wanted to keep a strict control on the flow of information in the Soviet Union. A debate 
developed among the Bolshevik hierarchy on press freedoms, and some of the 
Bolsheviks argued that if the public was presented with a number of conflicting views, 
they would realise the 'correctness' of the Bolshevik position. 55 The position taken by 
these moderate Bolsheviks closely matches the Libertarian Ideal, the foundation of 
media ideology in the Western world. 
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In the first step in establishing this control, new laws were introduced. When the first 
Soviet Constitution was introduced in July 1918, private ownership of press, printing 
and broadcasting facilities was outlawed. 56 By March 1919 Russia's media was either 
operated or controlled by the Bolsheviks. 
To ensure compliance with the State's wishes a state agency, Gosizdat (State 
Publishing ) was established in May 1919. The effect of this creation was to centralise 
publishing and give the government a monopoly on all printing supplies. Gosizdat also 
had the power of the use of censorship at its disposal. 57 And with Stalin's rule, all 
non-party publications had ceased to exist by 1929. 58 Rigid conformity to Socialist 
Realism was enforced by the Stalinist era. All forms of communication were strictly 
supervised throughout the production process. Certain issues were not allowed to be 
discussed and other issues were mandatory. One third of all films produced during 
Stalin's rule were forbidden to be exhibited. 59 
1.5 Late Soviet Media 
There was a vast information network was created in the Soviet Union, by 1988 there 
were some 8000 media organisations.60 But the control of information was almost 
absolute. Expectations from their political masters demanded that certain state 
information was to be published, often at the expense of any other news or features. 
This state information was given the term ofitsioz by Soviet Journalists, and included 
such items as obituaries for deceased state and party leaders, congratulations or 
condolences to foreign governments and accounts of important official events (such as 
the draft law on co-operatives or visits by foreign dignitaries recorded verbatim). 61 
The control of information by the state is well exemplified by what happened during the 
Chemobyl accident. The disaster occurred on April 25,1986. Vremya had a small item 
on the night of the 28th of April, 1986 which only stated that something was wrong. It 
was not until May 6, 1986 that information on what had actually happened began to flow 
freely. 62 This seems to have signaled the beginning of the breakdown of the control of 
information flow. 
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During the communist era there were some 'unofficial' media outlets. There were 
broadcasts from some foreign radio stations (such as BBC and Radio Free Europe I 
Radio Liberty) and the so called samizdat publications (underground press). The 
samizdat had existed in the Soviet Union since the 1960's. However, the publications 
had a small circulation, were generally hand typed and the readership was restricted to 
religious and political dissidents. 63 
At the state's disposal were four methods to control the media. The Party had the right 
to grant ( or decline ) licences. Due to the communist structure of the economy, the 
media organisations relied on the state for finance. The state as controller of all 
property, was responsible for the granting of access to media facilities. 64 The Party 
also had a monopoly in dictating policy to the media in such areas as training, 
censorship ( the official censorship agency was Glavlit ( Chief Administration for the 
Affairs of Literature and Publishing Houses). Senior media personnel also checked 
what to be published in the papers and as a means of ensuring a continued political 
reliability of media workers by the state. The Politburo and the Central Committee 
Secretariat were tasked with the responsibility to select senior workers. For instance, the 
chairman of TASS was selected in this manner. Senior workers were also co-opted into 
leading Party committees. 65 
By the mid to late 1980's a change began to occur in Soviet politics, which was to 
flow on effect to how the media operated. The new leadership under the rule of 
Gorbachev, began the reforms of perestroika and glasnost. The original aims of these 
policies was to revitalise a stagnant Soviet society, but to remain within the existing 
political system. 
Gorbachev urged and encouraged a return to glasnost, the type of glasnost that was 
created by Lenin. The critical aspect of glasnost was meant to strengthen the state by 
pointing out and discussing any weaknesses, had been suppressed since the rise to 
power of Stalin.66 
Part of this 'new' process involved going into the past. A sort of reclamation of Soviet 
history. Those previously persona non grata in Soviet culture (such as Bukharin and 
Trotsky ) were rehabilitated. And the excesses of the Stalinist regime was brought out 
into the open for the public to witness. 67 
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A gradual breakdown of Socialist Realism, as portrayed by the state began to occur 
with the advent of new technologies in the 1980's. New technologies such as faxes and 
videos began an "information contamination." 68 The ideological hegemony of the state 
was being broken down. The large and cumbersome state censorship apparatus was 
ill-prepared to cope with these new inventions, which had the capacity to quickly 
disseminate information. 
The event which ended the Communist Party's absolute control over what news was 
told to the public, occurred on the 6th of May, 1986. Deputy Prime Minister Sherbina 
gave a full account of the disaster at Chemobyl in a news conference. After this 
monumentous disclosure, disaster news became a more common item in the Soviet 
news. 69 Reports on previously taboo subjects started to become common, such as 
reports on crime ( including crime statistics ). The media was given access to 
unclassified material. This was a vast amount of material, so lists were created and 
these lists were distributed to the media. 7° 
Gorbachev knew that resisting change would be a very difficult proposition. Instead, he 
wanted to adapt the media to a PR effort aimed at reasserting a version of domestic 
socialist values and a change in Russia's image abroad. 71 The new term given to this 
program was socialist pluralism, a term which was to emphasize the state's acceptance 
or tolerance of new ideas. 72 
To consolidate and to ensure the continuation of these gains in freedom for the media, 
a new law was brought into force. The Law on the Press came into being on July 12, 
1990. This law guaranteed individual citizens and their organisations ( i.e. the media ) 
broad rights to access and disseminate information. Authorities had their obligations, in 
relation to these rights laid out. Legal and administrative sanctions were revealed, 
should the law be broken.73 The media did not need permission to print everything. 
There was still a list of unapproved topics, these include printing of; state secrets, 
inciting unrest, pornography, inciting criminal acts, exclusivity (based on religion, race 
etc.) and intolerance. Banned topics such as these were considered to be an "abuse of 
press freedom," if they were published. The result was some kind of legal or 
administrative sanction. 74 
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An important point to note at this stage is the new press freedoms did not extend to 
television. Gorbachev's administration regarded television as being too important to be 
left to its own devices. 75 The Communist Party felt that television was a lot more 
powerful and effective medium to transmit messages to the public. 76 
There were several objectives to the Law on the Press. It was designed with the 
intention of regularising relations between the media and; 
(i) The Party and the state machine 
(ii) Founding organisations, to which the media are affiliated 
(iii) Journalists who work for the media organisations 
(iv) Soviet society collectively 
(v) The international communications system. 77 
1.5 Chapter Findings 
The current owners of the private media organisations in the Russian Federation, have 
similar backgrounds. They ( Berezovsky, Gusinsky and Potanin ) worked in the 
apparatus of the old Soviet bureaucracy, where they gained a network of contacts. 
These governmental contact networks enabled them to acquire wealth and assets. 
Each of the oligarchs, described in chapter 1. 7 has a large industrial and financial 
empire. In order for them to protect their interests and lobby the government for further 
influence and property, the oligarchs developed a need to acquire media assets. 
Under the Soviet regime, the role of the media included informing and inspiring Soviet 
citizens into desired mode(s) of conduct. The communist party realised the potential 
value of the media, they developed radio and television networks to cater for the state's 
'educational' requirements. The media were subordinate to the state. Various themes 
and subjects could be classified as taboo or mandatory. 
As the newly established Bolshevik regime slowly consolidated its power, press 
freedoms were curtailed. State monopolies on the materials needed in the printing 
process were instituted. A state monopoly on advertising severed privately owned media 
from their main source of income. The powerful state organ Gosizdat emerged, which 
was charged with the responsibility of overseeing media operations. 
75curran & Park, op. cit., p. 83. 
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Lenin introduced censorship after a debate in 1919. During this debate some 
Bolsheviks argued that the public would conclude that the Bolshevik argument was best, 
after sorting through a variety of opinions. This argument appears to be similar to the 
Libertarian ideal, the Western media's ideology. 
By the time of Stalin's reign, the strict application of Socialist Realism was enforced. 
Lenin's original guiding principles were to give direction to the media, no communist 
leader ever renounced these principles. 
Literacy was actively encouraged in the Soviet Union. The effect of this was to nourish 
the popularity of reading and an interest in literature. Polls conducted on the level of 
newspaper and magazine usage, showed high consumption levels. These figures are 
somewhat offset by the artificial manipulation of usage, by making subscription a 
requirement of membership for instance. 
Gorbachev's media reforms, embodied in the 1990 media law granted the Soviet media 
editorial freedom and made it illegal to interfere with news content. Censorship in the 
Soviet Union had began to disintegrate as early as 1986, when a public announcement 
on the Chernobyl incident was televised. 78 Media reforms carried out under Perestroika 
were to form the basis of the early post-communist media. 
78 This broke the rule of forbidding the dissemination of bad news, which was thought of as being 
detrimental for morale by the communist leadership. 
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CHAPTER II: BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON THE MEDIA 
2.0 Chapter Objectives 
In 1987, well-known human rights activist Andrei Sakharov said "a state is bound to be 
more dangerous if it is not governed openly by the people, but secretly by political forces 
that are not widely known or understood." 79 Russian politics has had a turbulent history, 
the main period of focus in this chapter is on the last decade of political activity. 
An aim of this part of the thesis is to try to draw links between the business community 
( as represented by the oligarchs ) and the Russian government. One of the points 
which will be pondered: 'Is there any clear distinction/separation between politics and 
business?' 
Particular attention is to be paid to Putin's rise to the Presidency, and the implication(s) 
of this in the wider business and political community in the Russian Federation. Some 
measure of tension has been generated by Vladimir Putin's election platforms, especially 
the pledge to distance all oligarchs from power. I shall examine some of these 
repercussions, as the oligarchs own a large share of privately owned media in Russia. 
2.1 Russian Politics 
The modern Russian state began with the gradual breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Russia has only known two presidents since the collapse of communist power, 
President Yeltsin ruled seemingly single handedly for nine years. The Yeltsin years 
have been marked by political instability and economic crisis. There have been 
numerous changes of governmental posts, parliament has been suspended and 
presidential powers have been greatly strengthened. Putin's election as the next 
President have brought a new series of changes in the administration and handling of 
power structures m Russia . His promise of renewing a strong central authority have 
brought some controversy concerning the methods used to bring this goal to fruition. 
The Russian pres1dential elections of June 1991 saw the communist party monopoly 
broken and the first free elections in some seventy years. Six candidates contested 
these elections (including Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Zhironovsky ). Democracy was 
however interrupted by the communist coup of August 1991. 
79Keane, J., The Media and Democracy, Cambridge ( MA ), Blackwell, 1991, p. 127 
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The resolution of the August 1991 coup did not see an end to political conflict. During 
the summer of 1992 a confrontation began between the legislative and executive 
branches of power. Yeltsin attempted to outmaneuver his opposition by scheduling a 
national vote of confidence referendum in April1993, which he won with 58.7% 
expressing their trust in the President. The result of President Yeltsin's referendum 
victory was the drawing up of a new constitution for the Russian Federation. 
Parliament's new legislative structure was to be called the Federal Assembly, which was 
divided into two parts. A Federation Council was formed, also known as the upper 
house. The lower house was referred to as the State Duma. 80 
On the 21st of September, 1993 decree number 1400 was signed by Yeltsin which 
dismissed the members of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies 
and set a time for elections for the Federal Assembly. New elections were scheduled for 
December 12, 1993.81 
During the changeover from communism to democracy, the composition of the ruling 
elite has changed relatively little. Sakawa in his book writes that, "it was out of the old 
Soviet order that the new Russia was born." 82 The communist bureaucrats simply 
changed hats, from communists to democrats. They used their influence to establish 
themselves once more, as the new elite. "The new Russian elite[ ... ] with the old 
Party-State and managerial structures was greatly over-represented."83 
The dissolving of the old communist structures of power did not put an end to the 
conflict however, two weeks of political maneuvers ensued. Forces loyal to 
Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi and the Parliamentary Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov 
attempted to seize the Mayor of Moscow's office and the offices of Ostankino. On 
October 4, 1993 the rebellion was suppressed by the storming of the White House by 
government troops. 84 
The new constitution was put to referendum on December 12, 1993 along with the 
elections. Campaigning for the referendum was intense and the state-owned networks 
urged a 'yes' vote for the change, at the same time shutting out any opponents. 85 
80European Institute for the Media, 11.2 Political Background, Media in the CIS, 1999. 
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The elections was a mixed victory for the government. Although the new constitution 
was adopted, which also granted dominant executive status to the President and limited 
the direct influence of parliament, the government block did poorly at the polls. 
• Russia's Choice (pro-government) won 78 of the 450 seats. 
• The Liberal Democratic Party ( Vladimir Zhirinovsky ) won 63 seats. 
• The Agrarians won 55 seats. 
• The Communist Party won 45 seats. 86 
The parliamentary elections, although not an astounding victory for the government 
block, gave Yeltsin a lot of power and reduced the effectiveness of any opposition 
which may arisen in parliament. Yeltsin had the power to block anything that he did not 
like with his veto. 
Events of the next year saw a war break out in Chechnya and a continuing decline in 
the Russian economy. Elections were set to be held on December 17, 1995 in which a 
record of 43 political groups were set to contest the elections. 87 
State Duma elections were held on December 17, 1995, the result was a resurgent 
communist party gaining the upper hand. Poor economic and political performance saw 
government support fall sharply. 
• The Communist Party won 157 of the 450 seats. 
• Our Home is Russia ( government's party) won 55 seats. 
• The Liberal Democratic Party won 51 seats. 88 
Communist victory in the 1995 State Duma elections was a serious cause for concern 
for Yeltsin and was an indicator of what was to come in the 1996 presidential elections 
if nothing was done. The presidential elections were won by Yeltsin, the conduct of the 
election is described in detail in section 1. 6. 1 'The government I oligarch partnership.' 
The period up to and including 1999, was marked by unstable government and politics. 
Yeltsin spent a lot of time in hospital due to his ailing health. He was expected to stay in 
office until the year 2000. However, due to ill health, the strains of office and a rapidly 
deteriorating economic and political situation he resigned from office early. His chosen 
successor, Vladimir Putin took over the reigns of power. 
861bid. 
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Putin's rise to power was quick and dramatic. Yeltsin had realised that time was 
limited and he needed to ensure that a suitable heir was appointed before his 
departure. If an 'unreliable' was chosen, then it was possible that the business of 
Yeltsin and the 'Family' would come under scrutiny. Within a very short period of time, 
Putin had risen from obscurity in the ranks of the FSB ( successor to the KGB ) to 
become the Director of the FSB. The next position held by Putin was Prime Minister, 
after Yeltsin sacked the previous Prime Minister. Yeltsin's shock resignation in 
December 1999 meant that Putin became the acting President of Russia. The political 
move was a shrewd stroke, as Yeltsin's popularity was at a low and it gave time for the 
country to get accustomed to their new leader, prior to the March 2000 elections. 
The March 2000 elections were surrounded by allegations of political deals and a 
collusion between the media and the government. This was somewhat reminiscent of 
the 1996 presidential elections. Conduct of the press and the government during the 
1999 and 2000 elections is examined in chapter V of this thesis. 
2.2 The Political Struggle 
The struggle for power in the Russian Federation has been a bitter 'war' between 
business and politics, and between the oligarchs. Media outlets have been used as the 
medium which conveys various political communications to the public and to the 
Kremlin. A major source of the conflict among the oligarchs has been the process of 
privatisation, which is periodically carried out by the government. The change of 
presidential leadership has sparked further agitation between leading oligarchs, vying 
for influence over Russia's new direction. After Putin's confirmation as the country's 
new President in March 2000, he has caused some concern among the business 
community and regional leadership. Putin announced the new approach of a 
'dictatorship of law,' this signaled that he intended to create a strong central state. The 
proposed regional reforms and the announcement that all oligarchs will be kept equally 
distant from power has brought about an information war with one oligarch in particular, 
Boris Berezovsky. 
2.3 The Information War 
The redistribution of property has resulted in the business elite becoming bitterly 
divided. Such division was caused by the huge value of the assets being privatised. 
This tension and conflict spilled over into the media. Vsevolod Bogdanov, President of 
the Russian Union of Journalists said that "one can immediately see whose money is 
behind the news reported in the majority of Moscow's newspapers- just by reading the 
34 
headlines."89 A dispute over how the economic and political 'rules,' and how these 
should be applied to the government's privatisation scheme, initiated the tension. 90 
Attacks by the media were not restricted to attacking the oligarchs, but spread to 
attacking politicians as well. 
Further privatisation of state enterprises continued in August 1997. This was the 
auctioning of shares in the telecommunications giant Svyazinvest, and the mineral 
company Norilsk Nikel. Anatoly Chubais and the then First Deputy Prime Minister, Boris 
Nemtsov, were regarded as being responsible for the administration of the 
privatisation process. 91 Both Chubais and Nemtsov became the targets of intense 
lobbying by various financial interests. 
Uneximbank ( Potanin ) was granted both Svyazinvest and Norilsk Nike/ in the auctions 
by the government. 92 Responses to the outcome by the losers of the bid were fast. 
Gusinsky and Berezovsky accused Nemtsov and Chubais of rigging the auctions. 93 
Berezovsky went further and said that "if Nemtsov continues failing to listen to the 
concerns of the business community[ ... ] he risks losing its support."94 Hinting that he 
had the power to make or break Nemtsov's political future, depending on how favourably 
( or not ) Berezovsky's financial ambitions were fulfilled by Nemtsov. The thinly 
disguised threat, using Berezovsky's reputation as a major power broker in the Kremlin 
seems to have been backed up with action. Currently, both Nemtsov and Chubais are 
locked in political obscurity. 
The information war came to a head when Yeltsin summoned six of the oligarchs 
( including Potanin, Smolensky and Gusinsky, and Berezovsky was absent ) to the 
Kremlin, to obtain a pledge that they would cease fighting amongst themselves and with 
members of the government. Yeltsin made it clear to them that 'the state is above 
corporate interests.'95 Yeltsin delivered a similar message on May 26, 1998 in an 
international journalists conference in Moscow, when he accused the media magnates 
of 'censoring the news for their own purposes.' He also stated that 'accurate and 
objective reporting' was at risk because 'corporate ownership openly interfered in 
editorial policy.' 96 
89Fossato, F., Russia: Media, Money and Power- An Analysis, Radio Free Europe I Radio Liberty, 26 
September, 1997. 
www. rferl. org/nca/features/1997 /09/F. R U. 9709261152044 .html, 1 March, 2000. 
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Yeltsin's comments seem to carry a certain amount of hypocrisy though, his retention 
of power was largely due to the co-operation of the media. These issues are discussed 
further ( relating to the December 1999 and March 2000 elections ) in the second 
chapter. 
When Berezovsky was sacked from the post on the Security Council, coverage from 
the various newspapers gave a clue to the ownership of the papers and the dynamics 
of the oligarchs politics. Berezovsky was sacked in November 1997, papers that were 
owned by him wrote of Berezovsky as a parting hero and insinuated that the 
consequences of this dismissal would have negative implications for Chubais and 
Nemtsov. Two papers which wrote using this point of view were Vremya and ltogi. 
Papers that were under the lnterros group of companies control ( Potanin ), such as 
Komsomo/skaya pravda and lzvestiya, hailed Yeltsin's move as a long overdue step. 97 
Despite Yeltsin's plea for reconciliation, the oligarchs have continued to feud over the 
spoils of privatisation. A financial analyst, who wanted to remain anonymous summed 
up the situation. "Alliances including on opposite sides, all members of Russia's 
financial elite have been set up for the privatisation of different assets and they will 
remain at war until the battle is over." 98 
2.4 Putin's Rise To Power 
Electioneering by Putin prior to the presidential election of March 2000 resulted in two 
pledges. Years of uncertainty and seemingly endless manipulation by the oligarchs (of 
the political system and the economy ) made people yearn for a stronger central 
leadership. To meet these feelings Putin pledged to distance all oligarchs equally from 
power. The second pledge was Putin's plan to establish a 'dictatorship of law'. 
On July 8, 2000 Putin addressed both houses of parliament in his first state of the 
nation address. A portion of his speech contained his ideas on the defense of the state, 
and the building of a strong central state. In his address, Putin said "the only real choice 
for Russia is to be a strong country, strong and sure of itself." 99 
97Belin, L., 'How Financial Dependence Slants News Coverage,' Politicisation and self-censorship in the 
Russian media, Radio Liberty, November 1997. 
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99Reuters, Highlights of Putin's State of the Nation Address, 8 July, 2000. 
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One of the methods that Putin intends to use to achieve a strong central state, is the 
rule of law, the so-called 'dictatorship of law.' President Putin believes that a strong set 
of laws will clarify what is expected of the country's citizens, to bring order to a chaotic 
Russia. "We need to get all the authorities, all citizens to be aware of their 
responsibilities before the country." 100 A message that echoed the famous inauguration 
speech of President Kennedy, "ask not what your country can do for you, but what you 
can do for your country. n 
In Russia's chaotic present, a proposed cure, that of patriotism was hinted by Putin. 
There is some concern that what makes Russia unique and different is being lost. If 
these lost Russian traditions and culture are revived, a renaissance of the Russian 
state will soon follow. "The unity of Russia is strengthened by the patriotic nature of our 
people, by our cultural traditions, memories[ ... ]." 1°1 An emphasis was placed on 
patriotism and unity during the speech, on the premise that a strong central state can 
only exist if people feel strongly for their motherland and if the people are unified in their 
purpose. 
One of Putin's concerns is the nature of the relationship between Moscow and the 
regions. The governors of the provinces have been given a free reign since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Governors of the eastern spans of Russia, and the 
more remote areas, rule these regions as their own ( independent of Moscow's 
authority). Events such as the scramble to grab Russia's wealth in the privatisation 
auctions, a rising rate of crime and a harsh life for the ordinary citizen have created a 
desire for the re-emergence of a strong central state. In the electioneering prior to the 
March presidential elections, Putin offered an appeal by promising a dictatorship 
of law. Implying that this would bring stability back into peoples lives. For this to work, 
the power of the regional governors needs to be broken. 
Power is to an extent diffused, some of the Kremlin's wishes are not carried out, 
especially if they do not further the local governor's ambitions. Some of the regions are 
ruled by the governors as states within a state. "The regions should not compete for 
power( ... ]. We have created little islands of power, but there are no bridges to connect 
them."102 
Chechnya is Putin's achilles heel. The Chechen problem brought him to power, but 
also has the potential to see his removal, if not solved soon. "The situation in the 
100ibid. 
1011bid. 
1021bid. 
republic has become complicated to such a level that the territory has become a 
springboard for the expansion of international terrorism into Russia."103 
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The recent attacks by the government on Media-Most have another possible 
meaning, other than the suppression of a free press. As outlined earlier ( described in 
detail in section 2.4 ), the media is largely controlled by the oligarchs. Putin made the 
pledge to end the oligarchs grip on Russian politics. In order to send a message to the 
oligarchs, he needed to make an example of a media group. Media-Most has the 
reputation for being one of the most independent and outspoken media organisations in 
Russia (when they refused to follow the Kremlin's wishes on what is allowed to be 
shown in the coverage of the Chechen war). If the government had succeeded in 
bringing Media-Most to its knees, then other media groups, which were less 
independently minded would soon bow to their pressure and the oligarchs would lose 
their voice. This test case could become a blueprint for tackling the other media 
organisations under the control of other oligarchs. 
The detention of Vladimir Gusinsky, Media-Most's head, and the attacks on 
Media-Most did not have the desired effect. Instead of crushing resistance to the 
Kremlin will, the actions of the Kremlin united the previously divided and feuding 
oligarch community. In an unprecedented move the oligarchs displayed open solidarity 
and supported Gusinsky. On 14 June, 2000, seventeen of Russia's most prominent 
business leaders published an open letter to the prosecutor general, Vladimir Ustinov. 
In the letter, the oligarchs labeled Gusinsky's arrest as a political vendetta and a threat 
to democracy in Russia. 104 
In an interview at Radio Mayak, one week from the election, Putin said that the 
oligarchs influence was largely due to their "merging of power with capital." Putin went 
on to issue the threat that ·such a class will cease to exist. [ ... ] Unless we ensure equal 
conditions for all. we won't be able to pull the country out of its current state."105 Putin's 
comment has brought him into conflict with the oligarchs. One of the more outspoken 
oligarchs is Bons Berezovsky. 
1031bid. 
1 04 Russia's 'Oligarchs' Rally Behind Fallen Comrade, EJC News Media Digest, 15 June, 2000. 
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2000. 
1 050/igarchs Will Become Extinct, Putin Vows, Agence France Presse, 19 March, 2000. 
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2.5 Berezovsky's Challenge 
In May 2000 Berezovsky was openly boasting about his prowess as the power broker 
of Russian politics. He talked of his role in being able to persuade President Yeltsin to 
resign, and in promoting the next President to office, Vladimir Putin. By late July 2000, 
however with the political fortunes seemingly turning against him, Berezovsky has been 
taking a different approach. He has begun to distance himself from the government and 
into the position of opposition. When Berezovsky was in the process of resigning from 
parliament he parted with a message, "I do not want to take part in the destruction of 
Russia and the creation of an authoritarian regime. There is a deliberate campaign being 
unleashed, aimed at destroying big business in Russia. All power is being concentrated 
in the President's hands."l06 
But what are Boris Berezovsky's exact motives for this sudden change in political 
affiliation? Are there are any alterior motives? A possible reason for Berezovsky's 
actions are related to recent events of the political past. 
Boris Berezovsky has tried to exert his influence on the newly elected President Putin 
very quickly. It was a blatant attempt by a political actor to influence his audience 
( President Vladimir Putin ) with subjective political reality. In late March 2000, a paper 
owned by Berezovsky printed an article which reminded Putin of who was responsible 
for getting him into the presidential office, and the possible consequences if he forgot. 
Putin's planned reforms have the potential to seriously disrupt the way that 
Berezovsky will be able conduct his business deals in the future. The plans to 
strengthen the central government at the expense of the regional governors means that 
separate business deals with the regions may not be allowed. And it is in the regions 
where the vast wealth of natural resources are located, at present in the control of the 
governors. 
Recently, Putin has also pledged to crackdown on the oligarchs, to distance them all 
from power. Berezovky's proximity to power has placed him as a target of this 
crackdown. Another of Putin's election promises was to tackle the problem of 
corruption. When the government was headed by Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, a 
charge of embezzlement and money-laundering was laid against Berezovsky in 1999. 
When Yeltsin removed Primakov as Prime Minister, Berezovsky's arrest warrant was 
lifted. 107 Kaspe was quoted as saying "Berezovsky clearly understands that his number 
1 06Fred Weir, Russian Moguls Cry Uncle, Christian Science Monitor, 25 July, 2000. 
Johnson's Russia List #4421, 25 July, 2000. 
1071bid. 
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is coming up. That is why he has been moving for the past month into opposition to 
Putin. When the police come for him, he wants to be able to say it is about political 
repression, not a criminal investigation." 108 
During April and May 2000, Berezovsky's business 'transactions' were subjected to 
intense scrutiny by the Prosecutor General's Office. One of the investigators assigned 
to the Aeroflot case, Nikolai Volkov was prepared by early April 2000 to officially lay 
charges against the oligarch. Berezovsky was accused of fraud and money-laundering, 
an estimated US$400 million made by Aeroflot was transferred to two of his financial 
companies ( Andawa and Forus ) in Switzerland. An additional charge of creating a 
criminal association is under consideration. 109 
Berezovsky does not intend to be passive in his resistance to the likely scenario of 
his business being curtailed. He has made two announcements, firstly that he is 
stepping down as a deputy in the State Duma ( supposedly as a mark of protest 
because Putin's style of leadership). The second announcement was that he is 
consolidating his media assets into a single company, to protect his political interests.I 10 
Through the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Berezovsky made it quite clear that he 
intended to use his media empire as a political weapon, that would enable it to serve as 
an "important political lever" in challenging President Putin. Ill 
Initiating an information war with Putin's administration, Berezovsky continues to try 
and influence public opinion and the government through his media assets. In May 
2000, Berezovsky had published an open letter which criticised Putin's plans to limit 
regional power. Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Centre, said 
that "the letter is a pretext to form a new opposition of regional leaders and oligarchs. "112 
Yevgenia AI bats, an independent journalist based in Moscow, went on to describe an 
article published in another paper owned by an oligarch that she refers to as BAB ( Boris 
Abramovich Berezovsky ). The article alleged, in a half-hearted manner that election 
fraud had taken place. This article refuted previous election claims; 
108Jbid. 
According to information from unofficial sources, acting President Vladimir 
Putin won around 42% of the vote on March 26, not the 44.8% the 
1 °9Gusinsky Will Laugh Until Berezovsky Cries, 22 May, 2000. 
www.smi.ru, 23 May, 2000. 
11° Russian Tycoon Announces Media Plan, EJC Media News Digest, 19 July, 2000. 
www.newsday.com/ap/international/ap978.htm, 20 July, 2000. 
111 Jbid. 
112Feifer, G., Berezovsky's Letter Dominates, The Moscow Times, June 1, 2000. 
Johnson's Russia List #4339, 1 June, 2000. 
Communists say that he got, and certainly not the 52.5%, as the Central 
Election Commission has stated. Putin received 10.5% of his votes as the 
result of outright election fraud. 113 
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Berezovsky claimed that he was worried about Russia's future, he did not want to see 
the end of democracy. Izvestia took a more cynical approach as to possible motives for 
writing this letter. The newspaper claims Berezovsky views himself as a kind of.father 
figure to Putin ( because of his help at the elections), the letter was a public attempt to 
control Putin, who was making decisions which were independent of 'The Family.' 114 
The letter contained eight suggestions, which Berezovsky wanted put to a public 
referendum. These suggestions would ultimately enhance the regions independence. 
Berezovsky's proposals would also give him more opportunity to interfere with regional 
politics. The sixth suggestion would benefit Berezovsky, because Prosecutor General 
Ustinov is an associate of Berezovsky's. 
• Ask President Putin to cancel the decree which establishes the seven federal 
districts. 
• Use direct popular elections to create the Federation Council. 
• To pass legislation that the dismissal of elected regional and local leaders will only 
be carried out by the will of voters. 
• Delineate and unify respective rights and obligations of the federal centre and the 
regions in a single, standardised federative agreement. 
• Retain present system of creating organs of local government, while strengthening 
legislation which gives their independence from regional leaders and accountability 
to voters. 
• Establish local prosecutor's offices, which are directly accountable to the 
Prosecutor General's Office, for overseeing compliance to the constitution. 
• To introduce a common legislation which would establish the criminal liability of 
regional executive officials for specific violations of the federal law. 
113Aibats, Y., Power play: Oligarch's Message Clear to Careful Readers, Moscow Times, April6, 2000. 
114Feifer, op. cit. · 
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• To have the law dismissing or appointing the regional heads of regional offices of 
federal agencies canceled. This should be agreed to by the regional leaders. 115 
Putin's intended reforms have been labeled as a mistake and 'Soviet.' Berezovsky 
told Reuters on June 2, 2000, "what Putin is suggesting is destroying the principle of the 
vertical division of power. It is the centralisation of vertical power [ ... ] in other words, the 
Soviet system of government. [ ... ] but this is a mistake." 116 
The destruction of the vertical division of power which Berezovsky refers to is the 
power relationship between the regions and Moscow. Putin has announced that he 
wants to reform the provinces, and part of this reform entails amalgamating Russia's 89 
provinces into seven administrative regions. The proposed reforms would also give 
Putin the power to sack the governors and place administrators of his choice in place of 
the governors. 
Putin's threatened 'dictatorship of law' has the potential to ruin Berezovsky. Promises 
of keeping the oligarchs from power and to investigate alleged acts of corruption have 
proved popular with the Russian public. In a Reuters conducted poll, Putin received a 
73% rate of approval for his conduct in July 2000. 117 Berezovsky relies on his contacts 
within the inner circle of power in order to conduct his business. If the Kremlin is 
successful in its pursuit of the oligarchs, with Berezovsky shutout of the inner circle and 
his past business deals are used against him, then he will be finished. So far, 
Berezovsky's reaction to the pressure exerted on him and the other oligarchs, seems to 
be out of the desire for the self-preservation of his business interests and himself. In the 
nine years since the fall of communism, during the rule of President Yeltsin, Berezovsky 
has amassed a fortune and he has a lot to lose if Putin is successful. 
2.6 Chapter Findings 
In the period prior to March 2000, when Putin was elected President of Russia, the 
distinction between business and politics was blurred. These two groups overlapped 
each other's societal roles. Former President Yeltsin allowed this because the oligarchs 
gave him support through their media networks. In this symbiotic relationship, the 
oligarchs were granted access to valuable privatised assets and legal transgressions 
were ignored. 
11 51bid. 
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Originally, the oligarchs invested in media assets with the intention of using them as a 
means to an end. They sought to use the media to influence dealings with the 
government. It is the goal of the oligarchs to develop and expand certain governmental 
policies, such as privatisation. McNair hints at this motivation, when the oligarchs started 
to buy-out media assets. He also contends that, although this is no different from other 
media magnates motives in the West, what does differ is the scale of influence wielded 
by the oligarchs. 118 
Putin needed to distance himself from Yeltsin's tarnished legacy if he was to be elected 
to the presidency by the Russian people. Yeltsin may have selected Putin for this 
reason, he also needed a 'reliable person' in power to protect him from possible legal 
repercussions of his (and the 'Family's') deals during his reign. Russians had grown 
cynical and wary of the prevalent political cronyism. The main thrust of Putin's policies 
were aimed at re-establishing a strong centralised state, thus breaking up the 
fragmented regionalised power structures of the Yeltsin years. 
Part of the intended plan for ensuring the Kremlin's control was the separation of 
business and politics, which was embodied in the notion of distancing the oligarchs from 
political power. This position threatened the oligarchs very existence, which relied 
heavily upon maintaining political connections to create financial gain. 
The oligarchs needed to protect the status quo if they were to maintain their privileged 
existence. Media assets were brought into play by both sides of this power play. In this 
instance the media's objective was to construct political reality and to mobilise public 
opinion on the issue. 
Mass media manipulation of public opinion relied on the premise that the media is a 
source of information. Both sides of this power play consider the media to be a major 
source of definitions and images of social reality. Thus a major PR campaign by the 
Kremlin and the oligarchs began. 
During Yeltsin's tenure as President, Berezovsky earned a reputation as the 
Kingmaker of Russia. In the immediate post March 2000 election period, Berezovsky 
began to remind Putin that it was he, who brought him to power. Boris Berezovsky 
through his newspaper network, urged Putin to remember who are his friends. 
Berezovsky's actions best epitomise the political maneuvering occurring to gain 
political advantage over the opponent. He resigned as a deputy in the State Duma and 
118For further reading on this issue consult Curran & Park, op. cit., pp. 79-94. 
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pledged to unite his media assets in order to fight Putin's resurgent 'authoritarianism.' By 
doing this Berezovsky has placed himself in the position of political opposition. If Putin 
tried to begin any legal proceedings against him, Berezovsky would be able to say that 
he was a political martyr. Gusinsky had begun this process a long time prior to 
Berezovsky, when he was arrested ( Gusinsky) many rallied behind him. Berezovsky's 
late actions seem at best opportunistic. 
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CHAPTER Ill: THE INFLUENCE OF CORRUPTION ON THE MEDIA 
3.0 Chapter Objectives 
The objective of the first part of this chapter is to establish that corruption is not new to 
Russia and has existed for many centuries. Corruption has become endemic throughout 
Russian society, more so in recent years. I will attempt to put forward some possible 
explanations for why corruption occurred in the past and why corruption continues to be 
a problem in the present day. 
Various methods have been tried by the leadership, to try and break the cycle of 
corruption. These attempts have usually met with, at best limited success, because of 
the entrenched nature of the problem. A lack of willingness to tackle the problem and 
vested interests have proved to be the undoing of anti-corruption measures. 
Political leaders have us~d 'the fight against corruption' as a means to dispose of 
opposition or to gain votes (through popularity). Secretary- Generals of the Communist 
Party, including Andropov and Gorbachev tried to purge corruption from Russian 
society. More recently, both Yeltsin and Putin used the promise of a crackdown on 
corruption as a popular policy during their election campaigns. 
The 'no-holds barred' fight among the oligarchs to acquire privatised state assets has 
seen many dubious business transactions. As media organsiations are tied to different 
oligarchs, the reporting of 'irregularities' is dependent on who committed the 
transgression ( such as the owner of the media or his rival ). New reports are used to 
cover the actions of the owner and to 'expose' the dealings of his rivals. To what extent 
this regime operates. will be determined in chapter 3.6 and 3.7. 
3.1 Blat 
The concepts of blat. although closely linked to (and sometimes involving) corruption, 
differ in some respects. Blat has a long history in Russia. The distinction between the 
two concepts, blat and corruption, is at best blurred, but they are different. 
Author of The Russian Mind, Hingley describes the system of blat as "the system of 
illicit deals and under-the-counter arrangements. [ ... ] frequently used, for example, by 
factory managers who seek to fulfill the norms imposed by the economic plans without 
45 
necessarily pursuing direct personal gain." 119 From Perestroika to Privatisation clearly 
defines the parameters of blat, 
in some cases money was used to facilitate exchange, in other cases 
another currency such as vodka was improvised, but often the process 
would be based upon informal barter of goods and services or even less 
specific forms of giving and receiving favours. [ ... ]operated both at the 
level of relations between enterprises and government institutions, and in 
the relations between individuals. 120 
Blat relied upon the ability to build an effective network of friends and acquaintances, to 
gain access to goods and services in a mutually beneficial series of relationships. 
The myriad ways in which people cultivated and used personal 
connections to circumvent bureaucratic controls over scarce resources[ ... ] 
everything that was obtainable under administrative auspices was also 
obtainable, and generally believed to be often obtained by the 
manipulation of personal connections. 121 
The concept of blat and its use is not new. Shortages which began to occur in the 
Soviet economy helped to make the use and the acceptance of blat more widespread. 
A normalisation occurred, as is explained in Cox's From Perestroika to Privatisation, 
"management's ability to behave in these ways depends upon certain expectations of 
other people's behaviour. That is if large numbers of people engage in blat it must mean 
that they expect others to be receptive to propositions." 122 
Blat and bribery are closely linked terms, but there are some major differences 
between the two concepts. Author, Alena Ledeneva stressed some differences in her 
book Russia's economy of favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange ( P. 39 ); 
• In blat, the parties concerned have ties (friends, family or acquaintances ), no such 
tie exists in deals involving bribery. 
• Once the bribe is given, the relationship between the parties often ends. Blat 
involves a continuity of relationship(s). 
• Law prohibits bribery, but no mention of blat is made. 
119Hingley, R., The Russian Mind, London, The Broadly Head, 1978, p. 148 
120cox, T., From Perestroika to Privatisation: The Politics of Property Change in Russian Society 1985-
1991, Aldershot, Avebury, 1996, p. 29 
121lbid., p. 30 
122lbid., p. 29 
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The importance of blat as it relates to the media, is not a direct influence on how news 
is told, but how the media came to be under the influence of the oligarchs. Personal 
networks were, and still are of vital importance to those who wish to conduct business in 
the Russian Federation. The oligarchs background is mostly from the old Soviet 
nomenklatura, the ruling elite. Connections and personal ties helped these oligarchs to 
create vast economic empires. Methods used by the oligarchs in the creation of their 
empires created a need to develop an effective means with which to defend what they 
had amassed (as well as a tool for lobbying the government). Russian media 
organisations have found a difficult existence in the new market economy, often seeking 
financial support, the oligarchs were willing to offer this assistance, but at the cost of 
editorial freedom. Thus, various media organisations have been drawn into various 
economic groupings (such as Most group and lnterros ). 
3.2 Definition Of Corruption 
A definition needs to be made of the word corruption, in order to fully understand the 
nature of this phenomenon. Corruption comes in many different forms and a number of 
variations exist. In a short and simplistic view "corruption is the misuse of public power 
for private profit." 123 However, corruption does not mean the same to everyone, 
motivation and the impact of corruption vary. According to nobribes.org, there are two 
separate categories of corruption: 'according to rule' and 'against the rule.' 
A broader definition of corruption by nobribes.org gives a better insight into some of 
the mechanisms involved in the process. "Corruption involves behaviour on the part of 
officials in the public sector, whether politicians or public servants, in which they 
improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of 
the public power entrusted to them." 124 
The Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition, the "perversion or 
destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour, the use 
or existence of corrupt practices, especially in a state, public corporation, [ ... ]etc." 125 
Author Carl Friedrich's definition shall be the last offered. He describes corruption as 
deviant behaviour associated with a particular motivation, normally that of 
private gain at public expense [ ... ]whenever a power holder who is 
charged with doing certain things, that is a responsible functionary or office 
123Reference centre: Understanding corruption, 'Definitions of Corruption,' Anti-Corruption network for 
Transition Economies, 2000 
1241bid. 
www.nobribes.org/rc_understanding.shtm, 4 April, 2000. 
125Editors Heidenheimer, A J., Johnston, M. & LeVine, V. T., Political Corruption: A handbook, New 
Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1989, p. 7 
holder, is by monetary or other rewards, such as the expectation of a job in 
the future, induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the 
reward. 126 
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By using the common traits of this selection of definitions, a pattern about the nature 
and definition of corruption emerges. Corruption occurs at a point where the public and 
private sectors meet, an 'abnormal' behaviour is induced by the desire to enrich oneself 
at the public's expense. It involves the misuse of public power for private gain, a public 
official and a private party who is able to corrupt the integrity of the public official. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development considers the use of bribes 
in Russia to be of epidemic proportions, to the extent that the Bank ( EBRD ) describes 
bribes as an unofficial form of tax. 
These may be paid for a variety of purposes, such as to obtain public 
services, to avoid or alter existing regulations and taxes, to gain 
government contracts, to obtain subsidies or other state financing, to win 
influence, and to appease 'predatory' officials. Firms can consider bribes 
as a cost to be paid for obtaining advantages or preferences from the 
government or as an unofficial tax[ ... ]. 127 
There are two separate categories of corruption, 'according to rule' and 'against the 
rule.' These categories refer to the level of legality involved in the acts of corruption, 
whether the action is carried out within the confines of the law, or not. 
'According to rule' corruption occurs when services or contracts are provided legally 
(inside the word of law). For instance a public official may receive illegal private gain 
for carrying out a task which they are required to do by law. 
On the other hand, 'against the rule corruption' involves transactions which are illegal. 
In this situation a bribe is paid to obtain services, which is not permitted by law. 128 
An article written by Andrei Piontkovsky in the Russia Journal concludes that Russia's 
form of corruption differs from other examples in the world. He describes the situation 
as "a complete merging of money and power at a personal level - a situation for which 
even the word corruption is no longer apt." 129 
1261bid, p. 3 
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48 
Piontkovsky explains that in 'classical corruption' there are two players - a 
businessman and the government official (whom the businessman bribes). But in the 
Russian case, the oligarchs assume the officials role or use their influence to obtain the 
right to select personnel for the official jobs and functions. Boris Berezovsky boosted in 
an interview with the Financial Times that he possessed this power, in October 1996. 130 
3.3 Corruption In The Soviet Union 
Vzyatka ( the take ) has been present and active in Russia long before the arrival of 
communism. The first recorded incidents, where the state has recognised and tried to 
do something about corruption dates back to the rule of the Tsars. In Russia, the first 
recorded law relating to bribery dates back to the reign of Ivan Ill ( 1440 - 1505 ) and it 
was during Peter the Great's reign ( 1672 - 1725 ) that the giving of bribes was made a 
crime. 131 There are several reasons given to try and explain the occurrence of official 
corruption. At various occasions, Soviet leaders had waged campaigns against 
corruption. The penalties for those that were caught were very heavy. Media organs 
were involved in the struggle, they were used to publicise trials of those accused of 
corruption, to stigmatise those that had transgressed the law and as a deterrent for 
others. 
Author S. Alatas, has postulated three possible reasons for the existence of official 
corruption in the Soviet Union. 
• None of the material benefits are owned by the officials, and they will only possess 
these benefits as long as they hold their appointment. This creates an atmosphere 
of uncertainty and stimulates the desire to obtain as much of what they are entitled 
to before they lose the opportunity. 
• Official culture encouraged and normalised corruption. Those who rose through the 
ranks of the bureaucracy came to perceive the giving and taking of bribes as 
normal. As a result, corruption became ingrained in the system. 
Greed of the leadership is the principal cause. They were permissive toward the ruling 
elite and cases involving the punishment of high-level corruption was rare. The effect of 
this was to remove the fear of being caught ( and punished ). 132 
130tbid. 
131 Alatas, S. H., Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Athenaeum 
Press Ltd., 1990, p. 119 
132tbid., p. 120-121 
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Heidenheimer, editor of Political Corruption: A Handbook, offers alternative reasons 
for the existence of corruption. 
• In the Soviet system, production plans were more important than strict adherence to 
the law. 
• 'Uncovering' corruption might be interpreted by those higher up in the system as 
laxness on their part for allowing it to happen in the first place. Better to hide the 
problem and pretend it is not there. 
• Those conducting the investigations on corruption are corrupt themselves. 133 
Corruption was recognised as a problem by the Soviet Union's rulers. Strict laws and 
harsh penalties were instituted in an attempt to stem the problem of corruption. There 
were also instances where those accused of corruption being subjected to publicity, in 
an effort to stigmatise the lawbreakers and discourage others. The state began to 
publicly denounce corruption, and refer to it as ideologically dangerous. 134 Smena 
magazine was reknown for running exposes on official corruption. Some of the stories 
have included articles on 'special' schools and the buying and selling of office and titles 
by the elite. 135 
Persons convicted of repeated and/or serious acts of bribery or embezzlement were 
liable for periods of 8-15 years imprisonment or the death penalty. 136 The threat of the 
death penalty was not an idle threat. On May 23, 1975, the Washington Post reported 
that 18 people were executed in Russia for economic crimes from mid 1970 until mid 
1975. 137 
There were also a series of sweeping campaigns against corruption at the regional 
level, one of the more notable examples occurred in Georgia. The local party boss, 
Eduard Shevardnadze waged a campaign in the early 1970's. Some 25,000 people were 
arrested in the course of the exercise. Shevardnadze received death threats and 
needed to travel in a blastproof vehicle afterwards. 138 
lnspite of the attempts by the state to battle corruption, overall the result was 
unsuccessful. Many officials who were dismissed from one department soon became 
133Heidenheimer, et al, op. cit., p. 14 
1341bid., p. 461 
135Moynahan, B., The Russian Century: A History of the Last 100 Years, London, Pimlico, 1997, p. 234 
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officials in other parts of the Soviet bureaucracy. 139 Diplomat Alexander Yakovlev 
summed up the reasons for why he believed corruption existed during the Brezhnevian 
era, "to succeed in anything one had to be sly, to lie, to violate the rules and laws." 140 
Konstantin Simis argued throughout in his book, USSR: Secrets of a Corrupt Society 
( 1982 ), on the whole Russian people are honest and moral and do not consider 
stealing from the state as real theft. That the theft was carried out as a matter of 
necessity, where commodity shortages in society are the norm. And these people would 
probably not steal from other citizens. This would certainly account for the lower scale 
corruption( theft from factories, shops, etc. ), the stakes were relatively low, and 
probably committed for the well-being and survival of the family. Official corruption was 
another matter, the value of what was at stake was much higher and the crime 
committed in a more calculating manner. Power and influence was used by the elite to 
generate and concentrate further power and wealth in their hands ( and in the hands of 
their 'inner circle' ). 
3.4 A History Of Corruption In Contemporary Russia 
Vaclav Havel, the Czech President gave his analysis of the Communist psyche in his 
1990 New Year's address; "we have become morally ill because we have become 
accustomed to saying one thing and thinking another. The children of communism 
learned to speak one way among family and closest friends, and another way outside 
the inner circle. The result is moral schizophrenia." 141 Havel's 'moral schizophrenia' 
does not relate solely to the Czech Republic, it is a problem throughout the former 
Eastern Block. And is certainly a contributing factor of the endemic corruption and 
political cronyism of the Russian Federation. 
According to an Internet source, in the final years of the Soviet Union, 30% of all 
commerce that occurred took place beyond the official economy. 142 Other assertions 
were also made in the article titled Where Did All of the Money Go? Corruption is 
widespread in the official structures of present day Russia ( such as the police, courts, 
government and other government departments ). Alexander Gurov, Director of a 
security research institute at the Ministry of Security ( 1993 article in the Chicago Times ) 
stated that "before, the criminals tried to influence officials with bribes. Today they 
139Heidenheimer, Johnston & LeVine, op. cit., p. 461 
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already have their own lobby in the government and the parliament -- not to mention 
the prosecutor's office." 143 
One of the main assertions was that in the final thirty years of the Soviet Union, 
corruption was rife. 144 The disintegration of the official economy meant that people had 
to learn to 'survive' by any means. This resulted in a 'normalisation' of corruption as a 
concept and its use in society. Corruption has allowed individuals ( the oligarchs ) to use 
political power to accumulate economic power after the fall of communism. The Soviet 
system's design and functioning created a gap between the formal rules and actual 
practice, this gap created the temptation for illegal activity and corruption. Russian 
bureaucratic centralisation of regulatory authority in practice left rule making in the 
hands of the bureaucrats who profited from this discrepancy. 145 
An equity strategist from Troika-Dialog brokerage, James Fenkner, summed up the 
problems in trying to tackle the present day problems with corruption. 
Corruption is nothing new, it is among Russia's oldest and most resilient 
dragons. It flourished in tsarist Russia and in the later days of the Soviet 
period and roamed freely throughout Russia during the 1990's 
privatisation process. Corruption is intractable, largely because those who 
must fight it are often its core beneficiaries. Given the depth and scope of 
corruption in Russia, not everyone in power could be replqced. [ ... ]A 
simple proposition, but a monumental task, given that any real attack on 
corruption could well have a negative effect for Russia's most powerful 
persons. 146 
The problem of official c.rime and corruption is becoming increasingly worse. Russia's 
crime rate involvtng public servants has increased significantly, in 1994 there were some 
16,600 cases reported which involved government officials (approximately 1/3 involved 
bribery). 147 F1gures from the Interior Ministry state that acts of crime and corruption by 
government off1aals rose by 35% in 1999. 148 In an interview with /tar-Tass, First Deputy 
Interior Minister Vlad1m1r Kozlov was quoted as saying there were 53,700 crimes 
committed by, or mvolvtng officials, an increase of 35.6% on 1998's figures. 149 
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Damage in terms of monetary value, to the Russian economy is enormous and is 
getting worse. Kozlov assessed the direct damage to the Russian economy in the 
region of 29.2 billion rubles (or US$1 billion) in 1999. The 1999 figure was 45% higher 
than for 1998. 15° Capital flight from Russia to Swiss banks is huge, the London 
Financial Times has estimated the value at approximately US$60 billion. 151 
Interpol's assessment of the crime situation makes depressing news. An estimated 
8,000 to 10,000 criminal gangs are currently active. These gangs employ upto 100,000 
people, and their influence is extensive. Approximately 40,000 firms and 550 banks are 
controlled by these organised crime groups. 152 
3.5 Government Campaigns Against Corruption 
Some measures appear to be being utilised to try and minimise the sc.ale of corruption 
by the central government. Charges have been laid against 21,000 government officials 
in 1999. A prominent figure to be charged is the Social Security Minister of the republic 
of Bashkiria. Several unnamed deputy governors have also been charged. 153 
One of the more bizarre cases of corruption to be brought to the public's attention, 
involved an admiral from the Russian Pacific Fleet. The admiral sold one of his fleet's 
warships to a foreign nation in November 1999 for an estimated US$107 million. 154 
Another case involves four generals in the Ministry of Defence, who stole US$450 
million. It has been alleged that the generals transferred the money through the Russian 
Central Bank to British United Energy International Lid. (which is linked to a Ukrainian 
company ) for materials, which were supposedly supplied by the Ukrainian Republic. No 
materials were actually supplied. 155 Actions such as these typify the total disregard that 
officials display to the consequences. 
The administration of Putin is waging a war against the oligarchs and the associated 
corruption in their financial empires. At the present, five high profile business magnates 
are under investigation. 
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One of the more high profile cases currently being investigated is the oligarch Vladimir 
Gusinsky. He is the owner of the MOST group, which includes the largest independent 
media group in Russia. The prosecutor's case revolves around an alleged US$10 million 
being embezzled in state property when he privatised a small television company in 
1997. 156 
A former Deputy Prime Minister and the chairman of Russia's largest carmaker, 
Vladimir Kadannikov is under investigation. He has been accused of massive tax 
evasion. Vladimir Potanin, another past Prime Minister has been charged with fixing the 
auction of the state-owned nickel producing giant ( which was one of the reasons for the 
feud that exists between the oligarchs). 157 Investigators are making demands on 
Potanin to pay up to US$140 million, which is the figure claimed to have been defrauded 
in the sale of Norilsk Nickel ( 39% stake ) to Jnterros. 158 
The other two figures who are currently under the prosecutor office's scrutiny are 
Anatoly Chubais and Vagit Alekperov. Chubais is a former Deputy Prime Minister and 
the current head of Russia's electrical monopoly, Unified Energy System. Alekperov is 
the chief of the controversial petroleum giant Lukoil. 159 The probe into Lukoil relates to 
alleged tax evasion. 160 
Putin was able to use the threat of a crackdown on the oligarchs to help bolster his 
popularity prior to the presidential elections in March 2000. This move has proved 
popular with the voting public. The chief analyst of the Public Politics Centre ( an 
independent Moscow based 'think tank' ), Svyatoslav Kaspe gave a possible reason for 
the popularity of this move. "The Russian public hates these businessmen for the way 
they acquired their wealth while the country was collapsing." 161 A poverty stricken 
Russian public has grown increasingly resentful of the way the 'New Russians' have 
amassed their wealth, and the way they flaunt their fortunes. 
A barrier to clear corruption, especially in the ranks of parliament, lies in the Russian 
constitution. The 98th clause of the constitution grants the State Duma deputies 
immunity during their tenure of power. The clause states that "they cannot be arrested, 
subjected to search, except cases of detention at the crime scene." 162 A cause for 
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public concern has been that some notable oligarchs have been elected to the Duma 
( such as Boris Berezovsky ) thereby avoiding immediate legal consequences for their 
financial transactions. 
3.6 The Privatisation Process 
The process of a transition from a communist to a post-communist economy has been 
a difficult time for Russia and fraught with many difficulties. Russia's main means of 
achieving the transition to a capitalist economy has been via privatisation of state 
assets. Bearing in mind, that technically there was no such thing as private property in 
Russia prior to 1991 (after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 ), this meant that the state 
owned everything. The colossal offering of state assets in terms of sheer number and 
the value of these assets has made them a tempting target for those with money and 
power. In a 1997 inteNiew, Berezovsky bragged that he and six other oligarchs owned 
economic empires which control 50% of Russia's GOP, when these enterprises are 
combined. 163 
The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development has identified four different 
stages of privatisation in Russia. 
• 1990 - 91 : Spontaneous privatisation ( Gorbachev ) . 
• 1992 - 94: Mass privatisation programme ( tradable vouchers ) . 
1994 - 96: Cash sales of shares. 
• 1995: 'Shares for loans' privatisation. 164 
The first round of privatisation in the Russian Federation began in 1992. During the 
year of 1993 some 6.5 million apartments were privatised, which represented 
approximately 20% of the total number of apartments. 165 In June 1994 the first round of 
privatisation ended. By this time, 139 million Russians had invested their government 
issued privatisation vouchers (a rate of 94%) and 70% of Russian industry had been 
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privatised. 166 Some 100,000 enterprises had been privatised by September 1994, with 
80% of the industrial workforce employed by private industry. 167 
Although privatisation is meant to redistribute the country's wealth to the citizens of 
Russia, many believe that the process is rigged. The word privatisation ( privatizatsiya 
in Russian ) has been altered in Russian slang, as a reflection of the public's cynicism of 
the state's conduct. Privatizatsiya has been changed to prikhvatizatsiya ( meaning 
grabbing) or piratizatsiya (meaning pirating). 168 
The sheer scale of the process is enormous and prone to fraud. A common form of 
fraud is known as 'nomenklatura privatisation.' This occurs when officials and those 
with contacts exploit the situation. 169 Nomenklatura privatisation is able to exist 
because of the large and inefficient Russian bureaucracy. An example of this type of 
corruption is clearly demonstrated in the loans for shares deaL Oligarchs Vladimir 
Potanin and Mikhail Fridman managed to acquire a 38% share of Norilsk Nikel for 
approximately 115 million pounds sterling in 1997, the company has been valued since, 
at 1 billion pounds sterling. 170 
Another factor which has aggravated the temptation for corruption by government 
officials are the low wages offered to state employees. These low paid workers have a 
lot of personal power and relatively little accountability ( largely due to the cumbersome 
structure of the bureaucratic machinery ). Russia has half the population of the former 
Soviet Union, but the bureaucracy is larger. There were 85 central ministries and 
departments in the Soviet Union, by 1995 the number of ministries and departments had 
increased to 137. 171 
By having so much power (through the issuing of licences and the handling of the 
privatisation process ) in the hands of the bureaucrats, who are relatively discontent, 
presented opportunities for those with contacts to play the system. A common scam was 
for officials to form private companies, buy former state buildings at very low prices, then 
to re-sell those buildings at huge profits and bank their earnings abroad. 172 
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In other instances, bureaucrats were offered 'incentives' to perform certain duties for 
'businessmen.' Such incentives may include all expenses paid overseas holidays, high 
paying jobs in private firms (where they do not have to actually do anything) or cash. 173 
A new class emerged from the privatisation process, a privileged group known as the 
privilgentsia. This group was formed through the acquisition of assets during 
privatisation (such as factories, banks and retail shops), and developed into a middle 
class. 174 
3.7 Media Involvement In Reporting Corruption 
The Russian media by virtue of their actions, still operate on the premise that if you 
control how the message is sent, then control is exercised over how the message is 
received by readers and viewers. Financial interests ( the oligarchs ) who own the 
media, routinely use the media as a weapon in an on-going information war. There is 
nothing subtle about this information war and the public have become wary about the 
hidden agendas behind the newspaper headlines. 
Russian political figures have been the target of numerous exposes of alleged acts of 
corruption by the press. When such allegations are made by the media, the first 
question asked is "who benefits from this?" 175 The accuracy of what is alleged is of 
secondary consideration. Such suspicion of the media's motives has the effect of 
diminishing the media's role as a watchdog. 
A lot of controversy has surrounded the process of privatisation in Russia, many 
substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations have been levelled at the political and 
business figures at the centre of the reforms. In August 1997, Alfred Kokh the State 
Property Committee chairman was fired amid a controversy incorporating the 
privatisation auctions. The media made a series of allegations, that Kokh had 
accepted bribes from Oneksimbank, the winner of those auctions. Kokh was subjected 
to an investigation because of the allegations made against him. Apart from Kokh's 
sacking, there were no other repercussions such as policy changes or reversal of the 
auctions forwhich Kokh was criticised. 176 
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Another high ranking government official who was the subject of a media scrutiny was 
Anatoli Chubais. Moskovski Komsomolets published a transcript of a June 1996 
conversation involving Chubais (at this time a high ranking campaign aide to Yeltsin) 
in the autumn of 1996_177 The transcript was potentially very damaging for Chubais in 
three ways. He was implicated in the misappropriation of government funds, was found 
to be lying to journalists about his actions and was caught attempting to obstruct a 
criminal investigation into the contents of the transcript. The authenticity of the 
transcript was never challenged in court, which tends to give credence to the case that 
this transcript was genuine. President Yeltsin however, never reacted to the transcripts 
publication publicly. Chubais was eventually promoted to become Yeltsin's chief of staff. 
In March 1997, Chubais was appointed to the government and the investigation into the 
campaign finance scandal was quietly closed down in April 1997.178 
The campaign finance scandal of 1996 was not the only business conducted by 
Chubais to come under the scrutiny of the Russian press. In July 1997, lzvestiya 
alleged that he accepted a US$3million interest free loan from Stolichnyi Bank in early 
1996. 179 An article accused Chubais of interfering to help Stolichnyi Bank to acquire a 
state-owned bank ( Agroprombank) in November 1996. As a result of the article, 
Chubais wrote a letter to the editor condemning the article, but there was no other 
official reaction and no investigation was started.180 A closer examination of the 
interests behind the news reveals that lzvestiya is controlled by Vladimir Potanin, a rival 
oligarch of the owners of Stolichnyi Bank ( became SBS-Agro after the takeover ). 
Boris Berezovsky, an oligarch and politician has been in the media spotlight on several 
occasions as a result of various business deals. Berezovsky's association with the 
airline Aeroflot has been plagued with scandal. In July 1997, Moskovski Komsomolets 
accused the oligarch of embezzling US$98 million from the airline and transferring it to a 
Swiss company which he owns. Some of the other scandals which have been reported 
by other papers, concerning Berezovsky include ( especially pertaining to his 
relationship with 'The Family'); Berezovsky buying Yeltsin's daughters expensive gifts 
and he pays the salary of Aeroflot's Director Valery Okulov ( Yeltsin's son-in-law ). 181 
In some cases, media exposes linking high ranking government officials with acts of 
corruption have simply 'disappeared.' In August 1997, Novaya Gazeta published a 
transcript of a phone conversation between businessman Sergei Lisovski and Boris 
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Nemtsov. The contents of the conversation pointed to Nemtsov stalling a presidential 
decree's publication (the decree was concerning the declaration of income for personal 
reasons). The government opened an investigation into how Nemtsov's phone was 
tapped and how the transcript was leaked to the press. Nemtsov was neither 
reprimanded nor was there any investigation into his actions. 182 A possible reason for 
the President not taking action against Nemtsov is that Novaya Gazeta is partly funded 
by Gusinsky. At the time, Gusinsky was waging an information war against Nemtsov 
and Chubais, due to the controversy surrounding the privatisation auction of 
Svyazinvest (which will be explained further on in the thesis). 
A lot of the examples which I have given in 1.4.1, although probably genuine examples 
of official corruption, tend to reflect the political affiliations of their financial backers. If 
reporting a story of corruption is in the interests of the owner I backer, then it will be 
reported. This is a trend and part of an ongoing information war, waged by the oligarchs 
upon each other. The intended audience of these articles is the government, the 
oligarchs are using their media assets to lobby the government and to gain influence. 
Boundaries between business and politics are unclear, the oligarch who gains the ear of 
the President has access to a vast number of state assets yet to be privatised. Such as 
Vladimir Potanin's shares for loans deal which he made with President Yeltsin. Media 
interest in official corruption concerns economic and political advantage, not a genuine 
desire to expose social injustice or a matter of informing the public. 
3.8 Use Of Corruption In Politics 
During the heights of the Stalinist purges, to be called 'an enemy of the people' could 
result in imprisonment or execution. Stalin used the threat of enemies of the people as a 
justification for h1s bloody purges of any opposition ( real or otherwise ) to his rule. With 
the arrival of capitalism and democracy a new kind of 'enemy of the people' has 
emerged. The ·public enemy' has become the spectre of corruption and those who are 
corrupt. However, ts the new found strength being used on this crusade directed 
against the rampant corruption which exists in Russia, or merely used as a tool for the 
political and econom1c elite to rid themselves of opposition? Instead of assassinating 
the person, their character is irrevocably damaged (by public exposure in the media) 
and the end result is the same. 
Coleman, in The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire describes clearly, how 
allegations of corruption are used for political gain and the consequences of these 
allegations. "During the communist era, political rivals were purged by using charges of 
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ideological deviance. The use of the term political corruption is used to discredit and 
remove rivals from power. This had the added effect of increasing public awareness 
and perhaps exaggerating the level of corruption."183 
Often charges of corruption or financial impropriety are the opening moves of a 
campaign to undermine the accused, to render them vulnerable to dismissal or their 
assets are taken over. The accused may or may not be guilty of the alleged crimes. An 
example of this kind of campaign emerged in November 1998. ORTwas warned by the 
government to pay back state loans. In spite of initiating emergency measures, ORT 
was still unable to meet debt repayment and was close to bankruptcy. The implications 
go beyond what is on the surface. ORTis 51% government owned, which means the 
government was prepared to sue itself to acquire payment of its own money. 184 
Charges of corruption and 'serious financial mismanagement,' were used by Yeltsin to 
justify the sacking of three heads of State TV and Radio Broadcasting. First to go was 
Poptsov in February1996, followed by Sagalayev in February 1997 and Svanidze in 
February 1998.185 
The Russian press has been one of the forms of opposition faced by the Russian 
government. Their attacks on the government's conduct in the Chechen War has been 
a source of irritation and embarrassment. On February 2, 2000, the State Security 
Committee held a press conference. Alexei Alexandrov, a Duma Deputy on this 
committee issued a press release in which he warned journalists to resist any possible 
financial offers. He stated that he had received information concerning smuggled money 
from unidentified "western colleagues." According to Alexandrov, the purpose of this 
bribe money was designed at "bribing Russian journalists [ ... ) to communicate distortions 
and false information about Acting President Vladimir Putin and the armed forces in 
Chechnya." 186 
Adding some emotional rhetoric to the press conference, Alexandrov went on to say 
that a Russian journalist would never take money that "smells of the blood of our 
soldiers[ ... ] and would never enter into talks with people who conduct work hostile to 
our state." 187 Andrei Ryabov, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
regarded Alexandrov's statements as "just another theory about Chechen terrorists from 
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Kremlin officials." And that, "all sides in this conflict are trying to use their methods of 
informational war against each other.[ ... ] Yesterday's press conference was one of 
those channels."188 
The State Security Committee's move was designed to intimidate the media, which 
were already on the defensive after the Babitsky affair (described in chapter 6.5 ). At 
the same time, the Security Committee was trying to imply that any information coming 
from the private media that did not match the government's version was due to corrupt 
journalists. It was an attempt to try and discredit the media who were not bowing to 
government pressure, by tarnishing them with the stigma of corruption. The emotional 
rhetoric was aimed at creating an atmosphere of patriotism, therefore any journalist that 
did not follow the Kremlin's story was not only corrupt, but also a traitor ( because the 
bribe money was supposedly smuggled into Russia from abroad). 
3.9 Chapter Findings 
Although blat has changed in its character from the Soviet era ( as described by 
Ledeneva ), and strictly speaking is not corruption, it is still an important process in 
terms of having some influence in shaping contemporary Russia's power structures. The 
creation of 'inner circles' was a necessity to survive the shortages of the planned Soviet 
economy. 189 By creating such cliques, some people had access to powerful and 
influential bureaucrats who carved up the old Soviet structures and privatised them. 
These people gained power and wealth very rapidly, some of them forming the 
oligarchy. One of the most notable of the inner circles was Yeltsin's entourage widely 
known as 'The Family.' 
'The Family' is a tight circle of associates which has exerted a great deal of influence, 
power, influence and wealth was given and taken by this small exclusive group. 
Membership of this group included some of the more notable oligarchs, including Boris 
Berezovsky and Vladimir Potanin. Some excesses and abuses of power of this group 
have been brought to light but have never been punished for their alleged crimes 
( because they are protected by high ranking governmental patrons ). 
Corruption has been used as a tool to rid politicians or businessmen of unwanted 
opposition. Professor Leslie Holmes has pointed to this in his recent works. 190 Soviet 
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leaders such as Andropov and Gorbachev used corruption as a tool to taint and destroy 
political opposition. Yeltsin used the platform as a 'Crusader' against Soviet corruption to 
gain public attention and support for his eventual bid for Russia's leadership. More 
recently, Putin made the pledge to end the political interference by some of 'The 
Family's' members (namely the oligarchs) as an electioneering platform. 
During the Soviet period, the Communist monopoly of the dissemination of information 
( through controlling the media ) gave the state power to present a one-sided picture. 
The show trials during the height of Stalin's Great Terror of the late 1930's provide a 
good example. During the late Soviet period ( early 1980's ) televised corruption trials 
were shown as a preventative measure, by dissuading other would be transgressors by 
the prospect of adverse publicity. 
The media situation in contemporary Russia is more complex. Media are divided into 
either state owned media enterprises or private media enterprises. State owned media 
enterprises have long been subjected to political interference from the Presidential 
administrations (of Yeltsin and Putin ). Firing and hiring of key personnel is done with 
possible political advantage in mind ( such as the Mikhail Lesin's promotion to the post 
of Press Minister). Media under state control tended not to report allegations of 
government corruption or gave only the government's view on the matter. 191 
Privately owned media are largely concentrated in the hands of the Oligarchy. As 
stated by Altschul! earlier in the thesis, media organisations are bound to say what they 
are told to by their owners. The oligarchs exercise censorship through the use of 
economic leverage (they use their ownership to dictate editorial content). 
Articles in newspapers and television programs which claim to expose corruption in the 
government or in big business may have another motive. This was clearly the case in 
articles published by newspapers owned by Gusinsky and Berezovsky, after they lost in 
their bid to secure the newly privatised telecommunications company in 1996. Nemtsov 
and Chuba is were blamed by Gusinsky and Berezovsky for their failure in acquiring this 
company. A series of scathing articles regarding the competency of Nemtsov and 
Chubais began to appear. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE CHECHEN WAR. 
4.0 Chapter Objectives 
The Second Chechen War is a significant event in several ways, and has had a 
considerable impact on relations between the Kremlin and private media organisations. 
This chapter aims to explore the significance of this conflict and its impact on the media 
in the Russian Federation. 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in August 1999, there had been a gradual erosion of 
media freedoms. The war gave the state the opportunity to consolidate and expand their 
stranglehold on the media for the 'good' of the nation. A new concept has begun to be 
floated in the public arena, the state was to be protected above all else, even at the 
expense of personal liberties. 
The attempted creation of nationalist sentiment was one of the tools the government 
intended to utilise in order to control the flow of information ( on matters which concern 
the Russian state) domestically and internationally. State security aided by a nationalist 
sentiment in the public would ( in theory) allow the government greater ability in bringing 
about the demise of a free media. 
Some events which have arisen from the Second Chechen War include the handling of 
Andrei Babitsky (discussed further in Chapter ~I), restrictions of movement imposed by 
the military on media personal, use of rhetoric and specific language to generate hostility 
toward the Chechens ( and to unite the Russian population behind a political figure ) and 
the use of the conflict to generate the political popularity of Vladimir Putin. 
4.1 The Second Chechen War And its Consequences 
With the bomb blasts that rocked Moscow last year ( 1999 ) and the Chechen invasion 
of Dagestan, under the guise of an Islamic jihad, the Kremlin countered the 'terrorist' 
threat with force. Initially, the war began successfully for Russia. But as time dragged 
on and the incompetence's of the Russian campaign were exposed, the authorities 
became increasingly guarded about what information was allowed to be shown to 
Russian and international public. Moves by the authorities to restrict the flow of 
information began several months before the conflict in Chechnya and in a totally 
different context. Military authorities began instituting conditions, nowhere is this more 
evident than in the handling of the Babitsky affair. 
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On May 12,1999, the State Duma delivered a statement regarding the inadmissibility of 
using the Russian mass media in NATO's propaganda war in the Yugoslavian conflict. 
The Duma said that the Russian media were distorting coverage of the conflict, giving 
NATO a favourable facade. To defeat the 'propaganda,' a number of ideas tabled in 
parliament. The Federal Service of Television and Radio was charged with developing 
a system of controls that could be used to affect coverage by the Russian mass media 
of military conflicts which either directly or indirectly impacted upon security matters of 
the Russian Federation.192 
The Second Chechen War was launched after what was termed as a 'terror campaign' 
was initiated by the Chechens against Russia. There was still a bitter memory of 
Russia's humiliation in the First Chechen War ( 1994 - 1996) fresh in the memory of the 
Russian people. This manifested itself in hatred being directed at Chechens and 
Chechnya. In an analysis of their performance in the First Chechen War, the Russian 
government came to the conclusion that one of the reasons for their defeat was a loss in 
public support for the war. The change in the public attitude came from a shaping of 
public opinion by the media. Russia was also mindful of the need to maintain good 
relations with the international community in order to continue receiving much needed 
loans. With this in mind, and by watching the PR campaign run by NATO during the 
Yugoslavian crisis, Russia's media strategy was formed for the upcoming Second 
Chechen War. 
The implementation of the new censorship tactics are set in Dagestan. On the 9th of 
August, 1999, the Dagestani regional executive placed an official censorship on 
Dagestan's media. Before any news item could be aired it had to be cleared by the 
Dagestani Minister of Nationality Policy and Information. This applied to all print and 
broadcast media. 193 This was in effect a very effective gag that only permitted the 
government's view to be expressed in the mainstream media. All dissent was not 
tolerated, and was able to be brushed off by using the official organ of censorship, 
created for 'protecting' the people. The Kremlin was to follow suit soon after. 
On 17 August, 1999, the Russian Ministry for the Press, Television and Radio 
Broadcasting and Media Affairs delivered a formal warning to a limited number of TV 
networks. In which the media were forbidden from broadcasting any interviews with any 
of the separatist Chechen leaders. The stations warned were OR I: All Russia State TV 
192 Communists Propose to Restrict Russian Media Reports that Favour NATO, to Aid in Rebuilding 
Yugoslavian TV, Teleskop No. 17 (157}, 19 May, 1999. 
www.intemews.ru/crisis/restrict.html, 24 February, 2000. 
193cPJ, Alert: Restrictions on Media Coverage of Dagestan Conflict, IFEX, 23 August, 1999. 
www.ifex.org/alertslview.html?id=5448, 19 March, 2000. 
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and Radio Broadcasting Company, Russian TV, NTV and TV-6. The warning was 
issued on the grounds that by airing such interviews the media would aid the rebels in a 
"massive propaganda war," which would result in ethnic and religious intolerance. And 
by urging citizens to change their country's borders by the use of force. 194 
Initially the government tried to persuade the media, through a sort of partnership to 
blackout any views of the rebel Chechens. The Russian Security Council was the 
organisation charged with gaining co-operation from the media. Before asking for 
co-operation to what was a kind of self-censorship, Sergei Ivanov (secretary of the 
Security Council) emphasized that the Russian media had been largely supportive of 
the war effort (foreign reports were blamed for airing the rebel Chechen's views). In an 
interview with Komsomo/skaya Pravda on 3 February, 2000, Sergei Ivanov was quoted 
as saying that he was not "encroaching on the freedom of speech, but there must be 
limits and a precise understanding of what can and cannot be done. ( ... ] Use Chechen 
informers if you want. Just don't put the terrorists on the air." 195 The reintroduction of 
official state censorship was made blatantly apparent on the 14th of March, 2000. 
/nterfax wrote a brief article on what was conveyed to the Russian media; 
The Press Ministry will consider it a violation of the law on "Combat of Terrorism" if the 
Russian media provides a vehicle for the views of Chechen terrorist leaders. "We hope 
we will not have to issue warnings to the media for making public the words of Chechen 
terrorist leaders," said First Deputy Press Minister Mikhail Seslavinsky. He named Asian 
Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev and Movladi Udugov among those whom the press must 
not quote.196 
The warnings issued by the government were not empty threats. On May 4, 2000, the 
Prosecutor Generals Office said that they will be interrogating journalists from Novaya 
Gazeta and Kommersant. The papers had published an interview that had been 
conducted with the Chechen leader, Asian Maskhadov.I97 
Russian authorities had been restricting or preventing access to the warzone. Human 
Rights Watch described the actions of those concerned "Russia is keeping international 
and local journalists out of Chechnya through arbitrary and obstructive regulations. [ ... ] 
194rbid. 
195CNN I AP, Russian Security Chief Asks for Media's Help in War, EJC, 4 February, 2000. 
www. ejc. nl/mn/showresults. hmx?4185, 3 April, 2000. 
196Press Ministry Warns Against Mass Media's Quoting ofChechen Militants, lnterfax, 14 March, 2000. 
www.interfax.ru/freshnews/enews1433.htm, 16 March, 2000. 
197 Reuters, Prosecutor to Question Two Journalists, The Moscow Times, 5 May, 2000. 
www.moscowtimes.rui05-May-20001stories/story9.html, 6 May, 2000. 
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by keeping journalists out, Russia is trying to hide the evidence of its brutal campaign 
[ ... ] from the eyes of the international community." 198 
Under Russian law, accredited journalists are granted access to the entire Russian 
Federation, provided that no state of emergency has been declared. To date, no state 
of emergency has been declared within the Russian Federation. However, Russian 
officials demand that journalists who intend visiting Chechnya obtain additional 
accreditation from the military authorities in Mozdok ( Russian military headquarters). 199 
The Russian authorities have set up media tours. These tours are carefully staged and 
give a strong pro-government view. A government briefing centre was opened. This 
centre used media relation techniques that were borrowed from NATO, showing 
coverage such as the aerial bombings. 200 
Evident has been the different treatment received by the media. The media that are 
Pro-Moscow or follow the state version of events have been allowed a lot freer access. 
Some journalists have claimed to have gained access by bribing corrupt government 
officials. 201 
Those who have chosen not to follow the government line have been punished in 
various ways, normally by denying the transgressor access to Chechnya. When NTV 
aired an interview with a Russian officer on January 23rd, 2000, who said that Russia 
was suffering significant casualties, they were removed from the military journalists pool 
"'0" for several days.- -
In another incident, when Reuters and The Associated Press wrote accounts of a 
debacle at Minutka Square, Grozny, when an armoured unit was decimated. The 
authorities were qUick to act. The journalists involved were accused of working for 
foreign intell1gence agencies and trying to undermine the Russian war effort. 203 Pavel 
Gusev, editor of Moskovsky Komsomolets reported another act of official intimidation. 
He claimed that the police had visited one of his reporters, threatening to detain him in 
a mental hosp1tal :r4 
198Human Rights Watch, Alert and Update: HRW Urges Respect for Rights of the Press, International 
Freedom of Expression Exchange, 1 February, 2000. 
www. ifex.org/alerts/view.html?id=6043, 19 March, 2000. 
199·b·d I I . 
200Tracy, J., Kremlin Tells Press to Toe the Line, The Moscow Times, January 25, 2000 
201 www. ifex. org/alerts/view. html?id=6043, op. cit. 
202ibid., The Moscow Times, January 25, 2000, op. cit. 
2031bid. 
204·b'd I I . 
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In an attempt to appease and make their articles more politically acceptable for the 
government, some newspapers altered what was originally written. Komsomolskaya 
Pravda did just this with an interview with Asian Maskhadov on 18 March, 2000. The 
question and answer format article was written by Alexander Yevtushenko, who said the 
political pressure had forced the newspaper the write an anti-Maskhadov commentary 
with the article. He claimed that the commentary and the headline of the article were 
written without his knowledge. 205 The headline that caused the controversy was "Asian 
Maskhadov threatens new diversions and a protracted war," with the commentary "but 
he spoke on the telephone with a Komsomolka reporter from a mountain cave, into 
which he was chased by our troops." Yevtushenko said that the cave was entirely 
fiction. 206 
There has been increasing speculation regarding a conspiracy theory involving the 
government and the apartment bombings in Moscow. Khinshtein postulated (see 
'Khinshtein's Ordeal' ) that the bombings were the work of a secretive government 
agency that wanted to create an atmosphere of war hysteria, which Putin could take 
advantage of to win the March 2000 presidential elections. 207 The conspiracy theory 
has been taken seriously by some journalists and politicians. One journalist who has 
furthered study into Khinshtein's theory was Artyom Borovik, from the Sovershenno 
Sekretno media group. Versiya examined the government intrigue theory, as a reason 
for the bombings. Borovik was killed in a plane crash in mid-March 2000. The official 
government report blamed ice on the wings and pilot error. Borovik's colleagues stated 
that they believed his death was organised as a direct result of his reporting. 208 
A fear has been instilled in the Russian media regarding ihe reporting of news that 
does not agree with the Kremlin's official line. As a means of getting around the problem 
of attracting the Kremlin's disapproval by reporting 'negative' news, some Russian 
journalists have begun quoting western news agencies. In a news item on the Chechen 
war NTV quoted the bad news from a Moscow Times article, which was a quote from 
an Associated Press article. 209 
In a meeting with Russia's top journalist on 13 January, 2001, Putin made it clear that 
he wanted to see the creation of 'single information space.' The intention of this creation 
is intended to ensure the integrity of the state (defence of the state above all else ). 
205Karush, S., Pravda Distorts Maskhadov Interview, The Moscow Times, 23 March, 2000. 
www.moscowtimes.ru/23-Mar-2000/stories/story4.html, 23 March, 2000. 
206lbid. 
207 Russia's Kise/yov on Freedom of Press, Speech: Comment, June 6, 
Bloomberg. Published in Vremya Novostei. 
208lbid. 
2091bid. 
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Putin was quoted as saying "any talk about unity of the Russian state apparently starts 
with the formulation of its tasks and goals. A single information space is a priority task. It 
would be worth noting that the word came first." 21° 
Putin's statement would appear to agree with my contention that there is an attempt by 
the Kremlin to resurrect a strong centralised state and that this state must be protected 
at all costs. Even if the price comes at the cost of individual freedoms. Another point 
which I have made is that the state is unwilling to accept or allow dissent from state 
doctrine. The creation of a 'single information space' seems to be jargon signaling the 
re-emergence of state censorship. 
4.2 The use of Rhetoric and Emotional Language 
Due to the size constraints on this thesis I am unable to undertake an in-depth analysis 
of Russian newspapers over a protracted period. It is for this reason that I have chosen 
some articles mentioned previously in this chapter, and undertaken analysis of these 
articles. 
The use of specific language and images can carry a powerful message. Significance 
of news items which are printed or broadcasted not only refers to what is physically 
present in the text or news broadcast, but by which items are omitted. Agendas can be 
present by the fact that some news worthy material has been deliberately left out. 
The series of bomb blasts which occurred in Moscow and other Russian towns prior to 
the Chechen incursion of Dagestan prompted a mix of fear, anger and a thirst for 
revenge by the Russian public. This public sentiment was encouraged by the Kremlin 
who wanted to gain political mileage from any action which they took. 
A successor to Boris Yeltsin was being selected at the time of the increased hostilities 
between Chechnya and Russia. The last years of President Yeltsin's rule were 
characterised by stagnation, indecision and scandal. Yeltsin wanted a successor, who 
he could 'rely' on, so that he would be safe from any possible repercussions ( as a result 
of his rule) during retirement. His heir would need to be young, charismatic and 
energetic for there to be any appeal to the Russian public. 
The upcoming conflict was cast into a 'black and white' setting by a co-operative 
Russian media, somewhat reminiscent of the 1996 Presidential elections. This 
210 Putin Says Single Information Space Essential for Integrity of State, ITAR-TASS, 13 January, 2001. 
Johnson's Russia List #5026, 15 January, 2001 
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simplification of reality for public viewing was done to facilitate the propaganda effort. 
Initially, the Kremlin said that the defence of the state was paramount and other 
considerations were secondary. 
A specific vocabulary has been established, designed to dehumanise the Chechens 
and glorify the Russian forces. By doing this, it is easier to identify ( and support ) the 
Russian forces and to support the war effort. Russians have expressed the desire to 
have a strong, central leadership once more. This vacuum was filled, through the use of 
imagery by Vladimir Putin. A report written by Emma Gray lends support to my belief that 
the Russian media has (through being forced or complicity) created binary opposition in 
the Second Chechen war. 211 "Throughout the conflict, virtually all Russian media have 
demonised Chechens and highlighted Russian military successes." 212 
Some of the main TV channels ( ORT and RTR ) televised pictures of Putin at the front 
where he was talking with troops, handing out medals and hunting knives and flying in a 
jet fighter-bomber. These images conveyed the message that Putin was a vigorous, 
energetic and a man of action. This was in stark contrast to Yeltsin's later years which 
were marked by long periods of hospitalisation. Other political rivals were also 
marginalised, as they seen as talkers and not men of action. These images earned a lot 
of public attention and popularity, this was to prove crucial in the March 2000 
presidential elections. 
In the quest to create two opposing forces in the Chechen conflict, the Chechens have 
been cast in the role of the villain. The Chechen people have been characterised as an 
unruly mass, whose sole aim is to destroy the Russian state. It is rarely that Chechens 
are referred to as individuals, but more usually as terrorists, bandits or Islamic 
fundamentalists. 
While viewing the Russian military news site, the subject and content of the news 
available was selective. Several tendencies are revealed in news headlines. Firstly, the 
vilifying of the Chechens through the reference to Chechens as rebels or terrorists. This 
gives a focus for the Russian public, to hate the 'enemy' and rally behind their country. 
Throughout the headlines and the news stories Russian losses are not thoroughly 
addressed. News of Russian casualties is bad for domestic morale, consequently the 
issue is taboo and is touched on in a superficial manner. Bad news has been altered, in 
a manner which is similar to what occurred in the Gulf War. 2 13 
21 1 Emma Gray's report, Putin's Media War ( 27/3/2000 ), is located on the Committee for the Protection 
of Journalists website ( www.cpj.org ). 
2121bid. 
213 Bad news from the Gulf War, such as casualties to 'friendly fire' have only surfaced some time after 
69 
Another theme which arises from an assessment of the news headlines is the 
highlighting of Russian military successes. Results on the battlefield maintain a measure 
of public support, even if these efforts exaggerated. When the news of the bloodbath 
which occurred with the attempted storming of Grozny in the First Chechen War, the 
Russian public was shocked by the setback and soon began to withdraw some support 
for the war. 
A selection of headlines over the period of January 25- January 26, 2001 are as 
follows; 
• Federals detain two rebels trying to set off a landmine in Chechnya ( 25/01/2001 ). 
• Chechen warlords plan major terrorist act in Nozhai- Yurt district ( 25/01/2001 ). 
• Artillery strike kills five rebels, destroys three cars in Chechnya ( 26/01/2001 ). 
• Terrorist planting landmine killed near Fed commant point in Grozny ( 26/01/2001 ). 
214 
In an earlier quote from Jnterfax. First Deputy Press Minister Seslavinsky said that the 
government "will consider it a violation of the law on the 'Combat of Terrorism' if the 
Russian media provides a vehicle for the views of Chechen terrorist leaders." 215 This 
small quote provides an example of the vilifying process of the Chechens. By analysing 
this statement, several themes emerge, about the picture of the conflict as told by the 
Russian state. 
• To write something that does not agree with the government standpoint is illegal, by 
violating the 'Combat of Terrorism' laws. A country with laws is a 'civilised' and 
ordered society, the law provides a measure of legitimacy. Here, the implication is 
that the Chechen state is lawless (therefore the Chechen state is illegitimate). 
• Articles which contradict the Kremlin's position are likely to be propaganda from the 
Chechen leadership. A conclusion drawn from this can be the Russian government is 
merely trying to inform readers of the 'real' situation, information gained from 
Chechen sources is unreliable because of the 'propaganda' factor. 
• The Chechen leadership is illegitimate because they are terrorists and not a formal 
nation with a legitimately formed government ( such as Russia ). 
the war. During the conflict, such images or news was censored out of the headlines. 
214News headlines taken from www.militarynews.ru on January 28, 2001. 
215 See page 65, for the fuller version of this quote. 
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In the case where a complete fabrication of the truth occurred, in the newspaper 
Komsomolskaya Pravda on 18 March, 2000. The paper claimed that the article written 
was from an interview with Asian Maskhadov, the Chechen President. Tracts from the 
article included such phrases as; "Asian Maskhadov threatens new diversions and a 
protracted war," "but he spoke on the telephone with a komsomolka reporter from a 
mountain cave, into which he was chased by our troops ( see footnote 187 for further 
detail)." 
These two sentences have highly charged and emotive connotations. Some different 
meanings or messages can be derived from the above extract from Komsomo/skaya 
Pravda. 
• Although non-specific about the exact nature of the threatened 'new diversions,' the 
implication is that there will be a renewed campaign of terror against civilian targets. 
By using this threat, most civilians would want to avoid a repeat of the apartment 
bombing campaign at almost any cost. 
• The reference to a protracted war gives the reader an impression that the Chechen 
leadership needs to be eliminated, because they are fanatics and will stop at nothing 
in order to achieve their ends. This desire for war seems to be an irrational desire, 
the implication is that it is not possible to rationalise with people of such a mindset. 
• By using the reference to the Chechen leader hiding in a cave, the resulting imagery 
is that the Chechen leadership is cowardly. The other side of the dualist coin portrays 
the Russian forces as courageous and competent in what they are doing ( because 
they have cornered the Chechen leader). 
Newspaper articles and TV news bulletins such as these may be considered to be 
designed to create a polar image of the opposing sides in the Chechen conflict. The 
language used by the media is very specific and charged with connotations. 
It seems as though the main purpose of this form of public manipulation is to create a 
mentality of 'us versus them' which would unite the population towards a single goaJ.216 
There was, and still appears to be some discontent at the current standard of living 
conditions in the Russian Federation. The 'miracle' of capitalism still has not occurred for 
many. The concept of creating a war to distract a dissatisfied populace's attention is not 
216 To defend the Russian state and thus themselves from a 'common' enemy, the Chechens (who 
want to destroy them ). 
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a new tactic, in Shakespeare's Henry V a war was waged in France 'to busy giddy 
minds.' 
4.3 Chapter Findings 
Chechnya has proved to have been a serious blow for the maintenance of the media's 
freedom of speech. The Kremlin has had a lot invested in this conflict. Results of the 
First Chechen War ( 1994 - 96 ) proved to be a costly and embarrassing military and 
political failure for the Yeltsin regime. A consequence of the failure of First Chechen War 
was an openly hostile attitude of governmental representatives (military, police and 
other bureaucrats) toward the media. Media were perceived as 'the enemy,' because 
they 'betrayed' the state by the content of media reports. 
The Second Chechen War ( 1998- ) was used by the outgoing Yeltsin regime to raise 
the political popularity and profile of their chosen successor. Vladimir Putin was made to 
be seen as an energetic man, a man of action and willing to enforce the rule of law. This 
gave him an advantage over his political rivals by bestowing the attributes of a strong 
leader on Putin and shutting his political rivals from media publicity. 
Throughout the conflict, the Kremlin has sought to act in the role as the gatekeeper of 
all information flowing into and out of Chechnya. It has been their desire (the 
government's) to not have a repeat of the 1994- 96 conflict, where a loss of public 
support was attributed to graphic media coverage of Russian operations. 
A study by the Russian military of how the media were handled by the military in the 
1991 Gulf War and by NATO in the 1998 Kosovo Crisis was undertaken. Some of these 
methods employed in the Gulf War and Kosovo operations were copied by the Russian 
Forces. 
• Access to the battlefield was restricted by the use of journalist pools. Journalists 
were not to enter the area of operations for reasons of personal safety. Access to 
where the fighting was occurring was by military transport only, therefore journalists 
needed to be on good terms with the military if they were to be granted access. 
• Press conferences were held by military officials to disseminate information. 
However, the dissemination of this information was very much on the military's terms. 
These conferences provided the opportunity for officials to 'streamline' information, 
that is to control which information is released and which information is kept from the 
media. 
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Russia's stranglehold on the diffusion of information has been less effective than in the 
NATO and UN conducted operations. An important reason for this is the corruptibility of 
forces deployed in Chechnya. Some journalists claim to have circumvented the 
government imposed restrictions by bribing soldiers or police. 
Journalists or media organisations which break the government's wishes are subjected 
to various forms of sanctions. One of the more common sanctions is to refuse entry to 
the area of operations by either not granting accreditation or removing the transgressor 
from the journalists pool ( as happened to NTV ). Some journalists have complained 
about being harassed by tax inspectors and the police, who have tried to 'persuade' the 
media organisation to drop certain topics or stories. 
The pressure for media organisations to conform to the government's expectations is 
immense. Some responses to this pressure have begun to emerge. Most of the Russian 
media groups ( private and state owned ) have bent to the pressure. Media-Most is a 
notable exception, and has been subjected to unprecedented government scrutiny on 
every facet of its operations. 
Komsomo/skaya Pravda's article of 18 March, 2000 proved to be pure fiction. This is 
an indicator of the lengths the media will go to in order to appease the Kremlin. Another 
method of trying to avoid the government's wrath has been to quote 'bad news' from 
other media sources ( normally Western media sources ). 
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CHAPTER V: MEDIA PARTICIPATION IN THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS 
5.0 Chapter Objectives 
Electoral periods have become a time where greater than normal suppression of the 
freedom of the press occurs. Politicians are eager to stay in power, and will use the 
media to help them achieve this end. 
The main objectives of this chapter are to establish that a collusion has existed 
between the media ( both privately and state owned ) and the Russian government. At 
first, the media was not coerced by threats from the Kremlin, but acted in partnership 
with the government in the 1996 presidential elections. 
State owned media have been obliged to do as the Kremlin tells them, and will suffer 
the consequences if they do not or if the government performs poorly in the elections. 
Political control over the state media has been absolute, the state media are often 
subjected to political interference. Appointments of high ranking state media officials are 
made with political motivation. 
The state owned media were not initially (under the Yeltsin regime) under these 
pressures, yet they still did as the Kremlin requested. I shall examine some of the 
motivation behind this co-operation. Help given by the private media, via the owners 
( the oligarchs ) came at a price. This early co-operation may have triggered some 
expectations on the part of the government about future dealings. 
Some of the leading figures in the contemporary Russian media ( state media ) 
hierarchy owe their current status by rendering help to Yeltsin's campaign. Among this 
new set of bureaucrats is Mikhail Lesin, whose allegiance to the state is unshakable. His 
rise to his current position as the press minister will be put into the wider context. 
By the time of the 1999/2000 elections, the cordial alliance between the government 
and the privately owned media was partly broken. Gusinsky's media empire had 
attracted the attention of the state bureaucrats by their exposes on government 
corruption and the situation in Chechnya. 
The results of the 2000 presidential elections was critical for Yeltsin, who wanted to 
protect the legacy of his years of rule by being able to determine his successor. Putin's 
rapid ascendancy in Russia's political scene was a surprise for some. 
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Various tactics were used in both the 1996 and 2000 elections to marginalise the 
political opposition. I will endeavour to describe some of the tactics used by the political 
parties in their quest for public office. 
5.1 The Oligarch I Government Partnership In The 1996 Elections 
losif Dzialoshinsky, a professor in Moscow University's journalism faculty, says that 
business and politics are related. He also states that "control over powerful media 
outlets is needed in order to gain political influence. [ ... ]this is true for Moscow based, 
national media outlets, as well as for regional media throughout the country."217 
The co-operation between the oligarchs and the Kremlin in a mutually beneficial 
partnership was evident in the 1996 presidential elections. The incumbent, President 
Yeltsin was facing a loss to the Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyganov. Such a 
loss would threaten both the established political order and the oligarchs business 
interests, as a consequence they united against the threat. 
During the lead-up to the 1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin needed a miracle to 
avoid a loss to the communists. Opinion polls prior to the election gave Yeltsin single 
digit approval ratings, some Russian journalists openly mocked his chances at 
re-election. 218 Yeltsin asked for the help of the oligarchs who controlled the main media 
outlets. The oligarchs expected something in return for their help. Financial resources 
were amalgamated and a twin strategy unfolded. 
Anatoly Chubais ( head of the President's electoral team ) worked with the media 
magnates to give Yeltsin favourable coverage and to marginalise political opposition. 
The strategy worked, Yeltsin was re-elected as Russia's President. 
Gusinsky's right hand man from NTV, Igor Malashenko of NTV admitted during an 
interview in early 1996 that the political and economic interests which back NTV 
(including himself) were against a communist victory.219 Malashenko was given the job 
as an advisor on Yeltsin's team. His feelings about a potential election victory by the 
Communists seem to typify big business mentality. He hinted that if the private media 
gave "unbiased, professional and objective" campaign coverage, the Communists 
would win the election. Rationalising further, Malashenko felt that a Communist victory 
217 www. rferl. org/nca/features/1997/09/F. RU. 9709261152044. html 
218Belin, L., 'Owners attracted by power of media,' Politicisation and Self-censorship in the Russian 
Media, Radio Free Europe I Radio Liberty, November 1997. 
www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumediapaper/owners.html, 1 March, 2000. 
219www.intemews.ru/books/media1999/54.html, op. cit. 
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would erode media freedom permanently. For this reason, it was preferable to be a 
short-lived "instrument of propaganda" for the Kremlin. 22o 
A striking change in the coverage ofYeltsin by the private media. Criticism ofYeltsin all 
but disappeared from the media. His promises to end the First Chechen War and pay 
wage arrears were not treated with the usual skepticism. Whilst Yeltsin's coverage by 
the media was favourable, the Communists were consistently subjected to 'black' PR. 
For instance, Zyganov's coverage was often associated with Viktor Anpilov, a radical 
figure ( and marginal ) in the Communist party. The media showed both Zyganov and 
Yeltsin to the public, how the Kremlin wanted them to be viewed. An example in the 
election which clearly demonstrates the extent to which the media were prepared to go 
in exercising censorship, Russian Public Television Network refused to air Zyganov's 
final campaign advertisement.221 
During the period from February to June 1996, the media began a campaign to 
marginalise Yeltsin's political opponents. This was done by creating a perception that 
the election was to be a two-way contest between Yeltsin and Zyganov, everyone else 
were removed from the political picture. By engaging in this strategy, the Kremlin was 
able to hold up Yeltsin as the only barrier to Russia returning to communism.222 
In the final two weeks prior to the first round of the presidential elections, in early June 
1996, a barrage of favourable coverage for Aleksandr Lebed circulated through the 
media. Lebed is a retired General and was a presidential candidate. In a secret deal he 
made with Yeltsin, he had pledged to give his support to Yeltsin. The deal entailed 
Lebed withdrawing after the first round of voting and putting his support behind Yeltsin. 
Lebed also engaged in an anti-Communist election campaign strategy.223 This brokered 
deal certainly worked to Yeltsin's advantage. 
The media message in between the two rounds of voting was to "vote or lose." A grim 
picture was broadcast to the viewing public of communists returning to power if the voter 
turnout fell below 60%.224 
After the election victory, Yeltsin's main supporters were rewarded for their efforts 
and achieved considerable political influence. Vladimir Potanin and Boris Berezovsky 
220www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumediapaper/owners.html, op. cit. 
2211bid. 
2221bid. 
223Jbid. 
224Jbid. 
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were given governmental posts. NTV ( Vladimir Gusinsky ) was given permission to 
broadcast 24 hours on a nationwide basis, just 24 hours after Yeltsin's victory.225 
Some of today's business and public figures owe their rise to power as a result of 
aiding in Yeltsin's 1996 election campaign. One of the more contentious public figures to 
gain power and influence was Mikhail Lesin. Lesin was one of the founders of an 
advertising agency called Video International, which was responsible for the production 
of Yeltsin's campaign commercials. His reward was to be appointed as First Deputy 
Chairman of the state owned Russian Television network. 226 Since then he has been 
acting as the guardian of the Kremlin's interests, firstly influencing content on the state 
controlled media. More recently, he was appointed the minister of the press, extending 
his influence to the management of the privately owned media as well. 
Political and economic interests had combined on this occasion due to the threat of a 
communist victory. A communist victory in the presidential elections could have serious 
repercussions on the interests of the incumbent political and economic elite. The 
oligarchs did not co-operate solely for the 'good' of the country or because of the 
rewards that Yeltsin offered them, but the threat to their interests if Gennady Zyganov 
was elected President. There was a real possibility of the re-nationalisation of privati sed 
state assets. The main lesson of the conduct of the 1996 presidential election campaign 
was very clear. When handled correctly and effectively, the media can be a very 
powerful tool for manipulating public opinion. Prospective owners, i.e. the oligarchs, the 
potential power of the mass media is a major drawcard. 
5.2 The December 1999 And March 2000 Elections 
The pre-election coverage by the Russian media, leading to the December Duma and 
March presidential vote, a nasty campaign was waged against the Kremlin's opponents. 
The opposition had to contend with such issues as being shut out of publicity and where 
kompromat ( smear attacks ) were freely used. Strict government controls on political 
reporting and advertising has caused some media organisations to come into conflict 
with the Press Ministry and the Central Elections Committee. The stringent rules 
regarding political reporting put a gag on this news until after the election. 
Analysts from the European Institute for the Media (ElM) had assessed that nearly 
half of the television news coverage was spent showing Putin. 48% of the coverage 
225www. rferl.org/nca/features/1997/09/F. RU. 9709261152044. html, op. cit. 
226Belin, L., 'Media Squeezed by Market Realities,' Politicisation and Self-Censorship in the Russian 
Media, Radio Free Europe I Radio Liberty, November 1997. 
www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumediapaper/media.html, 1 March, 2000. 
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was given to showing Putin, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky and Zhirinovsky each gained 
approximately 10% coverage. From March 2 until March 21, 2000, ElM collated data 
from all television and print media. They found that Putin received 33% national 
television coverage, compared to around 1 0% each from the other leading political 
contenders. 227 
ElM identified the partly state owned television stations RTR and ORT ( Berezovsky 
also has a large share ) as being the most biased in favour of the Kremlin's choice.228 
On Sunday March 26, 2000, Putin said "I want to point out that the Communists 
achieved that level ( 30% of vote ) even though - let us be direct and honest about this -
they did not have that many opportunities in the media, especially electronic media."229 
This brief statement by Putin lends support to the notion that other candidates in the 
election were 'shut-out' in a deliberate attempt to minimise any opposition that the 
Kremlin may have faced. The Kremlin's pressure was not merely restricted to shutting 
the opposition out from media coverage, there was another more insidious method 
used. The use of Kompromat, a smear campaign against their opponents and carried 
out by ORTespecially. ORTwaged a ruinous campaign against Yavlinsky. On March 
23, 2000, there were three separate reports which attacked Yavlinsky. Among the 
accusations, ORT has claimed that Yavlinsky has illegally taken money from foreign 
backers, which has been denied. In Russia's relatively conservative society, 
homophobia and anti-Semitism exist. ORT exploited these prejudices, and showed 
groups of Jews and homosexuals voicing their support for Yavlinsky.230 Yavlinsky had a 
poor performance at the polls and was only able to gain less than 6% of the vote. 
Attention was not focused solely on Yavlinsky. Primakov and Luzhkov, as serious 
contenders were also the subject of a smear campaign. Luzhkov was portrayed as a 
corrupt murderer, and Primakov as a frail has-been by prime-time broadcasts.23 1 
Dorenko, a reporter from ORT was particularly savage in his attacks on Luzhkov. 
Claims made by Dorenko about Luzhkov bordered on the ridiculous, but 
destroyed his reputation none the less. Dorenko's claims included Luzhkov 
sympathising with the Scientologists, lied about helping a children's hospital, had been 
involved in a dubious real-estate transaction in Marbella, Spain, murdered an American 
businessman and some further allegations. Luzhkov responded by suing Dorenko for 
libel, and won. The loss did not silence Dorenko though, he claimed moral victory and 
227 Reuters, European Monitors Say Russia Media Biased for Putin 27 March, 2000. 
www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=146240, 28 March, 2000. 
228tbid. 
229tbid. 
230tbid. 
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began using computer graphics to morph Luzhkov into Mussolini and Monica Lewinsky 
with pearls.232 
ElM noted a third tactic employed by the government in suppressing their political 
opposition. Some media (media organisations not named) had said that the 
government had pressured them into making as little criticism of Putin as possible. This 
was done with the threat of using such financial measures as increasing broadcasting 
costs or calling in loans from banks that were partly state-owned. 233 
An example of a financial pressure employed by the government against a private 
media organisation was tried against TV Tsentr, owned by Moscow's mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov. TV Tsentr received two warnings from the Press Ministry during the 
December parliamentary election campaign for coverage, the station allegedly broke the 
election law. Under the law the consequence is that the station loses its broadcasting 
licence, which is put up for tender. A legal challenge by TV Tsentr resulted in one of the 
warnings being declared invalid.234 
The newly created Press Ministry has been a powerful tool in the Kremlin's attempts to 
quell media independence. The ministry has broad powers that enable it to regulate the 
press. Publishing licences were due for renewal in March 2000, which happened to 
coincide with the presidential elections, a fact that was not lost on the media. In addition 
to the fear of not having their licences renewed, the press can have their licences 
revoked at any time by the Press Ministry.235 As Mikhail Berger, Segodnya's editor 
rightly observes, "the Press Ministry will be no more than an instrument of the Kremlin. 
The ministry can use blackmail or revoke licences."236 
At the same time as the Kremlin smeared its political opposition with black PR, they 
were also very careful to cover their own tracks of any wrongdoing. Novaya Gazeta was 
to publish several articles in March 2000. These stories involved allegations of large 
campaign finance violations by Yeltsin in 1996 and Putin in 2000. However, prior to the 
publication of these articles, unidentified hackers broke into the paper's computer 
system and deleted the entire issue. The paper was delayed from publishing the 
stories. 237 
232Russia's Kiselyov on Freedom of Press, Speech: Comment, op. cit. 
233www.russiatoday.cornlnews.php3?=146240, op. cit. 
234steen, M., Moscow TV Cries Foul on Free Speech in Permit Row, Reuters, May 19, 2000. 
235Lagnado, A., Yeltsin Curbs Media During Run-up to Poll, The Telegraph, 25 July, 1999. 
2361bid. 
www. telegraph. co. uklet?ac=000659276559150&rtmo=quKKpMX9&atm ... wrus.htm, 29 February, 
2000. 
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The results of the concerted smear attack, launched by the Kremlin through the media 
( especially through the use of television ) had the designed effect. Putin, who polled at 
2% at the beginning of the campaign achieved a 53% share of the vote.238 Dorenko 
referred to reports that blamed him for the political demise of Luzhkov and Primakov in 
the presidential elections. Luzhkov and Primakov also connect Dorenko and the Kremlin 
inspired smear campaign as reasons for withdrawing from the presidential race. 239 
Lesin, the press minister reinforced the lockout of the media being able to report on 
candidates, under the election laws. He said that "the mass media basically have no 
right to even mention the name of any candidate or party. "240 
Alexander Veshnyakov, head of the Central Elections Committee delivered a threat 
regarding the reporting of political parties and candidates. He noted that it was 
permissible for candidates to campaign, but any reporting or editorializing of candidates 
( negatively or positively ) by media may be construed as campaigning. And as such, 
those that did the report are at risk of being closed down. Channe/1 invited 
Veshnyakov for an on air interview. During the interview a question was asked, was it 
allowed to report if a candidate stole a wallet. The answer was no that information 
cannot be reported, because that person was a candidate.24l 
Bearing in mind the case of slander involving Dorenko, the law is broken. Apart from 
the court case, when a successful lawsuit was filed against Dorenko, no other legal 
repercussions resulted. It would appear as though the law is not applied equally. 
Pro-Kremlin communications are tolerated and given an unofficial sanction by the 
authorities. 
5.3 Chapter Findings 
Initially the pnvate media supported the Yeltsin regime. This Kremlin/media partnership 
in the 1996 elect1ons was a mutually beneficial arrangement. By maintaining the political 
status quo Yeltstn retained his position as the President of the Russian Federation and 
the media ( represented by the owners of the media, the oligarchs ) had a sympathetic 
hearing with the Pres1dent. 
238Gentleman, A, Back to the USSR, The Guardian, May 29, 2000. 
239LaFraniere, S., Russian Media Fear for Their Independence, Washington Post, p. 19, 21 February, 
2000. 
www. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPiate/2000-02/21/0941-0221 00-idx.html, 29 February, 2000. 
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2411bid. 
80 
Other considerations entered this arrangement as well. NTV's Malashenko stated that 
he did not wish to see a resurgence of Communism. The owners of the private media 
organisations saw a threat to their assets if the Communists were to regain power, 
through the renationalisation of privatised state assets. 
When the oligarchs agreed to help the Yeltsin regime, they were offered financial 
inducements and access to the government's resources ( including soon to be privatised 
state enterprises ). Gusinsky received licensing and broadcasting concessions for his 
media network. Berezovsky and Potanin were granted governmental posts for their 
services. 
The strategy used by the press in the 1996 presidential elections employed two main 
methods of minimising political opposition to Yeltsin. The first method was to cover 
Yeltsin in a favourable manner and to broadcast only limited coverage of the political 
opposition. By employing this method the public are saturated by positive images of 
Yeltsin. On the other hand, the few images of the opposition which are shown are in a 
negative light. Theoretically this would create a 'black and white' picture in the voters 
minds, that Yeltsin would be the only 'realistic' choice, given the alternative choices. 
The tactic of narrowing the race for the presidency to a choice between two 
candidates, in the public's mind paid dividends. What had begun as a multi-party 
election soon saw a shrinking support for the other parties. This made the second part 
of the plan easier, to create an image of good and bad. Although Yeltsin did not win in 
the first round of elections, he did eventually win. Initial polls immediately prior to the 
elections rated Yeltsin's public support in single digits, which did not bode well for his 
political future. 
A change occurred in the conduct of the 1999/2000 elections. During these elections a 
two pronged strategy to 'neutralise' political opposition was used. Analysis of media 
coverage of the participating politicians by agencies such as ElM, revealed that the 
opposition were all but shut out from the media. Information concerning Putin 
( usually favourable ) was prevalent, this coverage even was even greater in television 
coverage. 
Kompromat was widely used, as the second element in the recent elections. The war 
of words was waged on an attritional basis. Whoever suffered the least damage to their 
image would be the winner. In this respect, it would be useful to own or have 
sympathetic media to defend ones own position and to spread kompromat against the 
opposition. The government had the best access to the media, through either direct 
ownership ( state owned media ) or sympathetic media. 
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Luzhkov and Primakov had limited access to media assets through TV Tsentr ( owned 
by Luzhkov ). Other politicians such as Yavlinsky did not have such access. Putin's 
political opponents had a greatly inferior media platform with which to defend their 
positions and attack the government's weaknesses. 
Top ranking bureaucrats have shown a willingness to protect their political patron. Both 
Lesin and Veshnyakov have made comments to the effect that they are ready and 
predisposed toward gagging the media during the elections. It is in the interests of these 
bureaucrats to do this, because as long as their patrons are in power they have a 
measure of job security. Their leverage lies in the ability to remove publishing or 
broadcasting licences and enacting the letter of the law (Electoral law). 
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CHAPTER VI: OTHER EVENTS WHICH HAVE INFLUENCED MEDIA DIRECTION 
6.0 Chapter Objectives 
It is the intention of this chapter to raise a series of issues which have had an impact 
on how the media operate in society and thus affects the media's functions. A shift in the 
underlying philosophy has been occurring in the contemporary Russian media since 
gaining a measure of independence from state interference. There has been a gradual 
shift from a model based closely on the Libertarian model, back to a mixture between a 
Soviet and Authoritarian model. 
State-owned media have been closely watched and controlled by the political 
leadership of the Russian Federation. Since 1996 this control has increasingly begun to 
extend to the privately-owned media as well. New laws, political interferenc-e, 
intimidation and the use of other leverage have combined to put pressure on the media's 
editorial independence. 
The pressure does not appear to be evenly applied across Russia. Russia's regional 
press seem to be under greater pressure than their counterparts in the major cities, such 
as Moscow. There are several journalist rights groups based in Moscow, which do not 
exist in some of the far flung republics. 
State censorship seems to be on the return, accelerating with Putin's rise to the 
presidency. The state apparatus such as the police, tax department, armed forces and 
FSB to name a few, are more than willing to aid in the task of reigning in the press. 
The introduction of this censorship began slowly. Beginning with an abortive attempt to 
introduce the morality bill ( which was said to be designed to protect the moral well-being 
of Russians ) and the measures to combat terrorism at the outbreak of hostilities in 
Chechnya ( 1998 ). At first the government blamed the foreign press and their influence, 
but has since began to subdue Russian media organisations, such as Media-Most. 
Critical Enlightenment theory goes some way toward explaining the current struggle 
between the media and the Kremlin. The theory analyses power play between groups in 
a given society, assuming that privileged groups have an interest in maintaining the 
status quo to protect their advantages. In the present day situation the oligarchs 
represent the old power structure ( Yeltsin and the Family) and Putin is a new power 
structure. As Putin threatened to destroy the oligarchs as a class, he has threatened the 
existence ( and privileges ) of the existing power structure. The old power structure 
owns a large portion of the privately owned media and use this asset to try and defend 
their position by attempting to mobilise public support through the use of political 
communication. 
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Putin has mobilised 'friendly' media assets to communicate his response to the claim 
that he is trying to reintroduce censorship. He has consistently claimed that he supports 
a free media, and by breaking the oligarchs hold on power will return the media to a true 
form of freedom, devoid of the oligarchs interference. Vremya MN has supported this 
view in an article. 
Some politicians and government departments have established their own media 
organisations. These media organisations are built for a specific purpose, to be the 
'mouthpiece' of their creator and owner. Information which contradicts their patron is 
either discarded or altered. Two enterprises that fit into this category are Vremya MN, 
established by the Russian Central Bank and TV Tsentr, which was established by 
Moscow's mayor Yuri Luzhkov. 
Modern forms of media communication have not escaped the attention of the Kremlin. 
The internet, although in existence on only a small scale at present has had special 
measures enacted to try and control the flow of information. 242Jn addition to trying to 
control the internet, the government, via Gleb Pavlovsky ( a senior media advisor to the 
Kremlin) has begun to establish a network ofwebsites ( www.strana.ru for example) to 
spread the government's point of view. 
6.1 Media in transition 
With the erosion and eventual collapse of communist power, a new and uncertain era 
began. During this transitional stage, there were no set rules and laws to observe. This 
ensured that a period of instability began. The nature of the press was dramatically 
altered. In Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, this sentiment is clearly 
expressed. "But the expansion of press freedom took place in a period of real transition, 
where old rules had lost their legitimacy and new ones had not yet been promulgated to 
take their place. Openness also created the means by which old hatreds could be 
publicly expressed."243 
The Russian media is still undergoing a period of transition, in terms of ownership, 
identity and laws currently being promulgated to regulate the industry. Where there 
once was a power vacuum, there now exist several strong financial empires and few 
242Polls from news bulletins on Johnson's Russia List, put the internet usage rate at approximately 
13% of the Russian population. 
243o'N 'I 't 2 e1 , op. c1 . , p. 
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media bodies fall outside this net. Federal measures being considered are in some ways 
draconian, in order to curb the excesses of what happened to the standard of 
journalism following the Soviet collapse. 
Readers of the newspapers are starting to lose confidence in the partiality and 
independence of what they read, according to some in the industry. Irina Petrovskaya, a 
TV critic with Izvestia newspaper, in an interview expressed this public lack of 
confidence. "The mass media themselves, unfortunately, tried to discredit themselves in 
the eyes of the public. And no one believes in any noble, unselfish motives any longer. 
It seems to everyone that behind the actions of any particular mass medium lies some 
corporate, commercial, or political interest."244 
The legacy of the communist past still exerts an influence on the media. During the 
upheaval of the period of glasnost and perestroika, to the 1991 coup and the hasty 
collapse of Soviet power the past was discarded almost overnight. Journalists, as was 
society in general, guided by a strict set of principles. The Marxist- Leninist doctrine, by 
which the media operated was all of a sudden discarded without having a doctrine 
absorbed to fill the vacuum. McNair states that some of the Soviet doctrine has been 
carried through into the present: "The audience is used to, and still expects, journalists 
to be politically committed propagandists. The media in Russia continue to be 
associated with the manipulation of public opinion, rather than its formation, and with 
private interests, rather than public service."245 
In another incident which highlights the apparent decline in the independence of the 
Russian media, was the resignation of Oleg Dobrodeyev from NTV in January 2000. 
Dobrodeyev was a co-founder and Director of NTV. His reason for departure was 
unclear, apart from his unease regarding the direction that journalism was taking. He is 
widely renowned in Russia as a strong upholder of a professional and balanced 
journalism. And prior to his departure from the station, was pushing for a more critical 
coverage of the latest Chechen campaign, which is where he came into conflict with 
Gusinsky. 
In the period immediately prior to his departure from NTV, Oleg Dobrodeyev had 
expressed some concern over the decline in the standards of journalism. His response 
to the media coverage of the 1999 State Duma elections was scathing. "All television 
244 Freedom of Speech and Andrei Babitsky, Chetvertaya Vlast, No. 1 03, 12 February, 2000. 
www.internews.ru/crisis/babitsky.html, 24 February, 2000. 
245curran & Park, op. cit., p. 91, quoted from McNair, B., Power, Profit, Corruption, and Lies: The 
Russian Media in the 1990's, Chapter 6. 
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channels," says Dobrodeyev, came out of this election campaign with huge losses to 
their reputations." 246 
President Yeltsin had a reputation of holding the ideal of a free press in high regard, 
that he was a champion of the freedom of speech because he did not allow the bullying 
of the press by anyone in his administration. This is essentially true, with regard to the 
Yeltsin government's relationship with private media organisations. However, his 
administration's record with the state owned media organisations showed a less tolerant 
approach. 
Yeltsin often interfered with the top positions of the state owned media organisations. 
His interference coincided with elections in the Russian Federation. 
For Example, on December 16,1993, four days elections, Vyacheslav Bragin was 
dismissed by Yeltsin.247 Bragin was the chairman of Ostankino (then named Russian 
State Television and Radio Company). Yeltsin was disappointed with the poll results 
and it seems as though Brag in, as the head of the state media, took the blame. 
A similar incident took place after the parliamentary elections and after Yeltsin 
announced his candidacy for a second term of office in 1996. On February 15, 1996 
Yeltsin sacked Oleg Poptsov the President of RTR (Russian State Television). RTR 
was accused of lying and focusing on negative news, such as highlighting atrocities in 
Chechnya and overstating economic hardships. 248 As outlined elsewhere in the thesis, 
the 1996 elections were almost lost by Yeltsin and he required the full co-operation of 
the press to boost his image and chances of re-election. After Poptsov's removal, 
Yeltsin invited NTV President Igor Malashenko to join his team of media consultants. 
This alliance held at least two tangible benefits for Yeltsin. Firstly he aligned himself 
with an independent television network and secondly, this union meant that Yeltsin had 
the backing of Most group behind him. 
6.2 The Governments Role 
During the Soviet era the government's role with regard to the media was clearly 
defined. With the emergence of the modem Russian state, the new role has been to 
uphold the new constitution. There are however 'grey areas' and there are attempts to 
246zolotov Jr., A., NTV Chief Leaves Post Without Explanation, The Moscow Times, 21 January, 2000. 
www.intemews.ru/crisis/ntvchief.html, 24 January, 2000. 
247 Russian Financial Empires: Most, RFE/RL, January 1998. 
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increase parliamentary power at the cost of individual freedom. There is an increasing 
use of emergency powers, which places limits upon personal freedom. Such as in the 
'battle against terrorism,' the government has made a concerted attempt to gag the 
media from giving any alternative views from the official version of the continuing conflict 
in Chechnya. During July 1999 a new ministry was created, the Press Ministry. A cause 
of concern for those in the media industry. 
It would not be an exaggeration to say, that the Russian mass media is under threat 
from the interests of both the government and big business (the oligarchs). Freedom 
of speech is slowly being suppressed by these interests. This sentiment is backed by 
those in the media industry and human rights activists. The former military affairs editor 
for Moskovskiye Novosti, Colonel Alexander Zhilin ( retired ) expressed his sentiment as 
to whom controls the press now. "Before it was controlled by the communists; and now it 
is controlled by the oligarchs." 249 
Yelena Bonner, widow of Andrei Sakharov, expressed her concerns about the future 
of the media in an open letter to the press in March 2000. In this letter she wrote, 
"Almost all of the newspapers and television companies are under the control of the 
Family and other corrupt power-brokers, which ensures a censor-like guidance of the 
mass media in the interest of those authorities. n250 
Andrew Kramer's article ( 'Russian Journalists Name Enemies of the Press,' 
Associated Press. July 5, 2000) highlighted the Russian Union of Journalists concerns. 
A list naming the 'enemies of the press' was made public, Mikhail Lesin was at the top, 
Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Ustinov (the prosecutor general) were tied in second place. 
Although it is recogmsed that the oligarchs have some actions to answer for, the 
journalist rights groups appear to apportion more blame to the politicians. 
Pressures on the freedom of the press have led to a self-imposed censorship, which is 
especially evident wtth the 'purpose-built' media. Those who have tried to prevent 
stories exposing corruption or other dubious deals use a variety of means. 
6.3 Bureaucratic Interference 
The Russian government has used its extensive bureaucratic system as a means of 
controlling the media. There has been an increase in the creation of punitive laws and 
government agencies with wi~e sweeping powers that can cause a lot of trouble when 
249Russia's Kiselyov on Freedom of Press, op. cit. 
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used. New methods of impeding journalists from investigating and writing stories are 
appearing, these include the use of the court system and denying access to information. 
The new Press Ministry was tasked with "working out and implementing state policy 
on the mass media information technology, advertising and other spheres of the 
communications industry."251 The Ministry has played a critical role in the recent 
developments of the 'battle' between a tree press and the Kremlin. Extensive powers at 
the Press Ministry's disposal has meant that the balance of power has been tilted in the 
government's favour. A particularly feared power is the ability to revoke publishing or 
broadcasting licences, which effectively shuts down a media organisation. 
A new government decree came into force in November 1998, this caused a series of 
protests from the press community. The new decree would require media organisations 
to prove that their publications do not in any way endanger people's health. The Health 
Ministry demanded to know if a paper's print is too small, ink too thin or columns too 
narrow. The ministry claims that some rogue publishers may be causing damage to 
people's eyes and staining their hands. Editors and publishers have labeled the 
move as an act of censorship. Saying that "at best it will simply be used by corrupt 
bureaucrats to get more bribes, at worst it could be used to close down undesirable 
papers. "252 
The Russian Union of Journalists conducted a series of surveys into incidents 
involving journalists and media/state relations. Regions which had the worst record for 
media/state relations were named; Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Rostov, Nizhegorod, 
Krasnoyarsk and Sankt Peterburg were named as the worst in the Russian 
Federation.253 
Statistics from the surveys gave the number of incidents which were reported by 
journalists. The exact definition on the nature of these 'incidents' is not defined. 
251 Russia Today, New Russian Ministry to Oversee Mass Media, EJC, 8 July, 1999. 
www.ejc.nl/mn/showresultnews.hmx?3095, 3 April, 2000. 
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1996: 370 reported incidents 
1997: 77 4 reported incidents. 
1998: more than 1 000 reported 
incidents. 254 
A more detailed analysis of the exact nature and scale of the level of conflict that 
exists between the media and the state is given. The report, Media in the CIS- 11.4 
Media and the Government was written by the Russian media watcher lnternews. This 
report named three types of officials who came into conflict with the media. 
( 1) Bureaucrats from organs of the executive power and government. 
(2) Officials from state security, armed forces and the courts. 
(3) Officials from the various strata of law enforcement.255 
An issue of increasing importance is that of denial of access to information by officials. 
This is a deliberate attempt by government officials to shut out the media from official 
information. The number of incidents involving officials denying media access to 
information has also been increasing. 
Graph 2: Incidents involving officials denying media access to information 
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These incidents can be broken down further, into the exact nature of how the officials 
deny the information. There are three main ways or means used to achieve the media 
blackout. 
( 1) By denial of access to observe open sessions of government bodies, 
government businesses, foundations and organisations. ln1996 this made 
up 63% of the 66 incidents and 32.4% of the 139 incidents in 1997. 
(2) Placing restrictions on the use of recording devices, such as cameras, during 
open court sessions and open sessions of the state administration. 
(3) Refusing to release information or delaying the release of information for an 
unreasonable length of time. 7.6% of the 1996 incidents and 20.9% of the 1997 
incidents consisted of this type of obstruction.257 
Accreditation is an issue which is closely associated with the issues that were raised 
above. The reason for this is an unaccredited journalist is denied access to information 
more readily than an accredited journalist. As the state is responsible for accrediting 
journalists it can be easy for an official to refuse a journalist's accreditation if that 
journalist has written critically of the government in the past. Authorities have started to 
set some arbitrary conditions which seem to be done to eliminate 'unfriendly' journalists. 
Some demands made by government officials of journalists undergoing the accreditation 
process are demanding CV's from journalists, a full list of pseudonyms used and 
samples of publications from the last two to three years.258 
In an effort to increase the pressure on journalists, using the issue of accreditation, 
deputies of the Duma attempted to move on journalists that were critical of the 
government. In March 1997, the deputies resolved to remove the accreditation of ORT 
journalists, who had according to the deputies, "discredited the activities" of parliament's 
lower house. This decision was revoked by the Russian Supreme Court, after the 
ensuing legal battle.259 
On September 12, 2000, Putin signed into law a national doctrine which establishes the 
guiding principles on information security. This doctrine was created by the Security 
Council, one of the aims of this legislation is to ensure that "the Russian and 
international audience receive truthful information about state policy and official Russian 
256 tbid. 
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position regarding socially significant events in Russian and internationallife."260 The 
wording of the doctrine allows for a certain amount of interpretation, this may allow for 
some government control on the flow of information. Such a doctrine will likely have an 
impact on the editorial freedom of the private press, and deliver further influence and 
greater power to the Presidential Press Service and the Ministry of Information. 
6.4 The Morality Bill And The Consequences 
Until recently, the Russian government tolerated the workings of the press. The Upper 
and Lower Houses of parliament gave their support to the creation of a new law, the 
so-called 'morality law.' This push was especially strong from the Communist Party, 
under the leadership of Zyganov. The proposed federal law was the basis with which to 
form a 'Higher Council for the defence of morality in television and radio broadcasting in 
the Russian Federation.•26I The new council was to be made up of ten members with 
the right to punish those who violated the law through fines, issuing warnings and 
recommendations for replacement of channel heads. Although the council was not able 
to enforce the punishments, it would have been obligatory for the government to do 
so.262 In response, the Moscow Media Law and Policy Center deemed the Jaw to be an 
anti-democratic piece of legislation. 
This conclusion was reached on the grounds that "any law must be in unerring 
compliance with the Constitution. The norms of the law 'on a Higher Council' are very 
similar to certain articles of the Constitution. But to be similar and to be in accordance 
with are far from being the same thing. "263 Part 3, Article 55 of the Federal Constitution 
states with regard to the placing of limitations on the actions of citizens, it is only 
possible if it is done "with the aim of defending the morality, health, and the rights and 
legal interests of others." The first lines of the morality law stipulated that "the freedom of 
television broadcasting and radio broadcasting can be limited: with the aim of defending 
the morality, health, and the rights and legal interests of citizens."264 
260"Putin Places Tough Curbs on Media," EJC Media News Digest, 13 September, 2000. 
www. news. ft. comlft/gx. cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3ZB 1 PY 1 DC&Iive=true&, 14 
September, 2000. 
This policy marks a departure from the more 'relaxed' frameworks in which the Russian media 
used to operate in the 1990's under Yeltsin's rule. 
261 Moscow Media Law and Policy Centre, Commentary on a Higher Council for the Defence of Morality 
in TV and Radio Broadcasting in the Russian Federation, 5 April, 1999. 
www.internews.ru/e_pages/research/commentary.html, 5 January, 2000. 
262News on Laws: Ethics and Morality Bill, on Mass Media, Control of ORT Shares, Teleskop No. 6 
(146), 17 February, 1999. 
www.internews.rulcrisis/morality.html, 24 February, 2000. 
263www. internews. rule _pages/research/commentary. html, op. cit. 
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Another point of contention with the proposed law was the regime of how the fines and 
penalties were determined. Article 27 of the Constitution sets the parameters of fines 
clearly, "the fine is established within the parameters of one-tenth to 100 minimum 
wages." This fine could be increased to 1000 minimum wages in exceptional 
circumstances and subject to certain criterion and obligations being met first. The fine 
for breeches of the code of Administrative Violations was to be set at 50, 000 minimum 
wages.265 This is clearly an attempt, had the law been passed to create a large, 
economic deterrent for the government to bring to heal any 'dissenting' elements of the 
media. 
Freedom of expression under the current Constitution is in theory guarded by Article 19 
which says that no one may hinder the production of a program and it gives the 
producer the guarantee that he or she can "perform the activity on the basis of 
professional independence." The current law on Mass Media lays liability on the 
program's producers. This liability would have been laid with the broadcaster in the new 
law.266 Given the nature and the content of live talk shows, the producer would not be 
liable for what he directs. This would leave the broadcaster open to any possible 
abuses (intentional or otherwise) from the actions of the producer. 
In effect the Higher Council would have had the power to determine what constitutes 
the 'interests of citizens.' This free hand would have ended in a free hand to set the 
ideological and moral standards for what was to be shown in the mass media. Through 
the use of the notion of taming the 'immoral' nature of the Russian media, the 
government would have a practically unlimited power to determine what is aired by the 
media. And to impose draconian measures, that would probably put out of business, 
anybody that would not conform to the official view. Whatever the pros and cons, the 
law was vetoed by President Yeltsin on 31st of March, 1999. 
6.5 Radio Liberty And Andrei Babitsky 
Radio Liberty has been on the receiving end of a lot of the government's attempts to 
muzzle the media. Initially established to provide the peoples of Eastern Europe, under 
Communist rule, a 'free voice' and an account of news and events. Radio Liberty has 
retained its independence and continued to openly state their own opinions, even if it 
contradicted the government's line. This is how the radio station has come into conflict 
with the Russian government's administration. 
2651bid. 50,000 minimum wages= 4 million rubles, 1000 minimum wages= 83,000 rubles 
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Andrei Babitsky began working for Radio Liberty approximately ten years ago as a 
correspondent. Thi? was when local ( Soviet Citizens ) were paid US$25 to read their 
stories into Soviet telephone lines for broadcast on short-wave band.267 Attention from 
the KGB was the result for some journalists who worked for the station, as was the 
possible loss of their jobs. 
When the Second Chechen War broke out, Babitsky went to cover the events. His 
coverage did not follow the government version of events, and he soon incurred the 
wrath of the Russian officials. The Moscow Times estimated that Andrei Babitsky was 
detained on January 16, 2000. The federal authorities however, did not admit this until 
January 28, 2000. The reasons given for his detention was that Babitsky was allegedly 
aiding the rebels, and he lacked the proper accreditation.268 After his detention by the 
Russian authorities, Babitsky was part of a publicised swap. The swap was Babitsky for 
two Russian POW's on February 4, 2000. This was shown on Russian TV. 
In addition to Babitsky's treatment, Radio Liberty has been told to provide the Russian 
authorities with copies of all of the station's broadcasts in the period from February 15 
until March 15, 2000.269 Mario Corti, head of the Russian service of Radio Liberty, said 
that Babitsky's arrest was a warning to all other journalists working in the country. "They 
are saying, if you won't report the way we like, the same thing could happen to you. 
Corti went on to say that "we are getting the impression that programs are being 
selectively jammed. Especially those where we talk about Babitsky."270 
The response from journalists, nationally and internationally, was to condemn Russia's 
actions as a blatant attempt to muzzle the press. One of the points raised was that 
under international law, civilians ( such as journalists ) should not be treated as 
prisoners of war. 271 Below are some comments made by leading Moscow newspapers 
on what happened to Babitsky, and the consequences. 
Kommersant: 
referred to the move as absurd and "an encroachment on free speech." 
267Tien, D. R., "Uberty's Silenced Voice,"The Moscow Times, 5 February, 2000. 
www.moscowtimes.ru/05-Feb-2000/stories/story39.html, 5 February, 2000. 
268saradzhyan, S., "Video Shows Swap of a Grim Babitsky,"The Moscow Times, 5 February, 2000. 
www. moscowtimes. ru/05-F eb-2000/stories/story2. html, 5 February, 2000. 
269Radio Uberty Chief Slams "Intimidatory" Chechnya Media Law, Agence France Presse, 16 March, 
2000. 
www.russiatoday.comlnews.php3?id=143101, 17 March, 2000. 
270Kovalyev, V., Liberty: Babitsky Silenced for Good, The St. Petersburg Times, 15 February, 2000. 
www.times.spb.ru/currenUiiberty.html, 17 February, 2000. 
This incident is reminiscent of oppressive practices of the Soviet times when Soviet dissidents 
were imprisoned or put into psychiatric hospitals. 
271www.moscowtimes.ru/05~Feb~2000/stories/story2.html, op. cit. 
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Nezavisimaya Gazeta: 
the exchange was "a blow to Russia's international prestige." And "it is obvious that the 
initiators of Babitsky's arrest worked independently and more likely without the sanction 
of the country's political leadership." 
Izvestia: 
called the exchange a brilliant piece of political engineering. "For propaganda 
purposes- it was genius. If Babitsky does not phone in another couple of days, the 
Chechens will be blamed. Between the security forces and journalists there has been a 
long-standing battle. Only now the game has got dangerous." 
Segodnya: 
"The Kremlin has worked out how to win the information war." Babitsky was referred to 
a 'the Kremlin's Caucasus prisoner' ( Kavkazskii Plennik ). The newspaper went on to 
say that the Russian authorities had sentenced the reporter without a trial and had 
silenced the press. "The authorities say that after the exchange they cannot answer for 
the journalists fate. That sounds like a sentence."272 
Moscow's press community (apart from a few) rallied together to publish a special 
joint edition of Obshchaya Gazeta. This was a similar response to what happened in 
1991, when a governmental crackdown on the freedom of the press occurred. The 
leading statement in the paper, written by the Russian Union of Journalists read "a 
threat to freedom of speech in Russia has for the first time in the last several years 
transformed into its open and regular suppression." And that the Babitsky case is 
perceived "not as an isolated episode, but almost as a turning point in the struggle for a 
press that serves the society and not the authorities."273 
6.6 The Kremlin's PR Machine 
The style in wh1ch the media was handled by Yeltsin, and how the media are treated 
now by Putin are d1fferent. This is evident in the post-Yeltsin analysis of the Russian 
media. Primakov, while as Prime Minister introduced a 'new' method to deal with the 
non-government friendly elements of the Russian media. These methods were later 
reused by the Putin administration after his rise to power. In the lead up to the 
Presidential elections of March 2000, the government began aPR campaign. The aim 
of this campaign was twofold. Firstly, to boost the image of Yeltsin's chosen heir to the 
272·b'd I I . 
273zolotov Jr., A., Papers Unite to Defend Babitsky, Free Speech, The Moscow Times, 17 February, 
2000. 
www.moscowtimes.ru/05-Feb-2000/stories/story3.html, 17 February, 2000. 
presidential office, the previously obscure Vladimir Putin. The second aim was to 
discredit any rivals that may prevent Putin from coming to power. 
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Russia's Presidential Press Service is the mainstay of the Kremlin's PR apparatus. The 
Presidential Press Service ( hereafter referred to as PPS ) is an independent subunit in 
the Presidential administration, as defined by statute (statute confirmed by Yeltsin on 2 
May, 1996 ). 274 As Frank Ellis's analysis demonstrates, the PPS serves two main 
functions, promotional - informational and analytical. 275 
The promotional - informational aspect is designed to spread and promote the 
President's position on certain issues. It is the intention of the PPS to ensure that the 
government's account reaches the national and international media. Chapter Ill, 
paragraph 4 defines the role as "the forming, through the mass media, of public opinion 
about the activity of the President." 276 In effect, the PPS is an apparatus used for the 
dissemination of information from the government's point of view. 
Analysis of media content is the second function of the PPS. News stories are 
analysed in order to try and judge public opinion, and from this information the best 
strategy, which could be employed to achieve the Kremlin's goals. 
To illustrate this point it would be useful to refer to Vera Kuznetsova's article in The 
Russia Jouma/'Censorship, and the Loss of Freedom.' She describes Yeltsin and his 
relationship with the press thus: 
He himself violated many democratic principles. But for Yeltsin, freedom of 
and a free press were sacred. Even as the free press flung mud at him 
and his family and even when freedom of speech threatened to topple his 
regime, he did not use powers to gag these freedoms. In fact, many argue 
that the first Chechen War was lost partly because of a loss in public 
support as there was virtually no censorship in Russia at that time. The 
military's shameful attempts to control information at that time met with a 
total fiasco. The free Russian press proved stronger than the state's 
repressive machinery- largely thanks to Yeltsin."277 
Under the supervision of Primakov, a different type of censorship evolved. His 
relationship with the press was uneasy, as Primakov was unable to accept criticism. 
Soon, he began to speak of the state above everything else. As a result, the flow of 
274EIIis, F., From Glasnost to the Internet: Russia's New lnfosphere, London, MacMillan Press Ltd., 
1999,p.91 
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information that flowed between the government and the press was reduced. This was 
able to be achieved by a variety of methods. One method used was to rate more 
documents as "classified." The number of documents that were given a "classified" 
rating increased drastically. To further minimise information leakage, government 
officials were forbidden from saying anything to the press.278 
Yeltsin's reaction to Primakov's attacks on the press was to publicly chastise Primakov. 
Going further, Yeltsin made it clear that he would not allow any attacks on a free press 
or the freedom of speech. 279 
After Putin became President and in bringing his entourage ( many of whom were from 
the KGB), the Primakovian tactics were used against the press once more. The process 
of cutting the journalists off began. 
The White House, the seat of government, has barred access to 
government meetings to journalists, citing the excuse that no country gives 
journalists open access to cabinet meetings. Having curbed the freedom of 
the press, the new elite set about bringing media-friendly state officials 
into line-making sure they keep silent.280 
The first test of the PR machinery was the Second Chechen War. This war was a 
launching pad for Putin to gain recognition and give him a popular platform for his 
election campaign. A former adviser to President Yeltsin was brought in to put a 
professional spin on the war. 
Sergei Yastrzhembsky's explanation for the restrictions on the press's freedoms were 
'noble.' The media "should take into account the challenges the nation is facing now[ ... ] 
When the nation mobilises its forces to achieve some task, that imposes obligations on 
everyone including the media."28I 
6.7 Who Affects The Way News Is Told, And How 
The contemporary Russian media has been undergoing a rapid and difficult 
transformation. This is due, to an extent, to factors outside of the media's control. Media 
organisations have been severely weakened by a financial crisis. This has in turn 
impacted upon the media's independence, leaving them vulnerable to financial takeover 
and manipulation. In the last few years there have been some notable cases of 
278Jbid. Primakov moved against the media during his brief tenure as Yeltsin's Prime Minister, 
September 1998 - May 1999. 
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attempts to silence the media by the government and by private individuals. The climate 
in which journalists work is becoming more dangerous. Intimidation is a more frequently 
used method of achieving compliance from the media. Those who challenge the 
incumbent powers are often subjected to professional or physical attack. 
Media institutions have progressed in Russia since the fall of the communist state. In 
contrast to the Soviet state, pluralism does exist in the media. Andrei Fadin, a Russian 
journalist summed up the current situation of the Russian press. "A peculiar freedom of 
information[ ... ] If one reads half a dozen newspapers a day and watches a variety of 
television networks, one gets a fairly accurate picture of the news."282 
6.8 Khinshtein's Ordeal 
Alexander Khinshtein was the subject of much controversy throughout February 2000. 
It was a case which involved the freedom of the press. The case drew the attention to 
the authorities, who tried to use blunt methods to silence Khinshtein. 
Khinshtein is a reporter with the Moscow newspaper, Moskovsky Komsomets. He is 
an investigative reporter with a special interest in exposing high level corruption. Among 
some of his claims of corruption, is an article that he wrote accusing Boris Berezovsky of 
helping to finance the Chechen rebels. 
In January 2000, after this article was published, the police charged that Khinshtein 
had concealed that he had suffered from a psychiatric disorder when applying for a 
driver's licence in 1996. According to the Interior Ministry, fake documents had been 
used to 'prove' his mental fitness. During their investigation the Interior Ministry had 
wanted to force Khinshtein into a psychiatric hospital in the town of Vladimir. 
Throughout the investigation, Khinshtein maintained his innocence and said that 
Vladimir Rushailo ( Interior Minister) had "personally engineered a campaign to gag · 
him." 283 That this investigation was in response to him exposing high level corruption 
and attacking the politically connected Boris Berezovsky. 284 
282www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumediapaper/prospects.html 
283saradzhyan, S., Manhunt Warning for Khinshtein, The Moscow Times, 5 February, 2000. 
www. moscowtimes.ru/05-Feb-2000/stories/story5.html, 5 February, 2000. 
284Yablokova, 0., Police Drops Khinshtein Case, The Moscow Times, 17 February, 2000. 
www.moscowtimes.ru/17 -Feb-2000/stories/story4html, 17 February, 2000. 
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Eventually Khinshtein voluntarily checked into the Moscow Psychiatric Research 
Institute on the 7th of February, 2000. The examination proved that he was of sound 
mind. 
It was not until the 17th of February that the Interior Ministry announced that the case 
against Khinshtein had been dropped. This was done on the grounds that "his actions 
( Mr Khinshtein's) presented no major threat to society and did not cause any serious 
consequences, " said Vladimir Martynov, spokesman for the Interior Ministry's 
investigative committee. 285 The investigation had drawn the attention and criticism of 
the media. Oksana Yablokova of the Moscow Times wrote that "some said it heartened 
back to the Soviet-era practice of confining dissidents in psychiatric hospitals and was a 
sign of shrinking press freedom." 286 
6.9 Relations Between Media-Most And The Government 
Media-Most and the government have been involved in a constantly changing 
relationship. At present relations between them are strained. The involvement of 
Media-Most in exposing 'truths' in Chechnya, corruption in government circles and 
supporting candidates other than Putin in the presidential elections has had the two 
sides feuding. A series of misfortunes have been plaguing Gusinky's organisation 
recently. 
The media group have had state owned banks calling in their loans. Another incident 
was a raid on the offices of Media-Most in Moscow. And on a more personal note, an 
official from the Kremlin publicly referred to Gusinsky as "a type of bacteria."287 
Prior to the Kremlin's open display of hostility toward Media-Most a meeting took place 
preceding the upcoming elections of December 1999 and March 2000 between Vladimir 
Gusinsky and the Kremlin's Chief of Staff, Alexander Voloshin. Gusinsky claimed that 
Voloshin tried to persuade him to co-operate with the Kremlin during the presidential 
elections. According to Gusinsky the following conversation took place, "Voloshin said, 
as if he were joking, let's pay you US$1 00 million so that you wont be in our way while 
285Jbid. 
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287 Editorial, Moscow Times, Raid Part of a Disturbing New Pattern, May 17, 2000. 
The vicious and humiliating language used resembles the Soviet press language, when 
newspapers used to initiate smear campaigns against Western politicians, etc., seeing them 
as enemies from the outside. This was due to the tensions of the Cold War period. This example 
appears to be born from this Soviet legacy, but is applied to what the State sees as enemies 
from within. 
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the election is on. You could go on a vacation."288 When Gusinsky refused Voloshin's 
offer, he was told that it meant war between the Kremlin and Media-Most. 
On the morning of Thursday May 12, 2000, offices of the Media-Most group around 
Moscow were simultaneously raided by the FSB, tax police and the general prosecutor. 
The original purpose of the raid was given as a tax raid, this was later changed. The 
FSB gave the explanation, that they were looking for eavesdropping devices. 289 
Mikhail Berger, Segodnya's chief editor proposed two possible explanations for the 
raid. Firstly, as a direct response to the recent reports on corruption in Russia's power 
structures. The second reason given, is that this raid is merely the start of a broader 
clampdown on the freedom of the press.290 
During the Presidential campaign, Media-Most gave their support to Grigory Yavlinsky. 
Thus giving Yavlinsky a platform to deliver verbal attacks on Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir 
Putin. 291 Due to the nature of the allocation of airtime on state controlled media at the 
time ( March 1999 ), these attacks would have been very difficult to attempt without this 
help. 
The government and the various agencies involved in the operation have offered their 
explanations following the consequences of the raid. 
Vladimir Putin offered a defence through the PPS on May 12, he reiterated his 
commitment to freedom of speech and went on "this attitude does not depend on the 
position taken by this or that publication or channel, nor to what degree that position 
agrees with that of the authorities[ ... ] all are equal before the law, no matter what 
business they are in." The statement argued that media companies cannot try to gain 
immunity from criminal investigations. "No attempt at blackmail in relation to law 
enforcement is permissible, just as limits on freedoms of speech and of the mass media 
are not permissible." 292 
While Putin tried to distance himself from acting in a heavy-handed manner against a 
free press, the Press Minister Mikhail Lesin gave a different explanation. Lesin tried to 
pin the blame of the raid on the media. His statement revealed a certain zeal, with 
288Dixon, R., Pushing the Boundaries of a Free Press, Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2000. 
289Editorial, Moscow Times, Raid Part of a Disturbing New Pattern, op. cit. 
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regard to the idea that the state must be protected at all costs against those who want to 
destroy it. "The defense of the state from the free mass media is a pressing problem at 
present." 293 
In the post-raid analysis, several theories have been offered to explain why the 
Media-Most offices were targeted by the government. This incident has attracted the 
attention of human rights advocate groups, such as The Gorbachev Foundation, 
Institute of Humane Communication, Russian Union of Journalists and the Glasnost 
Defence Foundation. Each offering an interpretation of events. These groups believe 
that the raid was a carefully orchestrated attempt by the government to curtail the 
freedom of the press. 
An article in the Christian Science Monitor by Fred Weir, puts the notion forward that 
this raid is merely the latest event in the sometimes very public feuds among the 
oligarchs. A struggle between the oligarchs on the 'inner circle' of the government ( such 
as Boris Berezovsky ) and those that are vying for influence. 294 
Many, mostly unsupported accusations are aired publicly. The feud between the two 
media magnates, Berezovsky and Gusinsky is particularly vicious. Gusinsky has been 
the target of anti-Semitic coverage on ORT, a television channel controlled by 
Berezovsky (both Berezovsky and Gusinsky are Jewish). 295 An editorial in the 
Moscow Times (May 17, 2000) was more specific on one of these allegations of ORT 
against NTV and Gusinsky, ORT had apparently insinuated that NTV was a base for 
Israeli spies. 296 
Alexei Simonov, chairman of the Glasnost Defence Foundation ( GDF ), did not view 
the raid as a random act. "This assault did not come out of thin air, it is part of a 
deliberate pattern of actions. There have been many warnings that the new President 
intends to force the press to follow his line, and use all means to punish those who 
refuse." 297 
The Russian Union of Journalists ( RUJ ) was equally scathing of the raid, viewing it 
as an attack on the freedom of the press and as an anti-constitutional act. In a 
statement released by RUJ several issues were raised, "the armed raid was an 
anti-constitutional, arbitrary act of government conducted with the goal of intimidating 
293Editorial, Moscow Times, Raid Part of a Disturbing New Pattern, op. cit. 
294weir, F., A Kremlin Warning to Media? Christian Science Monitor, 15 May, 2000. 
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the independent mass media. This is a real attempt to introduce censorship by ( men in ) 
ski masks. "298 
losif Dzyaloshinsky's view, who is the Director of the Institute of Humane 
Communication, is that "whatever Putin's programs for the economy and politics, we are 
absolutely sure he does not intend to tolerate dissent in society." 299 
Some analysts feel that there has been a shift in power, and as a result of this shift, it 
has enabled an attack on the freedom of the press. The Gorbachev Foundation's 
conclusion, is that "the security forces have become much more influential in Russia 
under Putin, and they are behind these new pressures on the press. The free press 
stands in their way, and Most is the premier symbol of independent media in Russia." 300 
In view of the above statement, it does not come as a surprise, that approximately one 
week before the raid on the Most offices, the Moscow newspaper Kommersant, 
published what was reputed to be a Kremlin 'working paper.' This paper called for an 
expansion of the security forces duties, to include such roles as intervening against 
opposition media and political groups. According to what was published in Kommersant, 
the document proposed that "the President needs a structure in his administration that 
cannot only forecast the political situation but also clearly control the political and social 
processes in Russia.· 30 I 
With the raid following this document's publication, there was some skepticism about 
the government's true intentions. And the reasons offered by the government were 
treated with little serious regard. The response of the press community in Moscow was 
to organise an Obshchaya Gazeta ( Joint Newspaper ). This paper is only produced 
when the press community feels that there is a threat to the freedom of the press. Some 
62 newspapers and media organisations helped to produce the issue on May 17, 2000 
(only 30 sponsors helped with the edition which protested against Andrei Babitsky's 
treatment by the government). 302 The media organisations owned by Boris Berezovsky 
were noted for therr lack of support in the joint edition. 303 Which highlights the highly 
political nature of the newspaper business and the oligarchs. 
298 tbid. 
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An uneasy truce between the government and NTVwas reached on the 28th of May. 
Kuk/y ("Puppets"), a political satire show using puppets, was dropped by NTV. 304The 
show was a source of irritation for Putin, who did not like the way he was portrayed on 
the program. Yevgeny Kiselyov of NTV said that 
NTV and Media-Most executives received conditions, the respect of which 
would mean the authorities would leave us in peace. Foremost, that Putin 
should no longer be the hero of the Kuk/y program. In order not to fan the 
flames, if someone high up is so worried about a rubber puppet of the 
President, before it was Yeltsin and now Putin, we have decided to try an 
experiment. We will try one program without the Putin puppet. 3os 
Kukly has had a long and troubled history with attempted political interference. The 
program has been a source of discontent for the Russian elite due to their irreverent 
portrayal. In 1995 the prosecutor general pursued a criminal investigation against Kuk/y 
for "insulting" President Yeltsin. On this occasion political support favoured the program, 
resulting in the prosecutor's dismissal. 306 
A renewed effort was waged against Kuk/y by supporters of Putin. They claimed that 
the President Putin had been "insulted" and called for the filing of criminal charges. 
Senior police officials added a warning to NTV, that if Kukly did not tone down the 
content NTV could face "unpleasantness." 307 
Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Centre summed up why he 
thought the government behaved in this way toward Kuk/y 
The Kremlin does not want to destroy NTV, it only wants to make it submit 
to the Kremlin's official line. They were very dissatisfied with Kukly's 
interpretation of Putin's political activities. This show is more damaging to 
Putin's reputation than any criticism from the communists or other 
politicians. [ ... ] (the Press Ministry) is trying to restrict and correct the 
media. It is a real threat to the free press in Russia. 308 
The Kremlin's actions in trying to force NTV to submit to their will seems to be heavy 
handed and unnecessary. Kuk/y was a very popular program, the popularity arising from 
3041n the early 1990's Russian TV used the British media as a model, and this satirical programme 
became a hallmark of the Russian media policy in the 1990's, reflecting the Yeltsin government's 
commitment to pluralisation of opinion and freedom of speech. Kuk/y is an imitation of the British 
satirical show "Splitting Image." 
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an irreverent treatment of Russia's leading political and business figures. This popularity 
has come into conflict with the government's intention to control the flow of information. 
Should they succeed in their efforts against Kukly, the Kremlin will have brought to heal 
a long-lived source of irritation. In addition, their success will also display the power at 
the government's disposal by subduing a high profile, private independent media 
organisation. This would have the effect of 'frightening' other would-be independent 
media groups into complying with future government demands. The recent series of 
'attacks' on NTVare part of a bigger picture of subduing the remnants of a free Russian 
press. 
6.10 Use Of Violence, Conflict And Intimidation Against The Media 
There has been a disturbing trend in recent years, conflict and violence directed at 
journalists. This intimidation is directed at the media community with the intention of 
suppressing unwanted publicity. The number of journalists killed or injured has risen 
steadily every year. There has also been an increased use of legal means to try and 
obstruct journalists from their work. The case involving Alexander Nikitin, an 
environmental journalist best exemplifies the effort the state will go to in order to 
achieve its objectives. 
Since December 1991 more than 120 journalists have been killed.3°9 Broken down into 
yearly statistics, some yearly figures are as follows; 
2000: 16 Journalists murdered, 73 attacks on Journalists. 310 
1999: 16 Journalists murdered (four in Chechnya ). 311 
1998: 11 journalists murdered and 60 attacked. 312 
1997: 15 journalists murdered and 21 kidnapped. 313 
In a January 1997 interview with the head of the Russian Union of Journalists 
Vsevolod Bogdanov, described in detail the dire situation facing Russian journalists. 
It is very easy to manipulate journalists. One can buy off those that are 
necessary and kill those that are not necessary. If a journalist receives 
309More Than 120 Journalists Killed Since December 1991, Agence France Presse, 4 May, 2000. 
www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=156927, 5 May, 2000. 
31 0 16 Russian Reporters Died, Associated Press report, January 13, 2001. 
Johnson's Russia List #5024, 13 January, 2001. 
311www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=156927, op. cit. 
312www. telegraph. co. uk/et?ac=000659276559150&rtmo=quKKpMX9&atm .. ./wrus25.htm, op. cit. 
313(1)Coalson, R., Media watch: Eerie Silence on Press Day, The Moscow Times, 5 May, 2000. 
www.moscowtimes.ru/05-May-2000/storieslstory28.html, 6 May, 2000. 
(2)RFE/RL, Russia: Watchdog Says Media Suffered "Retreat" in 1997, 14 January, 1998. 
www.ejc.nl/mn/showresultnews.hmx?1046, 3 April, 2000. 
US$50 a month [ ... ]and he is offered US$1 000 for an article, then it is 
difficult to talk about a moral choice. 314 
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Most of these murders have not been solved by the authorities, who seem to be 
unable or unwilling to seriously tackle this problem. In addition to the murder and 
assault of journalists, another category has been cited. A measure of conflicts has 
been recorded. The exact nature of the 'conflicts' is not clarified, apart from the conflict 
being between the media and local authorities in the provinces. A report was published 
in Versiya weekly newspaper, the figures being confirmed by the Glasnost Defence 
Foundation ( GDF ); 
Conflicts between the media and the local authorities in the provinces. 
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• Conflicts 
January 2000: 63 conflicts 
February 2000:123 conflicts 
March 2000: 139 conflicts 315 
In this sample there is a steady increase in the number of recorded conflicts between 
the media and local authorities in the lead up to the presidential elections in March 
2000. The head of GDF's monitoring service, Boris Timoshenko confirms this idea of 
tighter control exercised over the media during the run-up to an election. He contends 
that "the number of conflicts involving the media always rises during election campaigns 
when media are controlled more tightly than ever both by election officials and 
government officials backing certain candidates."316 However, the degree of control 
over the media is not evenly spread throughout Russia. Provincial journalists and media 
have a history of having a lot more control exercised over them by governors, mayors 
and other local officials than their counterparts in Moscow. 317 
314Fitzpatrick, C. A, Russia's Harsh Press Climate, Special Report: Russia ( 1997 ), CPJ. 
www.cpj.org/attacks96/sreports/russia.html, 4 March, 2000. 
315zolotov Jr., A, Media Feeling Heat in Provinces, The Moscow Times, 15 April, 2000. 
www.moscowtimes.ru/15-Apr-2000/stories/story6.html, 17 April, 2000. 
316rbid. 
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Vyacheslav Barinov executive Director of the Editor's Club, gave a depressing 
description of how the regional press are treated by local authorities and the business 
community. "Local authorities and businessmen see the press as their own property and 
want to use it. If editors refuse, they will soon find the tax police or fire inspectors on 
their doorstep, sure to discover infractions of the law and cause problems. "318 
Igor Domnikov who works for Novaya Gazeta, was attacked with a hammer in the 
entrance of his Moscow apartment on May 12, 2000. He was left for dead. Other 
journalists from the paper suspect that the attacker(s) got the wrong man. Oleg 
Sultanov, also from Novaya Gazeta was writing about corruption in LUKoif at the time. 
Sultanov looked like Domnikov and lived in the same apartment block. 319 Novaya 
Gazeta claims that Sultanov was approached some time prior to the assault and was 
asked to give up the investigation. If this had done so he would have received money, 
an apartment and a job. Refusal to give up the investigation could result in him 
becoming the target of a contract killer. LUKoil vigorously denied having anything to do 
with this incident. 320 The police dismissed the attack as the work of a drug addict or 
petty criminal that was scared away before any money was able to be taken. Police said 
that they thought it was unlikely to be a professional hit, because it did not have any of 
the tell-tale signs. 321 
The event which earned an environmental journalist, Alexander Nikitin the ire of the 
government, was his reports on government negligence with nuclear waste. Putin made 
the accusation that spies had penetrated the environmental movement. Nikitin was 
charged with treason. The charge of treason was laid because it had been alleged that 
secret decrees had been broken through his documenting and reporting of the 
government negligence with nuclear waste. A cause for concern was that the decrees 
were so secret that Nikitin's defence council was initially not allowed to see these 
decrees and the prosecutors admitted to not having read the decrees ( which their 
charges were based upon ). This case has been under Putin's direct control for more 
than one year. 322 When reviewing the way that this court case has been handled there 
are some irregularities. The first of which, why is President Putin taking personal charge 
( and for so long ) of a case that seems reasonably insignificant on the surface? A 
318Mereu, F., Regional Media Under Pressure, The Russia Journal, 10 April, 2000. 
www.russiatoday.com/rusjournal/rusjournal.php3?id=149812, 11 April, 2000. 
The above statement is well illustrated by the increasing number of attacks on journalists, merely 
confirming the continued use of bullying tactics by the government and associated 
pro-government circles or the oligarchy. 
319cockburn, P., Reporting Russia Becomes a Dangerous Trade, 22 May, 2000, The Independent. 
Johnson's Russia List, 22 May, 2000. 
320rbid. 
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second 'problem' with the Nikitin case is the use of some secret decree, which is so 
secret that neither the prosecution nor the defence had seen the decree at the beginning 
of the trial. And why was the defence initially denied access to this decree? This 
example points to the U-turn in governmental policies toward a Soviet style control of 
information. 
On September 13, 2000 the Russian Supreme Court rejected the prosecutors bid to 
have espionage charges against Nikitin reopened. The decision of the court's presidium 
( the highest judicial body in Russia ) is final and may not be appealed. Previously, 
Nikitin has been acquitted by a St. Petersburg court last year, this decision being upheld 
by the Supreme Court earlier this year. 323 This incident shows the lengths the 
governmental bureaucracy is prepared to resort to, in order to suppress unwanted 
publicity. Nikitin's case has lasted for some four years, since he was arrested by the 
FSB in 1996. 
The legal system is being used increasingly by the authorities to 'intimidate' the media 
with the threat of legal action being taken against them. Court cases involving the media 
are steadily rising. Data which was obtained by the Glasnost Defence Foundation, from 
Moscow and ten regional centres involving law suits against the media confirmed the 
increase. 
• 
• 
• 
1995: 
1996: 
1997: 
15.0% of legal conflicts. 
39.5% of legal conflicts. 
47.6% of legal conflicts. 324 
Therefore as this table demonstrates, there is an increase of approximately 25% of 
such cases. This is worrying if the Russian government wishes to develop and pursue 
democracy further. 
Courts normally accepts to consider approximately 40% of claims. The proportion of 
claims accepted involving actions lodged against the media is 97%. Of these cases, 
70% of suits are ruled in the claimants favour. 325 According to the Russian Union of 
Journalists, the problem ( why the suits occur in the first instance ) lies partly with the 
journalists themselves, and their style of reporting. 
323Reuters, Russia Finally Acquits Nuclear Dissenter Nikitin, September 13, 2000. 
www.russiatoday.comlnews.php3?id=198894, September 14, 2000. 
324'11.3 Legal and Regulatory Framework for the Media,' Media in the CIS, European Institute for the 
Media, 1999. 
www.internews.ru/books/media1999/55.html, 3 January, 2000. 
3251bid. 
The mass media regularly violate the law, covering the political and 
economic life of both the centre and the regions in a one-sided and biased 
way. Journalistic skills are low: very often journalists are incapable of 
expressing their ideas or of representing the facts in a form invulnerable to 
suits. Editorial offices in their hunt for sensations often invent exotic and 
scandalous headlines. The mass media are over politicised: up to 80% of 
newspaper pages or airtime are devoted not to the life of society but to 
who governs it and how they do so. 326 
6.11 Media In The Regions 
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The situation for the freedom of the press is not good. But regional press organisations 
face a lot more difficulties and dangers than their Moscow-based counterparts. Regional 
governors often rule their regions as they please. Those who interfere or obstruct their 
rule can be dealt with by a number of ways. The importance of the control of information 
is fully understood by the governors. A variety of carrot and stick methods are used 
throughout the regions to secure the co-operation of the local press. 
The Russian Union of Journalists ( RUJ) published a national study of media freedoms 
in October 1999. The conclusion of this study was that "there is no freedom of speech in 
Russia." 327 Oleg Panfilov of RUJ stated "about 80% of all printing presses in Russia[ ... ] 
and about 90% of all TV and radio transmitters are state-owned." 328 
Panfilov gave an example of how pressure may be applied by a governor in the 
provinces to bring 'rogue' media into his control. 
The usual mechanism and there have been many of such cases, works 
like this[ ... ] An independent newspaper in one of the provinces publishes 
an article critical of the work of the governor. The governor picks up the 
telephone and calls the Director of the printing press, because the printing 
press is subordinate to the governor. And he says, 'this newspaper must 
be punished.' The Director of the printing press already knows what to do. 
He picks up the telephone and calls the editor of that independent 
newspaper and says: 'You know, tomorrow our electricity rates are going 
up, the price of newsprint is going up, the price of ink [ ... ] so the cost of our 
printing services is going to rise three or four fold.' And that's it. That's the 
end of our independent newspaper. 329 
326Jbid. This is in contrast to the current trends in the Western media. For further details on this subject 
see Hodgson, G., "The End of the Grand Narrative,"www.prospect-magazine.co.uk, August I 
September 1999, 6 January, 2001. 
327 Russia's Kiselyov on Freedom of Press, Speech: Comment, op. cit. 
3281bid. 
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The state control over the printing presses, after ten years of privatisation reforms 
means that the state still has the upper hand against any independent minded 
newspapers. In the example above it is clear that these measures are used relatively 
frequently by the provincial governors to consolidate their political positions. When the 
stranglehold on information is under threat, extraordinary measures are taken to try and 
ensure the monopoly is kept. 
In an article published by Izvestia on April 14, 2000, the governor of Saratov was 
severely criticised. The article claimed that the governor never keeps his promises, and 
in a bid to be re-elected struck opponents off the ballot and falsified the vote count. 
Locally printed editions of Izvestia ( in Saratov ) differed from the paper printed 
elsewhere. Saratov printed copies reported that the governor sometimes keeps his 
promises and with regard to the alleged voting fraud, "in the opinion of the main 
challengers (of the governor), allegedly passed with legal violations." 330 Once again, 
by controlling the printing presses the governor was able to manipulate the situation in 
order to minimise any possible political damage. This is only one example, but it reveals 
a trend which exists in Russia today. 
lnternews monitored data in the period running from 1996 - 1998. A finding of this 
review was that nearly half of all court cases in Russia are actioned against journalists 
(the cases where the journalists are incriminated). There were 168 cases of this nature 
in 1996 and 350 cases in 1997. A closer look at the reason why the cases were actioned 
reveals that the majority are damage to honour and reputation. 67.9% of the 1996 cases 
and 72.9% of the 1997 actions. 331 Cases involving criminal libel make up a very small 
percentage of court cases. in 1996 only 9.5% of cases involved libel and this figure fell 
to 3.6% in 1997. ~ 3 : 
A method which 1s Increasingly more popular among the governors is the lawsuit. The 
basis of many of these lawsuits is Article 151 of the Russian Civil Code. The Article 
permits suing for damages to a citizen's honour and dignity. There is no allowance for 
truth as a defence for journalists. In 1997, The St. Petersburg Times reported on the 
outcome of court actton. An American-Russian joint venture had gone bad. The 
Americans sued therr Russian partners, the defendant was ordered to pay the 
Americans $US1.2 million. Vadim Bordyug then sued The St. Petersburg Times for 
honour and dignity damages. His argument was that the article was bad for his 
reputation, by reporting his loss in court to the wider community. The case has not been 
330tbid. 
331 www. intemews. ru/books/media 1999/56. html, op. cit. 
332 tbid. 
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ruled upon as yet. 333 Article 151 has reaching implications, this law has the potential to 
effectively gag any reporting on scandals or corruption. As truth cannot be used as a 
defence for journalists, this leaves them in a dilemma. If they do not write the story, they 
will not be sued, but newsworthy material goes unreported. If a story is published, then 
it is possible for the subject of the article to sue the journalist who produced the item. 
By contrast with the above-described actions against some 'rebellious' journalists, loyal 
media are rewarded for their efforts. There are federal subsidies given to loyal media, 
awarded by the governors and the Kremlin. Currently there are several thousand 
state-funded prizes for journalism. One of the more blatant (to encourage bias ) prizes 
was offered by the governor of Nizhniy Novgorod in 1996 for the best coverage of his 
re-election campaign. 334 
6.12 Purpose~ Built Media 
There has been a trend in recent times to establish media outlets to further personal 
political ambitions. Some of these 'purpose-built' media organisations are established by 
using state funds, are only loyal to their founder. 
One of the most vivid examples expose the new-style governor in Moscow, who has 
secured his reputation as a shrewd politician, who wishes to present himself as an 
ordinary Moscovite. Yuri Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow has presidential aspirations. He 
realised the need to relay political communication to gain recognition and support from 
voters. The television station TV Tsentr ( now a national station ) was funded by the 
Mayor of Moscow and the station requires his sanction in their operations. As described 
previously, TV Tsentrwas the mouthpiece of Primakov and Luzhkov's presidential bid 
in the March 2000 elections. 
In a similar situation in St. Petersburg, Petersburg Television is now officially managed 
by the Deputy Mayor. The pretext for gaining control of the station occurred after its 
finances were drained by corruption. 
A third example of a media organisation established with the use of state funds for the 
purpose of serving as a political mouthpiece occurred when the Central Bank created 
the national newspaper Vremya MN. The paper offers little in the way of stories 
concerning corruption. A major story omitted concerned the Central Bank's admission 
that Russia's hard currency reserves were kept in a British Channel Islands based 
333lbid. 
3341bid. 
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company ( FIMACO ) which had no employees or premises. 335 However, Vremya MN 
does engage in political intrigue, supporting the government. Several comments in the 
paper recently have revealed its true loyalty. 
The raid on the offices of Media-Most have been the subject of analysis by Vremya 
MN. The paper claims that recent government moves against the media are not 
designed to restrict the freedom of speech, but as a way of loosening the oligarchs 
stranglehold on the media. Vremya MN stated that the oligarchs, "who have been using 
this freedom (of speech) exclusively for their own benefit,"336 will be the losers and not 
the public. 
As a further rationalisation for the government's actions, the paper linked debts owed 
by news groups, to the government and Putin's promise to crackdown on the oligarchs 
( the 'Dictatorship of Law' ) as reasonable justification. As one article states: ulndeed 
strictly speaking, both Media-Most and ORT have found themselves in this difficult 
situation because they have borrowed money they will never be able to repay[ ... ] If, in 
fact, the state owns and supports both TV networks, then they both should work in the 
interests of the state. "337 
Vremya MN went on to use Putin's pre-election promise of distancing the oligarchs 
from state affairs, as a defence and legitimisation for actions against the media. The 
paper's view of the Media-Most raid, u[ ... ] no doubt that the police searches at 
Media-Most are only the beginning of a campaign to neutralise the unruly oligarchs." 338 
6.13 The Internet 
While the evolution of the internet has been described in the book by Frank Ellis, I 
would like to focus on some recent facts and data in relation to the use of the internet in 
Russia, which is starting to emerge now. The internet is a new medium which has had a 
considerable impact in the West. Information which is disseminated via the internet has 
the potential for instantaneous delivery to anyone with access to the web. This can pose 
a problem for a government wishing to impose censorship restrictions, because this 
information can easily pass a country's borders. 
335tbid. 
336Reading the Papers Uke Tea Leaves, Issue No.6, www.wps.ru, 16 May, 2000. 
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Russia has a potentially large market with a population of approximately 150 million 
people. OAO Svyazinvest announced that it expects that 10% of Russia's population will 
use the internet within three years. 339 These figures of internet usage are well below 
rates in the United States and Western Europe. Internet usage figures vary, but a 
common factor exists in the different polls, a low proportion of frequent internet users. 
Rafal Rohozinski of the University of Cambridge argued that the legacy of Soviet 
ideology still has an influence on the internet in Russia, setting Russia apart from the 
Western experience. 34° This argument would appear to support my contention of the 
existence of binary opposition, a division exists between east and west ( between 
Russian and the Western world ). A distinction exists between the ideology and 
mentality as a result of the environment, which has shaped this development. Russian 
society was for the most part, a 'closed society' for some seventy years. The skills 
acquired by Soviet citizens which were necessary for survival in this climate cannot be 
discarded quickly. Contemporary Russia (in the current political form) has only been in 
existence for less than one decade. 
Rohozinski asserts that this ideology has hampered the development of the internet 
(see footnote 314 to obtain a reference). The central government (Soviet) wanted to 
create an integrated system. This system's development was thwarted by lower order 
bureaucrats and officials who wanted control of such a project. 34l The project was also 
seen as threat by some, to the hidden economy. Blat's very existence would be under 
threat, along with the associated personal networks if information was readily available. 
According to the Deputy Communications Minister Alexander Volokitin, Russia has 7 
million internet users. Three million of these users are classified as being frequent users, 
the remainder are classified as occasional users. Volokitin also stated that Russians 
owned some 10 million personal computers. 342 
In research published by www.monitoring.ru in August 2000, approximately 9.2 million 
Russians have used the net. However, only 20% of these are regular users ( online for 
339 Russia has 7 million Internet Users, lnterfax, 29/11/2000. 
Johnson's Russia List, #4659, 29/11/2000. 
OAO Svyazinvest is the holding company of Russia's regional telephone companies. 
34° Rafal Rohozinski is a Ph.D. candidate in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Trinity 
College, University of Cambridge. His article How the internet did not Transform Russia 
( October 2000 ) is drawn from a previous work, Mapping Russian Cyberspace: A Perspective on 
Democracy and the Net. (this work is available at www.unrisd.org/infotech/conferen/russian) 
341 Control over such a project would give an agency or individuals access to information which could 
be subsequently used as a bargaining chip to gain goods and services, in exchange for this 
information. 
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more than one hour per week ). The research also established that the internet users 
are mainly concentrated in the main cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. 343 
A multitude of internet sites have been established, dedicated to politicians and politics. 
They range from personal websites of politicians such as Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir 
Putin ( www.putin2000.ru) to political discussion sites ( www.polit.ru ). 
This rapid expansion of unchecked information has caught the attention of the Russian 
authorities. On March 26, 2000, the Chairman of the Russian Electoral Commission 
Aleksandr Veshnyakov, announced that his agency would "consider the internet as a 
mass medium," and would "monitor and punish" any cyber-violations of Russian 
electoral legislation. 344 
The nature of the internet is complex and difficult to monitor, due in part to the sheer 
volume of users and information flowing through the networks. In spite of these 
characteristics, measures are being undertaken by the Kremlin to control the internet. 
In an effort to try and police the web Russian Internet Service Providers ( ISP's) are 
required by law to link their computers to the FSB ( KGB's successor). Putin signed 
another law, taking effect in January 2001, which has extended this requirement to 
include seven other law enforcement agencies. 345 
The implications of this law means that the law enforcement agencies are able to 
supervise e-mail and other electronic traffic. Searches are able to be made using 
keywords to seek out specific information, regardless of whether it is prejudicial to state 
security or not. Electronic information is accessed relatively easily by the governmental 
agencies after a presidential decree in 1995, banning the use of encryption algorithms or 
devices unless these were certified by the FSB. 346 These agencies have in effect been 
given a free hand to act as a new cyber-censor. 
6.14 Chapter Findings 
A common thread exists in the different parts of chapter six. There appears to be a 
tendency for increased government intervention in the Russian media. In chapter four I 
343 Gerrans, Sam., Democratic Russia Goes Online, TechWeb News, www.techweb.com, 27/11/2000. 
Johnson's Russia List, #4666, 3/12/2000. 
344 1bid. 
345 Gray, Emma. Putin's Media War, 
www .cpj .org/Briefings/Russia_analysis _MarchOO/Russia_ analysis _marchOO .html, 6/12/2000 
346 Rohozinski, Rafal. How the Internet did not Transform Russia, University of Cambridge, October 
2000. 
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mentioned Putin's desire to see the creation of a 'single information space.' Putin's wish 
seems to becoming a reality. The foundation for the government being the sole 
gatekeeper has taken on a greater vigour and sense of urgency after Putin's election as 
the President of the Russian Federation. 
The struggle for power between the old power structure (the oligarchs), who had 
gained power, privilege and power during the reign of Yeltsin need to protect those 
advantages from a new power structure ( Putin ). Prior to this power struggle, the 
oligarchs had identified the need to protect their position ( as is discussed in detail at 
chapters 3.6 and 5.1 ) and for this reason began to purchase media assets. When Putin 
declared that he wanted to destroy the oligarchs as a class ( refer to chapter 2 ), he also 
involved the media as well. There is a close association between the private media and 
the oligarchs, as they are the mouthpiece of the oligarchs. Hence, Putin's attack on the 
oligarchs was also an attack on the media. 
Putin has used PR to make his measures against the media more palatable to the 
Russian public. The power play has been characterised as a struggle of 'good' ( the 
government) versus the corrupt (oligarchs). By creating this binary opposition, Putin 
has been able to claim that his measures against the media (and by extension, the 
oligarchs) are for the public good. His claim of acting for the public good is based on the 
assumption that the oligarchs, through their ownership of the media dictate what is 
published. This assumption fits closely with Altschull's assertion on media ownership 
(see footnote 4 ). In addition to Putin, government controlled media outlets (such as 
Vremya MN) have claimed that by destroying the oligarchs power, a truly free media will 
be able to exist. 
Initially the main obstructions faced by journalists were physical attacks, which continue 
at an alarming rate to this day. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, over 120 
journalists have been killed. New forms of interference, aimed at disrupting journalistic 
investigation are being used. Some new avenues are through the use of lawsuits or 
bureaucratic interference. 
State-owned media has been under strict supeNision by the Kremlin. Although former 
President Yeltsin allowed the privately owned media a measure of freedom, this was not 
extended to media assets under state control. Initial co-operation between the private 
media and the Kremlin was because of self-seNing motives from both parties. The 
private media are not a homogeneous group, for details outlined in chapters two and 
three of this thesis. The personalities of the oligarchs ( and their individual interests ) 
who own the various media entities have for the most part been a factor in dividing this 
group into several main factions. 
113 
At first, the Kremlin targeted foreign owned and operated media, such as Radio Liberty. 
It would appear from the lack luster response from Russian owned and operated media, 
that they felt relatively safe in their position. The incident which began to unite some of 
the Russian media was the incident surrounding the treatment of Andrei Babitsky ( see 
chapter 6.5 ). Berezovsky's media were absent from the protest. The media which were 
owned by Gusinsky were present. This is possibly an indication of the prevailing political 
position of these oligarchs at that particular time. By February I March 2000, Gusinsky 
was out of favour with the Kremlin and Berezovsky still appeared to hold his position as 
'the Kingmaker.' 
Following Putin's declaration against the oligarchs and the raids on Media-Most's 
offices in May 2000, the other oligarchs began to realise the situation was dire. A 
change in political relationships had occurred. Some differences were set aside as the 
oligarchs united to try and protect their assets. This is probably because the oligarchs 
anticipated being 'picked-off one by one, unless they united to meet the threat from the 
Kremlin. 
Both Gusinsky and Berezovsky have established political organisations. Their media 
possessions have been used to consolidate their opposition to the government. By doing 
this, it seems, that these oligarchs who are not out of the 'inner circle' hope convey the 
image of a legitimate political entity in a democratic society. Should the Kremlin move 
against either of them, it may be construed as an anti-democratic move. This would be 
based on the premise that the action is being taken against the political party ( as 
Gusinsky and Berezovsky are representative of these political entities ) and not the 
individual for any possible legal transgressions. 
One of the reasons given for the decline of the effectiveness of the Soviet system of 
censorship is the introduction of new technologies, such as photocopiers and faxes. 
Faxes and photocopiers were able bypass the unwieldy bureaucratic system to some 
extent. At the present the new regime of Putin faces a similar dilemma, that of the 
internet. 
On the one hand the internet poses a problem, the Kremlin's ability to control the flow 
of information is under threat. But, on the other hand the internet could prove equally 
useful for the government to disseminate its information to a worldwide audience. This 
dilemma has resulted in what can be described as a 'schizophrenic' approach to the 
management of the internet by the Russian government. 
The Kremlin wants to stem the free flow of information by placing impositions on ISP's 
and forbidding the use of encryption. Powers which have been bestowed Russia's law 
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enforcement agencies by the Kremlin enable them to access all electronically 
transmitted information ( via the internet ). This is assuming that these agencies have 
the skills and technology to mount such an operation. 
Technologies, such as the internet also offer a cheap and effective way to disseminate 
information very quickly to a potentially wide audience. Gleb Pavlovsky ( a high ranking 
media advisor to the Kremlin ) has begun to establish a network of pro-government 
internet sites, some of which were named in chapter 6.13. Although initially slow to 
grasp the potential of the internet, the last year has seen a lot of time and effort go into 
developing the Russian government presence on the world wide web. 
By correlating the apparent intentions of the Kremlin with McQuail's media theory ( see 
chapter 1.3) some patterns emerge. In terms of the significance of the mass media, the 
government's intentions seem to be aimed at utilising the media as a source. By 
controlling the source of information the Kremlin will be able to determine a large part of 
definitions and images of social reality. If this is achieved, the place where society and 
group culture and values are created is also controlled. This would prove useful if an 
attempt is made to recreate a strong central state. 
Through managing the mass media as a source, the government is able to alter the 
social functions of the media. The current functions of the media appear to be aimed at 
entertaining and informing the consumer. Putin's attempts to resurrect national pride and 
to re-establish a strong centralised state requires a motivated populace to help achieve 
these ends. A primary function of the Soviet media was for the mobilisation of various 
societal objectives (for further information refer to chapter 1.3.2 ). This function of the 
media seems to be in the process of being re-established by the state. 
To date, the government's moves against the media have not been evenly applied 
across the vanous forms of media ( printed, television, radio and the internet). Priority 
has been assigned to media which the government considers to be the most powerful or 
effective medium 1n the transmission of messages. The Kremlin's moves indicate that 
priority has been given to controlling the medium of television. 
Television has been regarded as a pivotal element of the propaganda mechanism by 
the successive Russian governments. Gorbachev's refusal to extend press freedoms to 
television during glasnost and perestroika are testimony to the government's belief in the 
power of television. But, it may also signal a break in Russian history. 
Russia has had a rich tradition with the use of text to convey ideas and opinions. This 
skill has been successfully executed by a vast array of talented authors, such as 
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Pushkin, Gogo!, Goncharov and Tolstoy to name but a few. Russia had been primarily a 
text based society, in which the vast assortment of literature flourished. 
The Kremlin's zeal in attempting to reassert state control over television may be a hint 
to a shift in Russia's culture from text and the word, to a more oral and pictorial base. On 
the surface, the government's actions seem to be directed toward establishing uniformity 
in Russian culture. 
Perestroika and glasnost ushered in a new era in the philosophy of the Soviet Union, 
'pluralistic socialism' replaced the monolithic structure which preceded it. Pluralism 
continued in to Yeltsin's reign as the President of the Russian Federation. Recent 
moves by Putin's administration to introduce a 'single information space' within a 
democratic setting would appear to signal the decline of pluralism in Russian culture. In 
place of pluralism would be a 'monolithic democracy.' 347 
347The term 'monolithic democracy' refers to a situation where a country still hold democratic elections 
and is a multi-party state. But, there is little or no tolerance of views which diverge from the 
state's opinion. 
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CHAPTER VII: COMMERCIAL ASPECTS 
7.0 Chapter Objectives 
The value of the media as a tool to achieve political and economic objectives, through 
lobbying the government or public, became apparent in the early to mid 1990's ( see 
Chapter 5 ). As a consequence, independent media came under pressure from the 
oligarchs who sought to use the media as their instrument to lobby the government for 
further advantage. 
There are several issues which I want to argue in this chapter. The first issue involves 
the inherited legacy of the Soviet past. Specifically relating to the development, or rather 
the lack of development of the commercial advertising market. This lack of evolution, 
coupled with the drying-up of state funds weakened the ability of the privately owned 
media to remain financially free. 
The breaking down of media subordination to the state in the later stages of glasnost 
and perestroika ( as embodied in the 1990 media law ) and the eventual collapse of the 
central state power gave the media their editorial freedom. They were no longer the 
agitators and propagandists of the state. In the period immediately following the 
disintegration of communist authority journalists were full of elation and hopes for the 
future. 
Soon the harsh realities of this freedom began to be felt by the media. Under the 
previous regime the media were supported by the state financially. This support was 
now removed, and for the majority they now needed to sustain themselves. Many found 
the transition difficult and simply disappeared in the newly formed market economy. 
Recently, the Kremlin has begun to use money as a means of controlling (or 
attempting to control) TV stations, whose news coverage contradicts what the 
government wants. Loans made to ORT and NTV were recalled in an effort to secure 
stock from these companies. Control over ORT and NTV, added to the State's RTR 
channel, would give a monopoly in the nation wide channel services to the state. 
When the August 1998 crisis rocked the Russian economy, the first cutback made 
was in advertising. Seventy years of state imposed ideology compounded the problem. 
Advertising has been a traditional source of revenue in the West (and pre-Soviet 
Russia), but is poorly developed in contemporary Russia. A large portion of the main 
advertisers were foreign companies. 
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The August 1998 crisis was the worst single economic crisis faced by the newly 
capitalistic economy. A series of crises has weakened the media. State owned media 
are also not immune from the effects of a decade of underfunding by the government. 
Limited state funding which may be available to some media often have perceived or 
real strings attached. To borrow from the state implies an obligation to the state, to 
comply with the government's information requirements. 
Independent private media organisations have also struggled to retain their financial 
and editorial independence. Some media have resorted to inventive ways to remain 
economically viable (read chapter 7.4 for further details). Other media have borrowed 
money or have been bought out by the oligarchs. 
The consequences of borrowing money or selling out to the oligarchs have had a 
profound impact upon their editorial integrity. 348 Soon, some media found themselves to 
be subordinated to their new bosses. Instead of being subordinated to the communist 
state, a new class of business magnate dictated the terms. 
7.1 Effects Of The Economic Crises 
During the era of communist rule the existence of the media was to an extent 
guaranteed. As long as the press followed the state's rules, they received state funding. 
There was little or no concern for the commercial reality of a capitalist economy. The 
transition to a capitalist economy has proved to be a difficult process. A series of 
financial crises has rocked the fabric of the economy, and the effects have been far 
reaching. The media have not been excluded from those effects, leaving them 
vulnerable to financial takeovers. 
7.2 Gusinsky's Media-Most. 
The relationship between Media-Most and the government is a constantly changing 
affair. At present this relationship is under a lot of strain, due to several articles from the 
Media-Most group that contradicted the government line. The government has resorted 
to using various forms of pressure to bring them to heal ( through applying economic 
pressure and use of intimidation, for example ). 
During January 2000, NTV renowned for its independent news stories, came under 
pressure from the government. NTV owes money to the government run 
348By editorial integrity, I refer to the ability of a media organisation to determine its own content. And 
that this content is not dictated to them by another agency, such as mafia, oligarchs or the 
government. 
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Vneshekonombank, these debts were called in by the Kremlin. There had been some 
concern within government circles about news stories that were uncomfortable for 
officials. 
Media-Most is a large organisation and a division of the Most group. Dmitry Ostalsky, a 
spokesman for Media-Most, put the value of this organisation at more than US$2 billion. 
349 On May 5, 2000, St. Petersburg Times article 'uncovered' a growing friction between 
Media-Most and Gazprom. The reason for this tension was a loan of US$211.6 million 
made to Media-Most is in the process of being recalled. Gazprom proposing that 
Media-Most should turn over several portfolios to pay off their debt. 350 
Ostalsky has accused the Kremlin of using Gazprom to exert political pressure on 
Media-Most ( Gazprom is 38% government owned ).351 In order to try and avoid this 
government pressure, NTVannounced that it would sell a minority stake to aU. S. 
mutual fund. 352 
7.3 The Revenue Crisis 
The economic crisis that occurred in Russia in August 1998 had far reaching 
consequences for the wider social, economic and political structures. Media 
organisations were far from immune from the effects of the crisis. Journalists are also 
susceptible to bribery, by virtue of their low wages, to write an article that is requested. 
Under the Soviet system, advertising was not approved of in the highly regulated 
economy. This has had a flow-on effect in Post-Soviet Russia. Advertising market 
development has been retarded and revenue from this source has been scarce. Some 
publications have targeted the more affluent sections of the population, as they are more 
likely to be in the position ( financially ) to purchase the advertised products. 
In March 1997, the estimated combined national advertising market was worth in the 
region of US$1.5 - 1. 7 billion. To put this figure into perspective, it is worth 
approximately a hundredth of the advertising market's value in the United States.353 
Russia's add industry is worth half of Poland's and equivalent to Greece's market. 354 
349zolotov Jr., A., Media-Most Deal Leaked, The St. Petersburg Times, 5 May, 2000. 
www.sptimes.ru/currenUnews/n_media.htm, 6 May, 2000. 
3501bid. 
3511bid. 
352Editorial, NTV's Fate will Show Putin's Style, The Moscow Times, 25 January, 2000. 
3 53 Jones, A., Two steps forward, One step back: Russian journalism in the Post-Soviet era, July 1999, 
p. 11. 
www.adamjones.freeservers.com/russia1.htm, 22 January, 2001. 
354AFP, "Russian Media Chiefs to Fight Bill Barring Commercials,"Moscow, 12 February, 2001. 
Johnson's Russia List# 5089, 13 February, 2001. 
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Video International, which has ties with Mikhail Lesin, controls up to 70% of the 
Russian advertising market. 355 Lesin's company gain prominence during the 1996 
presidential election when it produced Yeltsin's promotional campaign. Officially Lesin 
has stepped down as from his position in Video International, although his exact position 
still remains unclear. 
Media organisations which have relied heavily on the advertising market as a source 
of income have been hard hit since August 1998. Since the 'August Crisis' advertising 
agencies have seen their orders more than halved. The bulk of their advertising revenue 
came from foreign advertisers. Of the US$450 million in revenue from advertising by 
Russia's main television networks in 1997, some 85% was from foreign clients. 356 
Russian Public Television and NTV suffered a 60% reduction in advertising demand.357 
During the first week of February 2001, the State Duma debated and then passed a 
law which would ban publicity spots during television and radio shows. 358 The 
politicians have argued for the law's case by stating that commercials are "an assault on 
the Russian language, that it depresses the have-nots in society and that sanitary 
napkins are trampling the dignity of our women." 359 
Advertising industry representatives have responded to parliament's legal move. Alexei 
Voynov, a legal advisor for the Russian Publisher's Association, argued that "any 
restriction on advertising makes the media more expensive, deprives them of investors 
and forces them to seek sponsors, either the state or commercial sector. In either case 
that reduces the level of independence of the press." 360 
Some media organisations stand to lose a significant share of revenue should the bill 
be passed into law. Voynov estimated that half of all television revenues nationwide and 
85% at a regional level, are derived from advertising. 361 TV6 would lose one third of its 
revenue should the bill be enforced. 362 Parliament's law on advertising has similarities 
to the Bolshevik moves against an independent press during the period 1917 - 1919. A 
355E-mail correspondence with Dr. Ivan Zassoursky, 6 February, 2001. 
356Fossato, F., Russian Media Empires in Decline: How Russia's Financial Crisis Hurts the Media- An 
Analysis, RFE/RL, 16 October, 1998. 
www.rferl.org/nca/speciallrumedia41analysis.html, 2 March, 2000. 
357RFE/RL, Russian Media Facing Cost Crunch, 22 September, 1998. 
www.ejc.nllmn/showresultnews.hmx?2014, 3 April, 2000. 
358
"Russian Media Chiefs to Fight Bill Barring Commercials," op. cit. 
359Latynina, Y., "How Much do Adds Really Cost?, "Moscow Times, 14 February, 2001. 
Johnson's Russia List# 5093, 15 February, 2001. 
36°''Russian Media Chiefs to Fight Bill Barring Commercials," op. cit. 
361 Jbid. 
362Jbid. 
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similar move was initiated by the Bolshevik leadership, which proved to be a death knell 
to the free press. 
Coupled with this decrease in advertising revenue, was an increase in paper 
production costs. The plummeting value of the ruble against the US dollar, made 
materials and printing costs more expensive. 363 The decrease in the value of the ruble 
also had the effect of lessening the value earned from newspaper subscriptions. The 
Moscow Times reported a 70% increase in production costs from August 1998 to 
September 1998.364 
There was also a failure in the distribution network. In a conversation that I had with 
Ken Rogers, of the New Zealand Dairy Board ( April1999 ), he explained that transport 
operators were usually small-time operations that were run on a minimal profit basis. 
The 'August Crisis' forced an increase in costs, which rendered their enterprises 
unprofitable. As a result, most of these operators were forced out of business. This in 
turn caused a failure in the distribution network. Therefore, newspapers were not able 
to be delivered. 
A longer term problem, that of a falling circulation has been the source of concern for 
Russian newspapers. According to a report from RUJ by 1997 there were only 200 
copies of periodicals for every 1000 people in Moscow. The regions circulation rate was 
even worse. 365 A decline in circulation has meant that newspapers have needed to find 
other sources of income. 
In October 1998, the nature of the crisis was serious enough for the state to consider 
monetary intervention, to prop up the ailing media industry. The State Duma considered 
the law "on state support for the mass media. "366 Concessions to the media included 
extended breaks on value-added tax and profit tax for media holdings for an additional 
three years. 367 
The state also gives subsidies to the media, which on a formal basis makes no 
distinction between state-owned or private media. 368 These federal subsidies may 
cover as much as 50 - 90% of the publisher's production and distribution costs. 369 
363www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia4/analysis.html, op. cit. 
364www.ejc.nl/mn/showresultnews.hmx?2014, op. cit. 
365Russia Today, Post-Soviet Russian Newspaper Circulation Plummets, 12 December, 1997. 
www.ejc.nl/mn/showresultnews.hmx?980, 3 April, 2000. 
366www.ejc.nl/mn/showresultnews.hmx?2014, op. cit. 
367 RFEIRL, Russian Media Facing Communist's Scrutiny and Higher Costs, 9 November, 1998. 
www.ejc.nl/mn/showresultnews.hmx?2243, 3 April, 2000. 
36Bwww. internews. ru/books/media1999/56. html, op. cit. 
369tbid. 
There are stringent conditions attached in order for a newspaper to receive the 
subsidies; 
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• Papers must be in the Federal register ten months in advance of the new fiscal year, 
to be considered for the state subsidies. 
• Register eligibility means that the paper must belong to local elected bodies, editors 
or other judicial bodies. If elected local bodies do not run the paper, then the paper 
must be able to produce a recommendation from a district wide public association. 
• The Federal Register permits only one paper from each district to be listed. 
In the event that several papers qualify for subsidies, a committee is formed. 
Representation on this committee consists of local elected councils, local heads of 
self-government ( appointed by local governor ) and Russian Union of Journalists. The 
criterion for selection is the "highest circulation, support of the readers and the widest 
distribution scheme over the territory of the district (town )."370 
A case of abuse of state authority occurred on the 6th of March, 1996, when the 
editor-in-chief of Amurskaya Pravda published an article outlining the paper's 
confrontation with the local authorities. As a consequence of the article, the vice-mayor 
made several demands to the paper insisting that a reply be published on the first page 
and also urging the paper to elect a new editor-in-chief. Should the paper have failed to 
abide by the demands, the vice-mayor made it clear that the state subsidies to the paper 
would stop. 371 
As of August 2000, the Kremlin has been involved in negotiations which involve ORT 
and NTV settling therr debts to the government. The 'August crisis' of 1998 has 
weakened the two organisations, as a result of this crisis revenues dropped ( mostly 
canceled advertrsrng ) and debts which were accumulated could not be easily repaid. 
Although the state owns 51% of ORT, Berezovsky who is the other shareholder, has a 
49% stake in the company. 372 Among the debts accrued by ORTis a US$100 million 
credit. The government is using this to pressure Berezovsky into relinquishing his 
interest. 373 ORTis a large television network, total control would give the Kremlin power 
37°1bid. 
371lbid. 
372Popeski, R. Russia Media Debate Turns to Control of TV Stations, Reuters, August 2, 2000. 
Johnson List #4435, August 3, 2000. 
373Jbid. 
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over two of the country's main networks ( including RTR ). However, the Kremlin is not 
stopping with the planned takeover of ORT, NTV is also on their 'wish list.' 
The US$211 million debt owed by Media-Most to Gazprom, which was described 
earlier in this thesis, is being used as leverage to bring NTV into the Kremlin's control. 
The Financial Times published an article on July 27, 2000, which said that Media-Most 
was soon to be valued in preparation for a sale. Media-Most denied this report, but 
acknowledged that although a deal had not been reached, talks were still in progress. 374 
Media-Most has been the cause of irritation for the government in several recent 
incidents, bringing the organisation into their control would certainly solve some PR 
'problems.' If the Kremlin was to have complete control of ORT and Media-Most, in 
addition to RTR, this would in effect eliminate any serious competitors in the 
dissemination of information ( on the basis of national coverage ) by television 
networks. Putin stated in his July 2000 union address that the oligarchs 'information 
war' was creating a "media of mass disinformation."375 But, is the public's interest the 
only concern that he has in mind while negotiating with Gusinsky and Berezovsky? 
7.4 Some Responses To The Crises 
Media outlets have responded to the financial crises, which have Russian companies 
using a varied assortment of measures. Mostly, the response was to cut back services 
and expense. This partly due to a lack of capital which could be used to carry them 
through a long or protracted economic crisis. Some novel approaches were adopted by 
some media organisations in order to survive. 
In an attempt to decrease expenditure many newspapers reduced the frequency and I 
or volume of their publications. Two regional papers that chose to take this course of 
action were the Chelyabinsk Worker and the Uralsky Rabochy.376 The effect of this 
measure was a decline of non-governmentally provided information, at a time when 
independent information was needed the most. 
Other attempts at cost cutting included canceling subscriptions to national news 
services and the Internet ( including e-mail ). 377 An immediate effect of this action has 
been the isolation of the regional newspapers. The flow-on effect was a diminished 
3741bid. 
3751bid. 
376susiness Development Service, Regional Newspapers and the Russian Crisis, Russian National 
Press Institute, 16 September, 1998. 
3771bid. 
www.nyu.edu/globalbeaUpubs/npi091698.html, 1 March, 2000. 
123 
ability to be able to effectively cover the crisis. By isolating themselves, the regional 
newspapers have retarded a free flow of information between the regions. 
Not all newspapers have responded to the crisis by cutting back services. An 
exception to this rule is the Stavropo/skie Gubernskie Vedomosti. The paper was faced 
with a potentially devastating drop in advertising revenue, as were most papers when 
the August 1998 crisis took effect. 
In 1995 Stavropo/skie Gubemskie Vedomosti opened a commercial retail store. This 
was in response to a demand for barter advertising, which was common in Stavropol. A 
wide range of goods acquired in the process of bartering are offered for sale. The shop 
has developed into a very profitable enterprise. Store profitability has ensured that the 
paper has greater flexibility in accepting barter advertising and has prevented the 
collapse of the advertising business, which has been characteristic of the crisis.378 
Economic crises have the power to destroy an economy. The media are part of the 
economy and are vulnerable. Problems associated with the effects of a long and 
protracted crisis were considered by US President Herbert Hoover in 1928, "free speech 
does not live many hours after free industry and free commerce die. "379 
7.5 Chapter Findings 
Several important trends arise from this short analysis of economic considerations of 
the contemporary Russian media. An influence which stills exerts a measure of control 
on the contemporary situation is the Soviet legacy. The rapid change of one ideology to 
a completely new set of rules has been a difficult transition for the society. 
Under the hierarchical system of the Soviet Union, the media was subordinate to the 
state. Media were specifically the agitators and propagandists of the Communist Party 
( CPSU ). In return for their co-operation the media were given state funding and 
support. Commercial considerations which were faced by their Western counterparts, in 
a market oriented economy were redundant in the planned economy. 
The transition from communism to democracy caught many by surprise, radically 
altering political and economic relationships. Marxist-Leninist principles had guided the 
media through some seventy four years of communist rule. A slow erosion of the 
legitimacy had begun, but the process was sped up by the glasnost. The transparency b 
378tbid. 
379tbid. 
brought by glasnost highlighted deficiencies of the system. In the aftermath of the 
transition, the press adopted the philosophy of the Western media. 
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Marxist-Leninist philosophy still have some profound influences on the Russian media. 
Soviet journalists had been trained to give an interpretation of news and not solely the 
bare information of the story. From a Western perspective, news still contains a bias. 
A second influence which has an indelible effect on the economic viability of the 
contemporary media. In the West, as it was in Imperial Russia, advertising is an 
important source of income. Commercial advertising was construed as an unnecessary 
evil by the Communist hierarchy, and was discouraged. Consequently, the advertising 
market has been poorly developed as a source of income by the present day media. 
The narrow base of advertising subscribers was exposed by the 1998 crisis. Media 
organisations which did to an extent rely on advertising as a source of income suffered 
reductions of up to 60% of their pre-crisis income (see chapter 7.3, The Revenue 
Crisis ). 380 
Other factors, such as a dependency on state funds have combined to weaken the 
financial viability of the media. A lot of media organisations have struggled to adapt and 
survive in the new market oriented environment, many have not survived this transition. 
Those that had survived were in a weakened state, rendering them vulnerable ( some 
out of necessity ) to financial takeover by Russia's major media groupings. 
In effect, one 'tyrant' has been replaced by another. Political interests controlled the 
finances and the editorial policy of the media under the Soviet regime, this regime has 
been replaced by the oligarchy. 
The Kremlin is in the process of re-emerging as a strong controlling influence on the 
media, using financial leverage to attain its goals. Independent media, TV in particular, 
have been targeted. NTV and ORT are the most easily identified victims of a vigorous 
attempt by the state to try and control national television programming content. 
Control of the TV stations is being attempted by calling in loans made to NTV and ORT 
by the government or government controlled companies (such as Gazprom ). TV is still 
an important social engineering tool. In May 1991, a poll was conducted which showed 
that 83% of Russians named TV as their main source of news and information.381 
38
°For further information about advertising, specifically relating to TV, a good book to consult is 
Mickiewicz, E. P., Changing channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia, Durham, 
Duke University Press, 1999. 
381Mickiewicz, E. ( 1999 ), op. cit., p. 230. 
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION 
8.0 Conclusion 
The Russian media gradually earned a freedom of speech, beginning with the first 
cracks appearing in the Soviet system of censorship and the emergence of Socialist 
Pluralism. The key event which witnessed the breaching of the 'wall of secrecy' that 
surrounded the Soviet state was the incident at Chernobyl, in May 1986. Mikhail 
Gorbachev's policy of glasnost delivered and secured media independence from political 
interference, embodied in the 1990 media law. Media organisations were 'truly' free for 
the first time in over 70 years. 
Events surrounding glasnost and the disintegration of the Soviet Union had a profound 
impact upon the media. A crisis of media doctrine ensued, the old Soviet media system 
was no longer apt in the new transition state. Since there was no appropriate model 
available within Russia, some journalists looked to the West for guiding principles. The 
period in which the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred and before the firm 
establishment of political order in the Russian Federation, saw a free flow of ideas 
closing following the principles of the Libertarian ideal model. 
Journalists played a decisive role in the August 1991 coup, by continuing a free flow of 
information relating to the events which were unfolding. This information, which defied 
the attempted news blackout ( by the organisers of the coup ) helped to defeat the coup. 
In the post-coup euphoria, journalists had high hopes for the emergence of the Russian 
media as a viable 'Fourth Estate.' 
The watershed of the demise of freedom of speech, was most visible in the conduct of 
the 1996 presidential elections. This election campaign was waged on an 'us versus 
them' manner. Collusion between the government and the oligarchs ( who own the 
private media assets ) directed the power of the media toward the purpose of ensuring 
President Yeltsin's re-election. The partnership between the oligarchs and Yeltsin was 
aimed at ensuring the existing power structure remained in power. Had the Communist 
Party won the election, the new system would have resulted in a loss of power and 
influence for the incumbents. Additionally, possible repercussions may have 
materialised, from possible abuses of power perpetrated by the oligarchs or Yeltsin. At 
this stage the media believed that they would be able to assert their independence once 
more, after the elections. 
State owned media was manipulated and controlled from the Kremlin. Yeltsin was 
willing to use his influence to hire and fire the heads of the state owned media, which 
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was often the case when he was unsatisfied with electoral results. Failure was laid at the 
feet of those in charge. Yeltsin did not need to bully privately owned media in order to 
get his way. Power and wealth were achieved by influence, by being close to Yeltsin, 
some oligarchs were able to increase their influence through the granting of 'favours.' 
Media-Most's Igor Malashenko's comments, saying that it is better to be a part-time tool 
of propaganda for the Kremlin, rather than face a return to communism reflects the 
private media's belief that this collusion was a temporary arrangement. 
The handling of the elections in 1996 is an example of what is possible in the shaping 
of public opinion, when the media is handled well. Media manipulation was skillfully 
handled, generating further interest in the media by the business elite. The often corrupt 
means by which the oligarchs acquired their assets necessitated a tool with which to 
defend their empires, attack their opponents and to expand their influence in the 
Kremlin. 
Some journalists uphold Yeltsin as a defender of the free press. Certainly, he arranged 
for state support of the media, prevented obvious political interference (such as when 
Primakov was Prime Minister ) and vetoed some potentially repressive pieces of 
legislation (the morality bill for example). But Yeltsin did not need to bully the oligarchs, 
who had mutual interests. The private media gave their support and co-operation to the 
Kremlin of their own free will. Yeltsin also ran the risk of losing important loans from the 
West if he was seen as being too repressive against a 'free' press. 
Yeltsin had originally hinted that he intended to remain as President until the year 
2000. However, the economy's continuing poor performance and Russia's loss of 
prestige on the world stage had forced Yeltsin to seek an heir to the seat of power. He 
needed to find someone who would be agreeable to the public and not be tainted by 
scandal. The fresh face that he found was Vladimir Putin, who he began to groom for 
the office of President. Putin was promoted from obscurity to become head of the FSB, 
successor of the KGB. Soon he was promoted to the role of Prime Minister. After 
Yeltsin's resignation, Putin was elevated to the post of Acting President. 
Heightened manipulation of the press traditionally occurs during electoral periods, the 
1999/2000 elections proved to be no different. In contrast to the 1996 election, in the 
recently held elections the media were split into political factions. Each bloc lobbied for 
their chosen political figure and disseminated kompromat about their political opposition. 
The campaign was not fought on the basis of who had the best to offer, but as character 
assassination progressed, who came out of it least tainted. Phobias rooted in society 
were exploited to get maximum political benefit, such as the spectres of homophobia 
and anti-Semitism. 
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Putin based his political appeal upon the promise of re-establishing a strong central 
state. Part of this promise was to regain central authority in the regions, Chechnya was 
the most openly rebellious region. A carefully managed media campaign was 
orchestrated to gain maximum political mileage from the conflict. The Second Chechen 
War marked a change in the public relationship between the private media and the 
state. 
Among the first restrictions to be imposed were travel restrictions placed on the 
journalists. The handling of accreditation and access to Chechnya was done by the 
military, who had shown their disdain of journalists during the First Chechen War ( 1994 
- 1996 ). Restrictions on accreditation contradicts the Russian constitution, regarding not 
hindering journalists from their work. Examples have been made of journalists, Andrei 
Babitsky attracted the wrath of the authorities for failing to heed the government in 
regard to what he reported. 
There are similarities between NATO's PR campaign during the Kosovo crisis and the 
Russian military's public image. Attempts were made to streamline the content of the 
media through the above mentioned travel restrictions and the use of press 
conferences. Those who broke the official line were punished, usually by the use of 
cutting the media organisation from the information sessions and denying them access 
to the area. One of the limits which has been enforced, is banning the official Chechen 
version of events from the news. 
Language has been used to generate images. The use of rhetoric has been very 
apparent in the Second Chechen War. Emotional language has been used to create a 
duality. The Russian forces image has been generated around the themes of 
righteousness, legitimacy and defenders of the nation. 
The Chechens have been chararcterised as an unthinking mass. Often portrayed as 
violent fundamentalists with a self-serving agenda, Chechens have been typecast as the 
villains. There is little potential for a Chechen reply to the Kremlin's accusations, as it is 
forbidden for the media to cover the views of the Chechen leadership. 
The political nature of the media through the oligarchy's ownership served to divide the 
media. Berezovsky distanced himself from criticising the Kremlin and imposed his will on 
media organisations under his financial control. The split emphasized the control over 
editorial policy by those who owned the media, this notion was raised by Altschul!. 
Bureaucratic obstacles are being used more frequently to try to intimidate and pacify 
the media. Since the collapse of communism, the Russian bureaucratic network 
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( ministries and departments ) have increased in number, as have the number of laws 
and edicts which govern Russian society. Officials seem to be more ready and willing to 
act openly against the media in order to achieve what the Kremlin wants. The Kremlin 
has used excuses such as patriotism, combating terrorism and the defence of the state 
at all costs to try and enforce censorship. These actions tend to support an emergence 
of a new ideology governing the media, the beginning of the authoritarian ideal. 
Mikhail Lesin has emerged as a central figure in the systematic suppression of the 
press's freedom of speech. The founder of Russia's largest advertising agency, Lesin 
has rapidly gained political power. He rose from obscurity in 1996, when he was 
responsible for conducting President Yeltsin's re-election media campaign. Currently, 
Lesin holds a governmental post, as the Minister of Press and Information. His 
ministerial position gives Lesin a great deal of power. Almost at will , he has the power 
to take away publishing/broadcasting licences by issuing an official warning. 
The implications of having a licence removed is different for a television network and a 
newspaper. A newspaper is able to change its brandname, therefore is able to absorb 
having their licence removed. However, the implications for a radio or television station 
is a permanent closure. At present Lesin is acting in the role of a censor. As Ivan 
Zassoursky wrote in his e-mail to me "Lesin right now is overseeing the closure of TV 
and, as a result, stabilisation of the political system." 382 By trying to prevent views which 
are differing from the government's, Lesin is recreating an ideological climate which 
resembles the era of pre-Socialist Pluralism in the Soviet Union. In this environment, 
there was only one permissible ideology and the state seemed to be permanent part of 
Russia's social fabnc. 
Journalists face a variety of threats from business and government. Through the use of 
legal means journalists are prone to law suits, imprisonment, fines, loss of work or 
violence. These tssues create a dilemma to those who work in the media industry, they 
are told to write an expose or face possible retribution. The threat is not a hollow 
promise, over 120 JOurnalists have been killed in the Russian Federation since 1991 and 
this figure is increasmg. Add to this the nature of the media's ownership, and the diverse 
interests of the oligarchs who own the media and two types of censorship emerge. 
Self-censorship patterns have emerged in the modern Russian media. This kind of 
censorship is driven by internal politics, namely the owner of the media outlet dictates 
editorial content, with the aims of protecting and to better their interests. The Russian 
Central Banks newspaper Vremya MN is an example, the scandal surrounding the 
382zassoursky e-mail, op. cit. 
129 
Central Bank depositing Russia's foreign reserves in a dummy account in the British 
Channel Islands was ignored. But, the newspaper entered the debate on the freedom of 
speech issue, defending the government and attacking the Kremlin's opponents. 
Imposed censorship is forced upon the media by an outside agency such as 
government agencies or organised crime. A variety of legal avenues, standover tactics 
or physical endangerment of the journalists are used to quash stories or alter the news. 
The continuing saga of Andrei Babitsky best eptomises this type of censorship. Babitsky 
was arrested in Chechnya in January 2000. His news stories contradicted what the 
government wanted the public to hear. The alleged crimes, at this stage, were aiding the 
Chechen rebels and lacking proper accreditation. Babitsky has since been awarded a 
prize in journalism, he was denied permission to travel to Denmark to collect the award. 
Currently, he is being prosecuted for having false documentation, namely an Armenian 
passport. 
The internet is in the infancy of emerging as a medium which, to a limited extent is able 
to by-pass restrictions which inhibit the conventional media. In this context the internet 
appears as a structural opposition to mass or representational media. 383 In this respect, 
the internet inherits and develops the traditions embodied in the Soviet era samizdat 
publications. Dissemination of information via the internet has one major advantage over 
more conventional means, once the information is posted it is present and cannot be 
removed. As such, the internet's characteristic has the potential to break the 'spiral of 
silence,' in which the conventional press mediums (radio, newspapers and television) 
are entangled. 
A drawback which prevents the internet from achieving further potential, is 
accessibility. Many Russians are simply not in the position, financially, to afford access 
to the net. In effect, this recreates the situation faced by the samizdat publications, 
where only a select or 'privileged' group has access to the material. The government 
has also realised the inherent potential of the internet. Gleb Pavlovsky has begun to 
establish a series of Kremlin aligned websites to give the government's perspective on 
the web. In recent years the Kremlin has embarked on trying to restrict the free-flow of 
ideas. New laws give the FSB and other enforcement agencies wide ranging powers to 
intercept electronically transmitted information. 
Recent attempts by the Kremlin to acquire NTV and Berezovsky's stake in ORT are in 
keeping with the apparent policy of dictating what the public is allowed to hear. 
Television is a very powerful medium for shaping opinion, it has the potential to reach a 
383zassoursky e-mail, op. cit. 
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large audience and requires little effort to absorb the information which is presented. 
Ellen Mickiewicz's latest book ( Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for 
Power in Russia; 1999 ) highlights the political elite's appreciation of the potential of 
television as a powerful tool of propaganda. By taking over NTV and ORT, the Kremlin 
would be in a powerful position to have a direct influence on the content of news over a 
wide area of Russia. All nation-wide channels would be under the Kremlin's control. 
Putin's promise to eliminate the oligarchs as a class and the subsequent struggle 
fought through the media appears to be a conflict over power and privilege. A path has 
been set toward the re-establishment of a strong, centralised state. The old power 
structure (from part of Yeltsin's inner circle) had a powerful and privileged position in 
the state hierarchy. Putin's needs to break or at least 'tame' this power structure if he is 
going to be successful in resurrecting a powerful Russia, because it is potentially a 
capable obstacle in attaining his desired end-goal. Putin, as the 'newly' established 
power, needs to stamp his authority on the political scene. As business and politics are 
inseparable, the oligarchs are affected. 
Putin has uttered assurances on various occasions that he supports the freedom of 
speech and is against the return of totalitarianism. The Russian Union of Journalists has 
a different view of Putin's position, naming him in second place (equal with Ustinov the 
prosecutor general, but behind Lesin, the Minister of the Press ) as top enemies of the 
Russian press. His actions have included personal condemnation of journalists who 
have broken the government engineered version of events ( when Putin called 
Alexander Nikitin a traitor for example ) and personal involvement in legal cases 
involving the nature of journalistic content ( his personal involvement in the Nikitin case 
lasted for more than one year). 
The federal bureaucracy has been more active in the interruption or suppression of the 
media's news gathering activities since Putin's accession to power. Putin's promise of 
destroying the oligarchs as a class seems to be only partially fulfilled. Some oligarchs 
have fallen from favour, such as Berezovsky and Gusinsky, but they have been 
replaced by other oligarchs, Potanin for instance. Russia's oligarchs rely on influence to 
achieve money and power, without it their empires may well collapse. The shift of power 
and influence among the oligarchs has seen an information war erupt between the 
various financial groupings and the government. 
Gusinsky, who had fallen out of favour with the Kremlin some time ago aligned himself 
as political opposition. When the government began to put pressure on Media-Most two 
significant events occurred. Firstly, the oligarchs, usually a disjointed collection of 
interests united to protect one of their own. The oligarchs united under the possibility of 
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a threat to their way of being, usually they fought over the potential offerings of the 
privatisation drive. Their open letter challenged Putin on the true nature of his reforms. 
The second significant event was the government was more willing to resort to the use 
of armed police raids on the offices of their opposition in the media, in an attempt to 
silence dissension and opposition. Since the police raids on Media-Most, the offices of 
the Glasnost Defence Foundation have also been raided in a similar fashion. Possibly 
setting a precedent in the government's handling of 'difficult' media. Previously the 
government hid behind the enforcement of laws, such as the political advertising laws to 
silence 'rogue' media, by revoking their broadcasting or publishing licences. Luzhkov's 
TV-Tsentrwas threatened with having its broadcasting licence revoked. However, some 
prominent legal cases have been brought before the courts, challenging the 
government's actions. TV-Tsentrwon one such case, thus setting back the 
government's plans and forcing a rethink of strategy. Media-Most's struggle for 
independence from Gazprom seems to have some government involvement. The 
Kremlin is in the process of buying a larger stake in Gazprom, which would give the 
opportunity to gain further involvement in the process of gaining control over NTV. 
The media are not entirely blameless for their current predicament. With regard to the 
increasing number of law suits being filed against media organisations and journalists, 
the Russian Union of Journalists blames the standard of journalism as allowing this to 
happen. Rules governing the operations of the media have changed, and the media 
were forced to make a profit or go out of business. In order to boost circulation and 
ratings, a breed of tabloid journalism emerged, surviving on the premise that 'sensation 
sells.' This kind of journalism has a focus on people and personality, the event itself is 
left somewhat neglected. 
A series of recessions have left the media in a vulnerable position also. Media 
agencies have sought funds from private and governmental organisations. By allowing 
this investment to occur, the new financial partner does have a right to dictate some part 
of the editorial content. In a round table discussion at Moscow State University in the 
first week of February 2001, the General-Secretary of the Russian Union of Journalists 
gave estimates of income and expenditure of the Russian media. He estimated that the 
combined revenue of the media are in the region of US$1 - 1.5 billion, where as their 
combined production costs amount to US$1 0 billion. 384 These figures beg the question, 
from where does the rest of the money come? 
384zassoursky e-mail, op. cit. 
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A strong connection exists between the Russian media and politicians or 'political 
investors.' Those who seek to gain political power or influence seek to use media to 
achieve their ends. The influence of the media was lent by the oligarchs to Yeltsin (and 
later, Putin ) in exchange for access to privatised property. This proved to be extremely 
profitable for the oligarchs, despite the fact that the media continued to lose money. 
During the period immediately after the fall of communist power, the Kremlin was in a 
weakened situation and was unable to dictate its will. As a result a diffusion of power to 
the regions occurred. Over the past decade the central state has increased its authority 
and has become more willing to flex their power. Putin's rise to power, his promises of 
restoring Russia's pride and position on the world stage has signaled an intention to take 
back power from the regions and a return to a strong centralised state. To prepare for 
such, it is necessary to have a united voice to communicate to the public and try and 
shape their opinion. A free and independent media have no place ( from the state's point 
of view) in such a society. 
A 'new speak' has emerged from the Second Chechen War, that measures must be 
taken 'in defence of the state,' at all costs. One of these costs appears to be the loss of 
the freedom of speech. Mikhail Lesin's interference in the freedom of speech is 
indicative of the zeal shown by some bureaucrats in the pursuit of the Kremlin's 
ascension to power. 
Government funds which have been used to 'prop up' the media have strings. To meet 
the criteria for these funds, certain unwritten rules need to be understood. The Kremlin 
have been using such leverage in the past. By accepting such financial aid some media 
have found themselves under an obligation to accept what the Kremlin dictates to them. 
The government's interference in driving the recall of loans to private firms, although 
politically motivated (to silence criticism of the Kremlin's activities), is quite within the 
bounds of the law. Media-Most's large scale borrowing to keep them financially viable 
has lead to their vulnerability. 
As the recent issue of Time magazine (January 15, 2001, pp. 22- 23) states, the 
problems associated with issues surrounding press freedoms and the communist legacy 
affect a greater area than the Russian Federation. The state has tried to influence and 
meddle with the mass media, the main point to the interference is aimed at eliminating 
pluralism from the media. Aidan White, from the Brussels based International Federation 
of Journalists said, "The crisis[ ... ] is symptomatic of a region-wide problem, there is not 
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enough respect for pluralist broadcasting systems. What we are seeing is a political 
culture refusing to change." 385 
385Time Magazine, January 15,2001, Purvis, A., Prague Winter, p. 23. 
Print Media 
- "Express-gazeta" 
- "Belorusskaya gazeta" 
-"Antenna" 
-"Expert" 
- "Komsomolskaya Pravda" 
Publishing House 
- "Izvestia" Publishing House 
- "Segodnya-Press" 
Holding Company 
- "Prime-TASS" 
- "Russky Telegraf' 
Appendix 1: 
lnterros ("') 
Vladimir Potanin 
Media Holdings 
Electronic Media 
- "Prime" News Agency 
- Radio "Evropa Plus" 
- "Alta" Advertising Agency 
- "Avtoradio" 
- "Severny Gorod" TV & 
Broadcasting 
- "Puis" TV & Broadcasting 
lnterros (includes more than 30 companies) 
with approx. US $38 billion in assets and they 
had US$ 16 billion in sales in 1996- nearly 10 
percent of Russia's GDP. 
SOURCES: 
www. rferl.org/nca/special/rufinance/oneximbank. html, 4/3/2000. 
www.interros.ru,25/2/2001. 
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Key Holdnings & Signature Companies 
- Jntenational finance Corporation (MFK) 
- Balt-ONEXIM Bank 
- Renaissance Capital 
- Norilsk Nickel (51% voting control) 
- Zil Auto Works (26%) 
-North West River Shipping (25%) 
-Kuznetsk Aluminium (25%) 
- Oktyabrskaya Railroad (25%) 
- Svyazinvest Tele-
communications (25.%) 
- Sidanko Oil (85%) 
- Novolipetsk Steel (15%) 
- LOMO Precision Optics (40%) 
-Perm (aircraft); Motors (27%) 
- Centra! Army ice hockey 
and basketball teams (75%) 
-Plus others 
Print Media 
- "7 Days" Publishing House 
- "Segodnya" Daily 
- "ltogi" Weekly 
- " 7 Days" Entertainment 
Magazine 
- "Karavan" Entertainment 
Magazine 
- "Obshchaya Gazeta" 
- "Novaya Gazeta" 
- "Smena" 
SOURCES: 
Appendix 2: 
Most Group 
Vladimir Gusinsky 
Media Holdings 
Media Most 
Electronic Media 
-NTV 
- TNT T elenetwork 
- Radio Ekho Moskvy 
-Bonum Satellite Operator 
www. rferl. org/nca/special/rufinance/most. htm1,4/3/2000. 
www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/feb98/bigseven.htm,25/2/2001. 
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Key Holdnings & Signature Companies 
- MOST Investment 
- MOST Development 
- MOST Engineering 
- Pharmaceutical Companies 
-Others 
Appendix 3: 
LogoVAZ 
Boris Berezovsky (*) 
Media Holdings 
Print Media Electronic Media 
- "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" - ORT 
-"Novye lzvestya" Daily -TV-6 
- "Ogonyok" Weekly 
- " Matador" Entertainment 
Magazine 
Berezovsky is often allied with Aleksandr Smolensky (SBS-Agro Bank) 
~=md Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Menatep,Rosprom). 
SOURCES: 
www.rferl.org/nca/special/rufinance/logovaz.html,4/3/2000. 
www. worldbank. org/html/prddr/trans/feb98/bigseven. htm,25/2/2001. 
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nature Com anies 
- AvtoVAZ Bank 
- Obedinionny Bank 
- Oil Finance Company 
- Sibneft Oil 
- Aeroflot 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOK - BASED REFERENCES: 
Akchurin, M., Red Odyssey: A Journey Through the Soviet Republics, New York, 
Harper Collins, 1992. 
137 
Alatas, S. H., Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, 
Athenaeum Press ltd., 1990. 
Editors Borchert, J., Leitner, S. & Stolz, K., Jahrbuch fur Europa und Nordamerika-
Studien 3: Politische Korruption, Opladen, Leske und Budrich, 2000. 
Clark, W. A., Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom: Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965 - 1990, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1993. 
Coleman, F., The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire, New York, St. Martins Press, 
1996. 
Constitution watch: Russia, East European Constitutional Review, Volume 9, No.3, 
Summer 2000, pp. 33 - 38. 
Cox, T., From Perestroika to Privatisation:The Politics of Property Change in Russian 
Society 1985- 1991, Aldershot, Avebury, 1996. 
Editors Curran, J. & Park, M-J., De-Westernising Media Studies .. London, Routledge, 
2000. 
Editors Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S., Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd Edition, 
Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2000. 
Ellis, F., From Glasnost to the Internet: Russia's New lnfosphere, London, 
MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999. 
Epstein, M., Genis, A. & Vladiv-Giover, S. Russian Postmodemism: New Perspectives 
on Post-Soviet Culture, New York, Berghahn Books, 1999. 
European Bank For Reconstruction And Development, Transition Report 1999: Ten 
years of Transition, London, The Stationery Office Publications Centre, 
1999. 
138 
Editor Gardner, C., Media, Politics and Culture: A Socialist View, London, Macmillan 
Press, 1979. 
Geoghegan, V., Utopianism and Marxism, London, Methuen, 1987. 
Gill, G., Russia's Weak State: What is to be Done?, Australian Slavonic and East 
European Studies Volume 14. Numbers 1-2: 99- 132, 2000. 
Editors Graffy, J. & Hosking, G. A., Culture and the Media in the USSR Today, London, 
Macmillan Press, 1989. 
Harper, T., Moscow madness: Crime, Corruption, and One Man's Pursuit of Profit in the 
New Russia, New York, McGraw Hill, 1999. 
Editors Heidenheimer, A. J., Johnston, M. & LeVine, V. T., Political Corruption: A 
Handbook, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1989. 
Hingley, R., The Russian Mind, London, The Broadley Head, 1978. 
Hoover, S. M. & Lundby, K., Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture, Thousand Oaks, 
Sage Publications, 1997. 
Keane, J., The Media and Democracy, Cambridge ( MA ), Blackwell, 1991. 
Editors Kelly, C. & Shepherd, D., Russian Cultural studies: An Introduction, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Kenez, P. A., History of the Soviet Union From the Beginning to the End, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, Ellis, F., The media as a social 
engineer, pp. 193 - 246. 
Editor Lazzarini, E., Modem Encyclopedia of Russian, Soviet and Eurasian History-
Volume 2, Gulf Breeze, Academic International Press, 1997. 
Ledeneva, A. V., Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal 
Exchange, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Levitas, R., The Concept of Utopia, London, Philip Allan, 1990. 
Lotman, Ju, M., Uspenski, B. A. & Shukman, A (Editor), The Semiotics of Russian 
Culture, University Of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1984. 
139 
McNair, B., Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media, London, Routledge, 1991. 
McNair, B., An Introduction to Political Communication, London, Routledge, 1999. 
McQuail, D., Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, London, Sage Publications, 
1994. 
Michiewicz, E. P ., Media and the Russian Public, New York, Praeger Publishing, 1981. 
Michiewicz, E. P., Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia, 
Durham, Duke University Press, 1999. 
Moynahan, B., The Russian Century: A History of the Last Hundred Years, London, 
Pimlico, 1997. 
Editors Nelson, J. M., Tilly, C. & Walker, l., Transforming Post-Communist Political 
Economies, Washington D. C., National Academy Press, 1997. 
Editor O'Neil, P. H., Post-communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, London, Frank 
Cass and Co. Ltd., 1997. 
Pearson, R., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, New York, St. Martins Press, 
1998. 
Petro, N. N., The Rebirlh of Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1995. 
Editors Pravda, A. & Zielonka, J., Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: 
International and Transnational Factors, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2000. 
Editors Priban, J. & Young, J., The Rule of Law in Central Europe: The Reconstruction 
of Legality, Constitutionalism and Civil Society in the Post-communist 
Countries, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 1999. 
Rose- Ackerman, S., Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and 
Reform, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Ryazanova- Clarke, L. & Wade, T., The Russian Language Today, London, Routledge, 
1999. 
140 
Simis, K., USSR: Secrets of a Corrupt Society, London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1982. 
Sakawa, R., Russian Politics and Society, London, Routledge, 1996. 
Time Magazine, Purvis, A., Prague Winter, pp. 22-23, Auckland, Comprint Ltd., 
January 15, 2001. 
Tunstall, J. & Palmer, M., Media Moguls, London, Routledge, 1991. 
Urban, M., Politics of Identity in Russia's Transition, Slavic Review, pp. 733- 765, Fall 
1994. 
Uspenski, B. A., Ivanov, V. V., Toporov, V. N., Pjatigorskij, A.M. & Lotman, J. M., 
Thesis on the Semiotic Study of Cultures (as Applied to Slavic Texts), 
Tartu, University of Tartu Press, 1998. 
ELECTRONIC - BASED REFERENCES: 
http://andersn.stanford.edu 
http://home .swipnet.se/-w-1 0652/robber/berez. html 
http://home. swipnet.se/-w-1 0652/robber/gusinsky. html 
http://ihr.org 
www.coe.fr 
www.cpj.org 
www.ejc.nl 
www. geocities. com/zassoursky 
www.glasnet.ru 
www.heritage.org 
www.ifex.org 
www.internews.ru 
www. interros. ru 
www. militarynews. ru 
www. moscowtimes. ru 
www.mother.com 
www.nandotimes.com 
www.newsday.com 
www.nobribes.org 
141 
www.npi.ru 
www.nytimes.com 
www.rferl.org 
www.russiajournal.com 
www. russiabynet.com 
www. russiatoday. com 
www.smi.ru 
www.sptimes.ru 
www.strana.ru 
www. telegraph .co. uk 
www.washingtonpost.com 
www.worldbank.org 
142 
